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EXECVE SUMMARY
1. This study on the Korea financial sector has been undertaken at
the request of the Government of Korea (GOK) through the Ministry of
Finance (MOF) with the close cooperation of the Bank of Korea (5OK). The
need for a more robust financial system that could effectively meet the
requirements of a growing and increaslagly complex economy is well
recognized by the Korean authorities, the major market participants, and
acadmicians. The finanial aysV in Korea during the last three decades
has been used principally to supm mt the country's industrial policy, but
the authorities desire a fundameutal reorientation of the system to make
it more market oriented to better serve the requirements of a complex
Korean economy, vhich is the tenth largest economy In the world.
2. The approach taken by the GOK s0 far haa been one of a sttep-by-
stepa reform reflecting the Government's cautiousness. Deregulation plans
have been adjusted from time to time to counter undesirable macrosconomic
developments, *nd these plans have generally lacked a specific timetable.
As a result, the O0K's plans are perceived by domestic market participants
and the international community (especially Korea's major trading
Partners) as being too halting and lacking credibility. Therefore, the
gM decided to issue a blueprint for the liberalization of the fi. -cial
sector and for market opening by early 1993. In this context, the HOF
made a formal request to the Bank in April 1992 to assist the GOK in the
preparation of such a blueprint. To get the best advice and fullest
domestic support, the 0OK has also sought the advices of three key donestic
institutions (tbe Korea Development Institute or KDI, the Korea Securities
Research Institute or KSMI, and the Korea Institute of Finance or KIF) and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A Bank aission visited Korea in
September/October 1992 to conduct the study. The mission greatly
benefftted from the contributions made by the three Korean research
institutions, 50K, and the NOF.
3. This report focuses on the following topics on which the GOK has
specifically sought advice: (i) the money market; (ii) monetary policy
and deregulation of Interest rates; (iii) directed credit (policy loans);
(iv) capital account opening; (v) bank supervision and prudential
regulations; and (vi) the bond market. Since the conduct of monetary
policy and the role of the central bank are closely linked to most of the
above topics, tbey are also covered. A brief discussion of the financial
system and recent macroeconomic developments are presented at the
beginning of the report to put the financial sector reforms in the context
of the economy. Key points on each of the above mentioned subjects are
summarized bel. The proposed reforms, the rationale behind them, and
their sequencing are also provided.
Me CAr*d of don F_Id Sedto
4. During most o! Korea's development process, the financial sector
has been viewed as an instrument for accelerating growth in the real
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econowy. This was tru. especially during the 19708, which saw a return to
low and often ngSativO real interest rates. The function of the financia1
systes was &an as one primrily to mobilize resources and to allocate
those funds to sectors and activities whose growth was being promoted by
the Goverrment. In addition to intelast rate controls, this strategy was
implemented through government ownership and control of commercial banks
and detailed credit allocation schemes. However, It did not contribute to
the development of the financial sector commensurate with the vitallty of
Korea's real econa.y. By the early-1980s, the Imbalance between the
financial and the real sectors of the economy were obvious to Korean
policy makers. In response, a gradual program of financial reforms w*s
LnitLated and has continued throughout the past decade.
5. Between 1986 and 1988, GNP graw at an average annual rate of
over 12 percent, due mainly to export growth, which averaged about 20
percent annually. This led to large current account surpluses durLng that
period. In 1988, the current account surplus amounted to US$14.2 billion,
or 8.2 percent of GNP. The rapid expansion of exports was brought about
by the sharp decline in oil prices, the depreciation of the Won against
both the yen and the dollar, and accelerated economic growth ln the OCD
economies (the main markets for Korean exports). The manufacturing sector
grew more rapidly In each of these three years, outstripping the growth of
the service sector. Much of the foreign exchange surplus accumwlated
during 1986-88 went towards reducing the stock of external debt, which
fell by end-1988 to about US$31 billion (or about 18 percent of ONP).
6. Since then, economie growth has been less spectacular, with GUI
growth of only 6.8 percent in 1989. The growth rose thereafter. However,
th main soure of groth Ln the meriod sjne 1989 has been fjom doLs
rather than exnort demand. Since 1989 (and including the first half of
1992), the growth of private and public consumptlon has been faster than
GNP growth. From 1989 to 1991, the contrlbution of net exports to GOM
growth was negative. Exports (in Won terms) actually fell in 1989 and
recovered only modestly in 1990 and 1991. Meanwhile, average import
growth in 1989-91 was over 15 percent. These trends in the external
sector appear to have been reversed in the fLrst half of 1992, with
exports growLng at over 12 percent and imports rising by only 7.5 percent.
Domestically, consumption growth reuained strong in the first half of
1992. GNP growth in this period slowed to an annual rate of 6.9 percent
(from 8.4 percent in 1991), mainly because investment grew at less than 3
percent, due to the imposition of controls on construction activity. GNP
growth duriag th. second half slowed further to an annual rate of 3
percent due to the sharp decline In investment.
7. As a result of these trade developments, the current account
balance shrank sharply in 1989 and shifted into deficit in 1990. Although
the deficit widened to about US$9 billion in 1991 (or about 3 percent of
GDP), it narrowed in the first half of 1992, and for the entire year is
expected to be about half its 1991 level. These changes in the current
account balance had their counterparts in a widening savings-iiventment
gap in 1990 and 1991. However, this reflected not falling domestic
savings rates (para. 9), but buoyant investment. A sharp increase in
consumptlon also kept import growth hlgh. During thls period, the
construction sector replaced manufacturing as the fastest growing sector
of the economy.
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8. The nifferences In macroeconomic outcomes during this period,
relative to 1986-88, were partly due to a less favorable external
enwironment. The eal effectiv exchang2 atemrc4p &1=8t 2
=ercent b eniM 197Z ad 189. and whle it denreciated slihtlv in l1990.
its Apnreciation again in 1I9 br et It bwak to its 1989 level.
However, the more significant changes occuuned domestlcally. As polltical
liberalixation proceeded, wage demands and labor dlsputes escalated,
leading to sharply higher unit labor costs in Korean manufacturlig that
hurt lts wompetitlveness In export markets. Moreover, consumptlon
expenditures (particularly on durables) and houslng construction rose
rapidly, compensating for their repression ln earlier years.
9. 'n terms of payrings behavior. the noteworthj change that
occurred duing the 1980s was the increase ln the gross national savings
rate which averaged 36 Mercent durinq 1988.91. Even more dramatlc has
been the behavior of household savings which almost tripled between 1980
and 1991, mainly propelled by sharp licome growth. The other source of
hlghor savligs has been the increase ln the corporate savings rate whLch
rose from about 10 percent through the 1970s and 1980. to about 17 percent
during 1988-1990. These remarkably hlgh savings rates, combined with the
constancy of goverrment savings, mean that contlnued hlgh real interest
rates in Korea cannot be attributeo to a lack of capital. An alternative,
and more likely explanation, is that 'ese rates reflect the inefficiency
of the financial system in intermedia:-ig. domastlc savings.
The Fhudl System
10. Structure of the System. During the 1970s, the deepenLig of the
financial sector in Korea was hampered by negative real Literest rates.
As a result of interest rate reforms and the fall in inflation, financial
sector development accelerated in the early to mid-1980s. The ratio of
broad aoney (X2) to GNP rose from 32 percent in 1979 to 41 percent by
1990. Broader measures of financial depth rose even more dramatically.
,The ratio of M3 to GNP has increased continuously from 1979 onwards,
almost tripling by 1991. Domestic financial assets as a share of GNP have
almost doubled over this period. The expansion of financial assets during
the 19808 also reflects the growing role of securities markets and the
introduction of new financial assets. However, despite the deepening of
Korea's financial sector during the last decade, the controls that remain
on financial sector activity left it behind other East Asian countries
such as Malaysia and Thailand, and substantially behind selected OECD
countries (USA, Japan, Germany) and Taiwan, China (Chapter II).
11. The more rapid growth in M3 compared to M2 reflects the
expansion of non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFis). The NBFIls (such
as short-term finance companles, Investment trust companies, insurance
companies, and mutual savings companies) were encouraged by the GOK to
mobilize funds from the curb markets (which had grown when real interest
rates were negative during the 1970s) into the organized financial sector.
The NiBFs were allowed to operate relatively freely both on the asset and
liability sides. The curb financial market has to a large extent been
effectively Integrated into the organLsed sector. The bulk of its
business, both on the deposit and lending side, has been taken over by
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33BF1s. The main beneficiaries of this integration have been large savers
who now enjoy significantly hlgher returns on funds invested in NBFIs than
they did before on non-financial assets or in the banking system.
12. The tight control of the domestic banking system through rigid
interest regulations (both on deposits and loans) and the de facto
deregulation of the NBFIs bha'e led to a rapid decline in the contribution
of banks in the financial sector. Administrative control through window
guidance has also hampered the development of the management cf domestic
banks and has placed them at a comparative disadvantage via-a-vis forei3n
banks and NBFIs. This decline in the relative importance of the banking
system has advers3ly affected the ability of the BOK to conduct monetary
policy (Chapter IV). The NBMIs are not as constrained as the banks by
monetary tightening (which uses M2 as the intermediate target).
Consequently, corporate borrowers have turned to NBFIs during periods in
which bank credit has been squeezed. 6iven that Korea is now the tenth
largest In the world, it needs a banking sector which is efficient and
capable of operating lobally side by side with the Korean conglomerates.
Therefore, a revitalization of the banking sector would be beneficial to
the economy.
13. Another structural change in the financial system that occurred
during the 1980s was the growth of the market segments that are not as
tightly subject to interest rate controls--in particular, the markets for
commercial paper and corporate bonds. The share of financial savings held
in the form of securities of various kinds increased from about 21 percent
(ir gross terms) ln 1979 to about 30 percent in 1991. Despite the steps
taken towaris deregulating interest rates on bank loans, deposit rates
have remained low and tightly controlled. As a result, different
borrowers are charged widely-varying interest rates on borrowed funds,
even for investments that involve the same degree of risk. Such
segmentation implies that many projects that deserve financing are
rationed of credit while others with lower rates of return are financed.
Money Market
14. The money market is one of the most important components of the
financial market pla¢- It Is the building block of a sound capital
market. The importance of developing an efficient money market (both
inter-bank transactions and the issue and trading of money market
instruments) in the context of financial reform is due to the fact that it
allows the central bank to influence market interest rates by easing or
tightening the access of the money market to its resources. In other
words, indirect mouetary control procedures (when direct monetary controls
or regulated interest rate policies are abandoned) function well if the
money market is well developed and is significantly diversified with a
broad range of money market instruments. The central bank can influence
short-term interest rates in the inter-bank market or other segments of
the money market by adjusting the supply of reserves to the system through
the purchase or sale of government securities or similar instruments.
15. Korea has a reasonably well functioning money market, but lts
potential is not fully realized because of interest ratb controls and
*ocessOv administrative intervention. In Korea, the money market
developed in the 19609 wlth the issuance of Monetary StabiLWzation Bonds
(1SBs) in 1961 and Treasury Bills (TBs) it 1967. In addition to these
Instruments, it now embraces a wide range of financial instruments:
Commercial Paper (CP), Negotiable Certificates of Deposit (CDs) in 1974,
Repurchase Agreements (RPs), Bankers Acceptances (BAs) in 1989, end the
Call Money Narket (inter-bank market). The Government made a conscious
effort to develop this mdrket to brLng the curb market into the organized
financial system with the promuigation of the Short-term Financing
Business Act, &ad the establishment of itvestment and finance comjaides
and the call transaction center in the Korea Bankers' Association. The
largest segments of the money market are call money, commercial paper and
"SBs.
16. The money market in Korea has bsen growing in size and diversity
in the lsst few years, paving the way for bolder action to liberalize
interest rates. However, it has remaxned much less competltive, segmented
and tightly controlled. Of all the individual fsgments of the money
market, the inter-bank market has been the most competitive and has
functioned .ith a minimum of restrictions, but its relative size is small.
The NSBs are the largest in volume and can be useful in conducting open
market operations, but their sale in the primary market has been managed
and the interest rate on them has been lower than market rates (Chapter
IV).
17. A well developed money market is essential for the monetary
authorities to influence the level and structure of market interest rates.
Until 1988, as observed in Chapter IV, the use of indirect monetary
control procedures was minimal in Korea. This was because the. BOE. as wtl1
as the NOF were setting, through regulations and rules, maximm interest
rates on each type of deposit and loan of banks, and controlling the
volume of bank credit through moral suasion and/or other means. Even
after the ceilings on interest rates were relaxed or removed in 1988,
informal window guidance took their place to achieve the same results as
the formal regulations as far as the levels of market interest rates were
concerned.
18. The GOK should take concrete steps to further develop the money
market. These 3hould lnclude: (i) full liberalization of interest rates
and introdurtion of rlsk free market based instruments. This could be
achleved either through issuance of the MSBs at market rates as they fall
due for refinancing or through issuance of new treasury bills in
sufficient volume and varied maturities to enable development of a vibrant
secoudary market. COXQ hould consider vancing the lifting of controls
on NSBs from 1997 to 1994. The impact on the profitability of the BOK and
the issue of policy loans need to be considered concurrently; (ii)
delegation of the function of interest rate setting, pricing, and choice
of instruments to the market participants; (iii) improvement in the
clearing and settlement system for money market instruments; (iv)
provision of on-line information on money market instruments to market
participants and public; and (v) strengthening of the credit rating
agencies and enabling them to rate the instruments based on credit risk of
the issuers. These recommndations are elaborated in Chapter III.
-vi-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Montetry Foley
19. Monetary policy in Korea has been ineffective since the
automatic policy loans provided by the S!K on behalf of the GO0 created
reserve money and therefore rendered monetary poliey ineffective. The
interest rate subsidy on such loans also adversely affected monetary
policy management. As a result, the ability of the BOK to conduct
monetary policy i8 very much constrained. The monetary policy objectives
in Korea had dual goals--price stability and economcd growth. However,
because of the possible conflict between them, a balance between the
objectlves has been maintained by occasionally switching the targets.
20. K2. one of the measures of broad money, has been the frequently
used intermediate target, while the monetary base has been the operating
target. These targets are reviewed continually to take into account
unanticipated developments in the economy. The targets have been within
the desired range more often than not, though of late. K2 as a monetary
policy target has lost much of its significance due to the emergence of
substitutes for K2 from the operations of DBFIs.
21. At present, the BOK has basically three indirect instruments of
monetary policy--rediscount policy, RRs, and a somewhat limited open
market type of operations. These have been operated in the past in
combination with other direct instruments of control, such as ceilings on
bank credit and Interest rates and window guidance of one type or another.
The rediscount policy has not been very effective, not least because the
rediscounts directed towards liquidity management were a small part of
total rediscounts, apart from the adoption of generally concessional
rediscount rates charged on bank access to the BOK. Reserve Requirements,
though potentially a powerful instrument, are less frequently used by the
BOK, as they have tended to have an adverse Impact on the portfolio of
banks and the liquidity of the financial markets. It also has less
flexibility relative to open market operations, which have been resorted
to on a limited basis in recent years.
22. The effectiveness of open market operations in Korea is
attenuated by the practice adopted by the authorities of offering interest
rates on paper such as NSBs used in open market operations which were
substantially lower than market interest rates. This has discouraged the
holding of MSBs on a wide scale, an4 consequently the development of a
secondary market for these bonds, essential for effective open market
operations. Besides, there is a lack of volume and diversity of paper
used in open market transactions as the Government's issuance of Treasury
bills is lioited and there are no other comparable instruments except the
IlS^s.
23. If monetary policy is to succeed in Korea in achieving its
monetary targets of K2 or any variant of it, it should be able to
influence the behavinr of the money multiplier. This is because K2
depends more on the changes in the money multiplier than on changes in the
monetary base. Of all the monetary instruments, open market operations
possesses a grenter power to change the opportunity cost of holding
currency by targeting monetary base as well as interest rates as th&
intermediate target, and by shifting the emphasis between the two in
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accordance with the needs of emergitg situations, as amply demonstrated by
the experience of both developed and developing countries which switched
in recent years to indlrect monetary policy instruments.
24. Korea would also do well to move more towards indirect monetary
policy i#struments. The reaons for this are the following: (L) banks
and financial markets have learned to avoid direct monetary control
procedures. An attempt to impose new controls would lead to new
distortions; (LI) the use of direct controls imposes costs on banks in the
form of a loss (: competitiveness vis-a-vis NBFIs or foreign banks. As
entioned earl ', A robust banking r -m is essential for Korean trade
and overseas . e -a. ins; (il) the co*..eexity of financial markets makes
it very diffif..- "or the monetary authorities to exercise direct control
effectively; (ivi with current account transactions being largely
liberalized (para. 38), money supply variations have been more frequent,
which do not lend themselves to direct monetary controls; and (v) with a
move towards a flexible exchange rate regime, the monetary authorities can
be in a better position to control money supply through resorting to
indirect monetary control procedures.
25. For indirect monetary policy instruments to be used, it is a
precondition that interest-rates on banks assets and liabilities hould be
completely deregulated. Most of the concerns about interest rate
deregulation expressed in official and semi-official quarters in Korea
have less validity at the present stage of Korean development and in the
context of the need to integrate Korean domestic financial markets with
the global economy. From this point of view, the government policy of
September 1991 to deregulate interest rates is a step in right direction.
However, its implementation in the first stage has not been perceived by
market participants as being real since formal regulations have been
replaced by informal window guidance. The deregulation plan would acquire
greater credibility and sustainability if the authorities could rearrange
sequencing of deregulation measures with specific dates which are not
conditional upon certain macroeconomic parameters.
Ced Allocato Systm
26. As discussed earlier, the Government has used the financial
sector to support its industrial policy through the allocation of credit
to selected sectors and enterprises in the form of policy loans at below
market rates. At the end of 1991. total pollcy loans amounted to V 60
trillion, or 39.7 percent of total domestic credit and the assets of KDB
and KEXIM. The share of policy credit climbed to 44.4 gercent in 1987 and
has gone down slowly. The ratio of policy loans to total loans of banks,
which jumped to 60 percent at the end of the 1970s from a 40 percent level
in the early 1970., declined to the 50 percent level in the mid-1980s.
27. The main sources of funds for policy loans consist mainly of:
Deposit Money Banks (DMBs), NBF1., and the Government. In 1991, the DMB.
accounted for 53.0 percent of total policy loans followed by the NBFIs
(40.7 percent) and the Government (6.3 percent). Commercial banks
(deposit money banks and local banks) are required to extend 35 percent of
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the increment in their loans from banking funds to SMHE. This ratio is 25
percent in the case of foreign bank branches which do not make use of the
BOK' rediscount window. The requirement for NBFIs is higher but the
interest rates are not regulated as is the case for the commercial banks.
Policy loans from government funds are mainly handled by the specialized
banks (Korea Development Bank, Korea Housing Bank, Industrial Bank of
Korea and the Korea Export-Import Bank).
28. The composition of policy loans of Deposit Money Bansd as of the
end of 1991 and their share in total loans was as follows: housing (U 9.7
trillion, 48 percent), for equipment of export industries (W 3.2 trillion,
16 percent), agricalture (W 2.3 trillion, 12 percent), foreign trade (W
2.2 trillion, 11 percent), special equipment loans (W 0.9 trill':n, 4
percent), fishery (W 0.5 trillion, 3 percent), livestock (W 0.6 trillion,
3 percent), and rural private debt subsidization (W 0.4 trillion, 2
percent). Since 1987, export financing has been phased out to a large
extent, but increased credit to the KDB and the KEXIM has more than
compensated for the reduction. Policy loans to the agricultural and
housing sectors and temporary subsidized credit for facility investment
have also contributed to the expansion of policy loans.
29. The BOK supplies credits to banking institutions either by
rediscounting commercial bills or by extending loans against the
collateral of selected financial assets of banks. At the end of 1991, such
loans from the BOK rediscount window amounted to about Won 13.5 trillion,
compared with U 151.2 trillion provided by the financial system. Since
most of rediscount loans are sector specific and involve automatic
rediscounting, about 95 percent of such loans can be considered to be
policy loans. The BOK can influence the use of such loans at a margin
through variation of the proportion that is eligible for rediscounting.
30. There are five major drawbacks to the provision of directed
credits in Korea. First, it is essentially a tax on the banking system
and mall depositors. Policy loans at below market rates reduce the
profitability of domestic banks and retard the development of a robust
financial market. Second, the existence of large policy loans at below
market rates coubined with controlled deposit rates adversely affects the
efficiency of the banking system. Intervention in the banking industry
(i.e., day-to-day operations and asset allocation decisions) does not
provide incentives for the bank management to innovate in their
operations. Nor do the banks have much incenttve to select profitable
borrowers since they are not rewarded for doing so. Rather, banks tend to
passively accommodate the credit demands of the government-favored
borrowers. Third, policy loans create moral hazard for bank supervision
and shift the credit from the private sector to the Government as the
Government becomes a de facto partner in the ventures. Fourth, the
development of professional bankers is retarded. Although most banks are
now private, the top management do not appear to have autonomy in managing
the banks. Finally, large policy loans made available through the
rediscount window of the BOK at below market ratss constrain the ability
of the BOK to conduct effective monetary policy.
31. .he cost of policy loans in Korea has been fairly substantial.
The interest rate subsidy extended to golicy loan borrowers in 1991
aonted to about 1 2.0 trillion. 10 percent of GNP and 6.2 percent of
-ix-
goerrment exenditure. The estimated amount of interest rate subsidLes
were calculated on the basis of comparing the corporate bond rate agaiLst
the average on-lending rate of three widely utilized policy loans: the
export promotion fund, the machinery industry promotion fund, and the NIF.
32. The relative emphasis of the Government's credit allocation
policy applied to the banking system has had a major effect on who bears
the cost and risk of intervention. The use of subsidized rates and
preferential finance has transferred the financing burden from the
government budget to the BOK and the banking system. The discount window
of the BOK plays only a limited role because many of the 80K loans are
automatic rediscounts of policy loans by the banking sector (Chapter IV).
BOK generally absorbs reserves created by the policy loans through the
sale of MSBs at below market rates to NBFIs. Although the interest rate
on the MSBs is below market, the BOK still incurs a negative spread of 6
percent p.a.--the spread between the NSB rates and the discount rates. As
a result, B0K incurred an operating deficit of V 1.27 trillion during the
January to May 1992 period, against its reserves of W 1.34 trillion.
33. It is well recognized in Korea that the volume of policy loans
is very large by any standards. In Japan, the size of total policy loans
was only 3 percent of the total bank credit and the level of subsidy was
much less. Therefore, there is a clear need for Korea to take concrete
steps to reduce the size of policy loans over time if the present system
of credit allocation is to be replaced by indirect monetary controls.
Since the adoption of an indirect monetary control policy to replace the
present system of directed credit is being contemplated by GOK, it is
important that the operating deficit of the BOK which emanates from the
policy loans be properly financed through the budget. For this reason,
there is merit in frontally addressing this problem of policy loans. Some
of the options for addressing the policy loans are discussed below.
34. While policy loans in the past have been targeted to support
development of the productive sectors and consequently contributed to the
growth of the economy through changing significantly the structure of the
manufacturing sector, the direction of preferential finance has changed
considerably in the 1980s. Policy loans are now targeted at sectors like
agriculture, fishery, and livestock, while the credit risks continue to be
left to the banking system. One option is that the Government should
continue in the direction it has already taken in sharply reducing
directed credit activities. More specifically, it is recommended that the
Government should: (a) develop a concrete plan to pbase out policy loans
in a period of four to five years. As a first step it may wish to reduce
the level of interest rate subsidy by linking the interest rate on policy
loans to a benchmark interest rate such as a market determined SB rate;
and (b) address the issue of policy loans on BOK books. The missdon
analyzed several options for achieving this. The options include: (a)
transfer of all policy loans from BOK's books to specialized financial
institutions; (b) creation of a trust fund; and (c) establishment of a
wholesale facility.
35. In some countries, policy loans were initially promoted by the
central banks, but were later transferred to specialized financial
institutions as the conduct of monetary policy became more complicated.
It was also recognized that a strong central bank free from development
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lending is essential for the financial system. The specialized
institutions are better equipped to handle such policy loans and the cost
associated with such operations can then be financed transparently through
the budget rather than through taxing the financial system. In Korea,
there are several capable specialized lnstitutions which can take over
these policy loans from the BOK. All the export loans could probably be
transferred to the Korea Export-Import Bank. The Industrial Bank of Korea
(IlK) could take over the small and medium industries loans. and the
Agriculture Cooperatives could assume the agriculture loans. These
institutions could operate rediscounting facilities for these loans.
Should the Government wish to pursue this course of action, it may adopt a
mechanism for transferring policy loans to specialized banks as discussed
in Chapter V.
36. The estimated costs to the Government of transferring all the
policy loans off BOK books to the specialized financial institutions would
be about V 1.5 trillion in the flrst year and V 190 billion in the second
year (para. 5.29). The subsidy element involved in these loans could be
linked later to a benchmark rate as reflected in the market related rate
on ESBa or Treasury Bills, which may be issued once the interest rates are
deregulated. Over time, it can be eliminated by equating the rate on
policy loans to the rate on MSBs or Treasury Bills. This measure would
remove at one go the rate distorting element from the financial system on
the eve of financial deregulation, thereby facilitating the emergence of
market related rates on all financial assets. An added advantage of the
proposed approval is that it would provide BOK with government securities
in exchange for the policy loans which can then be used to conduct open
market operations. However, it is appreciated that transferring all the
policy loans at one go may not be feasible. Therefore, the Government
should as a priority consider transferring at least the BOK policy loans
which are of a developmental nature. It is estimated that at least about
half of BOK policy loans are of this nature. The cost of carrying such
loans by the specialized institutions is to be financed from the budget.
Interest rate subsidies on any remaining policy loans with BOK are to be
progressively removed and the volume reduced.
Op_ng of th Capita Acout
37. Korea initiated a financial iberalization program beginning in
1981, but it was not the type of liberalization strategy familiar in
economic literature or in the Southern Cone countries where it reached its
apogee in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Two features distinguished
financial deregulation in Korea from the strategy pursued in other
countries. First, Korea has achieved positive real interest rates in the
financial market. Second, Korea has maintained (even during the
controlled phase of financial liberalization) strict restrictions on the
capital account on the grounds that a free capital account would induce
capital flight and spawn more serious macroeconomic and financial system
instability. Since then, Korea has moved a long way towards the
liberalization of the capital account through a series of small steps,
though the capital control mechanism remains in place. It has also been
able to have significant overseas investment.
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38. Since 1984, inflows of portfolio imestment have been
liberalized progressively. Initially, limited imestment was allowed in
Korean stocks by foreigners through imestment funds, foreign securities
companies were allowed to open representative offices, and Korear
companies were permitted to raise foreign capital through equLty-linked
bonds. In 1992, foreigners were allowed to imest directly In Korean
stocks, subject to limits. In addition, free capital repatriation is now
allowed. However, foreign borrowing by Korean companies is still
restricted. A plan for continued capital market liberalization has been
announced, and the short-term actions in this plan will focus on the
national treatment of foreign financial institutions and a widening of the
range for daily fluctuations of the Won so as to expand the role of market
forces in exchange rate determination. The current account of the balance
of payments is conAkerably free to a point that Korea has formally
accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the UKV Agreement, effective
November 1988.
39. PoliEc Implication of Liberalization of Capital Account. There
is an inherent bias against freeing the capital account in countries which
had repressed economies in the past, as Korea once had. This is because
the government in such an economy finances fiscal deficits by taxing its
financial system by instruments such as reserve requiremnts. Since
taxation depresses yields on bank deposits, the depositors tend to
substitute foreign financial assets with higher yields for domestic
currency denominated assets. Sven the borrowers, who have to pay higher
rates on loans, try to avoid the tax by seeking cheaper loans abroad, and
to the extent this happens, the domestic financial system shrivels with
the consequent fall in tax revenue. Hence, such econodmes have imposed
severe restrictions on the movement of short-term capital. Korea has
clearly outgrown that stage, but the Korean authorities are haunted by
their experience of capital account liberalization in the mid-1960s, which
led to a large amount of short-term capital inflows. However, the
repayment of short-term, overseas credit coincided with the appreciation of
the exchange rate induced by capital in£flow, which adversely affected
export earnings. This episode my have been a consideration behind the
decision of the Korean authorities to include capital account
liberalization in the blueprint for financial reform at a later stage.
40. An argumnt often voiced in Korean offLeial circles, and
generally taken as valid, is that the removal of capital controls in the
early phases of financial reforms will lead to the appreciation -f the
exchange rate, thus impeding exports and raising domestic liquidity. This
would then accentuate inflationary pressures, but without much impact on
high donestic interest rates in view of the prevailing inelastic demand
for bank credit. However, in the present context, it is unclear that
these would be the likly consequences. Korea currently has an inflation
rate of about 7 percent, wi'th a GINP growth rate of around 7 percent. The
fiscal deficit is modest at 1.4 percent of CMIP, the external deficit is
around 2 percent of GlNP, and exports are growing at a rate of 8-9 percent
(though this is lower than during 1987-89). The unemployment rate is less
than 2 percent, and inflationary pressures during the last few years have
emanated mainly from higher wage demands.
41. If the capital account were completely freed in such
circumstances, it would in all likelihood have a beneficial impact on
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Korean,growth. With an increased Inflow of capital, It ts true that the
exchange rate which has been depreciating in the last two years under the
new market-oriented exchange rate system would initially appreciate. At a
time when exports are expected to rise from their present low level, the
initial impact would admittedly be adverse. However, it need not be so,
as the appreciated exchange rate would lead to a fall in the level of
inflationary pressures insofar as the cost of imports on which Korean
Inmestment and consumption is significantly dependent will decline too.
To the extent inflation is moderated, inflationary expectations would be
dampened, leading to a decline in nominal and real interest rates in the
domestic financial markets. Thus, what may be lost by exporters through
appreciation of the exchange rates, could be compensated by lower interest
rates. Even the money supply effects of increased capital need not be
negative. With the capital inflow, the money supply will initially rise.
However, the impact of this could be sterilized through open market
operations by the central bank. Furthermore, the second round effects
would be healthy with the restoration of the money supply to its initial
level once the exchange rate has appreciated.
42. But the most significant impact of the increased capital inflow
would be reflected in the rate of growth of output. Considering that the
unemployment rate has reached the minimum possible level (i.e., 2
percent), output growth can be maintained if labor productivity is raised,
which is possible only with a switch from labor intensive techniques of
production to more capital intensive techniques. Korea can achieve this
switch with the import of cheaper capital goods embodying new
technologies. With new output and its pattern, it would be a short leap
to increased exports in new lines. In this scenario, the external deficit
may persist for some time. But this need not be a cause of serious
concern so long as that deficit remains sustainable nough to be financed
by normal capital inflows. The Korean economy has reached a stage in
which capital inflows to finance new long-term investment need to be
encouraged so long as the interest paid on them is equal to or less than
the rate of return earned on their use in domestic investment. If the
authorities feel the need to reverse the flows in one way or the other,
they will be able to do so with the new instruments of macroeconomic
policy at their disposal, such as the flexible use of exchange and
interest rates ma'e possible by the liberalization of the financial sector
and the capital account.
43. Despite recent reforms, the Korean financial sector remains
heavily controlled both in terms of pricing and allocating credit. Given
the pervasiveness and history of these controls, domestic financial
institutions, especially commercial banks, do not appear to be well
prepared either financially or managerially to compete successfully with
foreign banks in Korea or abroad. As mentioned earlier, the control
exercised by the authorities has not fostered development of professional
bankers of the standards which can compete effectively globally. However,
this does not imply that the talent does not exist. A rapid opening of
the capital account without sufficient asset/liability management skill in
the banking system can run the risk of causing failures within the
financial system. For this reason, measures to improve the stability and
officiency of the domestic financial sector should take priority at this
time. It is therefore recommnded tha cRital account libexaliatio
takes Rlace after the deregulation of the domestlc financial systesm to
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go the domestic banking sector. However, this should not preclude the
authorities from allowing limited liberalization (such as allowing foreign
portfolio investment in government securities and XSBs) after the
deregulation of interest rates have taken place. Such a measure will
further enhanced the development of the bond market (Chapter VIII).
Suapwuiunm and Prudmnt Reuatouis
44. Korea already has a relatively strong supervisory structure in
place, with strong leadership from the NOF. Government supervision over
the financial system in Korea has been historically strong for economic
regulation purposes. However, with the advancement of the Korean economy
Into the ranks of the OECD countries and the increasing market-orientation
of both the real and the financial sectors, the level of government
intervention will need to decline. Such a withdrawal by the Government
from direct credit allocation is essential to allow the financial sector
to exercise better credit discipline on enterprises and to play a more
-efficient role in resource allocation according to market forces.
Hawever, withdrawing from economic regulation does not mean that the
Government should reduce prudential supervision. Indeed, the move towards
greater market orientation would require the Government to be more
transparent in: (i) creating a level playing field for all financial
institution,' (iI) setting clear capital adequacy and other financial
rations to allow financial institutions to improve their risk management;
and (iii) generating timely and reliable system-wide information on the
performance of the financial sector and financial institutions.
45*. It is suggested that the GOK consider making the improvements in
the supervision and regulatory structure outlined below:
(i) Consolidate suervision over the entire financial system under a
single independent body which is directly responsible for
systematic monitoring and solvency of the financial system. The
present system of supervision with OBS being responsible for
roughly one half of the system, and the MOF for the other half,
with some delegation of examination functions to the OBS,
implies that no single agency will have at all times a global or
systemic view of risk trends in the financial system. In
several OECD countrles, the monetary policy function and the
supervisory function have been vested in the central bank, since
the central bank must be in a position to know when it is
providing lending of last resort, if it is also providing
"capital of last resort'. In some countries such as France and
Japan, the bank supervisory function has been vested with a Bank
Comuission within the Ministry of Finance. Some countries vest
supervision with a body independent of the Ministry of Fiance
and the other government ministries, such as in Canada, Chile,
Hungary and Germany. The concern is to separate prudential
regulation from economic regulation. This trend is also seen in
the securities industry, where the Securities and Exchange
Commission is an autonomous body from the Ministry of Finance.
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(il) 1 $ s *t X in Korea should mov closer to OEKD
standards as soon as possible. Specifically, loan
classification and loan provisioning standards, as well as
marking securities values to market should be amended fairly
quickly, to make the performance and solvency of domestic
financial Institutions more transparent avz 3mparable with
international standards.
(iii) IDncriEasedtrangaren. Current limitations on lending for real
state and consumer durables should be relaxed to make the actual
flow of funds more transparent and discourage disintermediation.
The needs of these sectors are financed indire-tly through the
banking system, but the authorities are not able to monitor more
accurately the ultimate utilization of funds through the banking
system, and therefore prevent on a timely basis excessive risk
concentrations in any particular sector (e.g., real estate). In
the absence of strong and independent outside supervision, the
GoverAment at times reverts to direct intervention (such as the
1991 rule on Chebols' picking three major business activities)
to control credit access by the private sector and encourage
productive" as compared to "speculative" borrowing.
(iv) Mismatch in maturitv. The Korean financial system still relies
heavily on using short-term deposits to finance long-term
investment. This fundamental uaturity mismatch occurs partly
because of the late development of the securities and long-term
bond market, and partly because of the lack of strong and deep
contractual savings institutions, such as private pension funds
and strong life Insurance companies. Recent liberalization
efforts to increase competition through the entry of foreign
life insurance companies have helped partly, but from a
strategic point view, system-wide stability and soundness can
only be strengthened through narrowing the maturity mismatch and
the strengthening of the capital base of the financial sector,
as well as the enterprise sector. Interest rate deregulation
will encourage the corporato sector to reduce its leverage as
the cost of debt financing will reflect the true cost of
capital.
Bond Mark
46. Korean securities markets have grown significantly through the
1980s. The excellent macroeconomic performance and phenomenal growth in
new equity securities, especially during the second half of 1980s, made
the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) one of the largest emerging bourses.
Although market activities have become sluggish over the last two years,
the Korean stock market now ranks thirteenth in the world in terms of
market capltalization.
47. In the process of domestic market growth, Korean authorities
have gradually taken measuess to open the stock market for foreign
Investment. Since investment trust funds for non-residents were flrst
established in 1981, Korean trust companies have set up a number of
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international investment rusts. The Introduction in 1984 of the Korea
Iumd, a ploneer country fund, brought a series of country funds for
international investment In Korean equities on the KSR. Finally, the
stock market opening for direct purchase by foreign investors became
effective lin January 1992, attracting nearly US$800 million for the first
three months in 1992.
48. The impact of the market opening on Korea's domestic economy has
been relatively inconsequential, erasing some of the concerns about
internationalization. Although observations are too limited to warrant
definitive judgement, foreign investment flows have not destabilized the
domestic market. The market opening was an important milestone, but many
restrictions remain. There appears substantial room for i-iprovement ln
the foreign ownership limit, regulatory arrangements (including a capital
gains tax), and administration and procedures.
49. The Korean bond market has also grown rapidly in recent years,
but the growth is confined to the primary market for relatively few
issues. New bond issues are dominated by MSBs and guaranteed corporate
bonds. The secondary bond market remains largely underdeveloped due to
interest rate controls and the controls of capital issues by the
Government. There is no benchmark for interest rates in Korea, and the
bulk of government securities and MSBs are allocated by the OF and BOK
mainly to financial institutions.
50. The first griority of the Government should be to develog the
domestic bond market. This will require both policy and institutional
changes. At the policy level the Government will need to: (i) deregulate
interest rates on government securities starting with the auctioning of
the MSBs or a ',apanese model of a mix of price competitive auction and
fixed underwritng syndicate. In this connection, the related issues of
the profitability of the BOK and the policy loans will need to be
addressed (Chapters IV and V); (ii) deregulate the interest rates on
corporate bonds and allow the market to determine the interest rate for
each issue based on the credit risk and rating assigned by the credit
rating agencies. In this connection, the credit rating agencies should be
developed further. Guarantees of the securities should be voluntary and
the guarantee fee should be market based; (iii) controls on capital issue
should be lifted and replaced by disclosure requirements. The decision on
when to issue securities and at what price should be left completely to
the issuers and the market participants; (iv) a network of primary dealers
should be activated for making markets in governmeat securities; (v) the
clearing and settlement system for corporate bonds should be improved; and
(vi) information on the bond market for investors should be enhanced.
The Govnmmtd Plan for Inbrot Rate DegtIon
51. It is realized by the authorities that local banks have been
greatly handicapped in conducting their operations competitively, while
foreign banks are not subject to interest rate ceilings, and NBFls have
been given greater freedom in regard to Interest rate determination.
Further, it was felt that a global financial environment has evolved in a
manner that the Korean financial system has to strengthen its links with
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It for eshancing efflciency of credlt allocatLon and saving mobilizatLon.
The Goverment, therefore, announced a plan in 1991 for gradually
deregulating interest rates and increaslng competftiveness of the banks.
The plan began to be operative in November 1991, and was expected to be
fully implementod by 1997 (See Table 9 1 in Chapter IX). Subsequent
discussions with the authorities lndicated that the process of interest
rate deregulation might be extended beyond 1997 by a couple of years,
depending upon several unexpected evelopments.
52. Though the deregulation pollcy was formally launched in the
second half of 1991, Its liplementation has been more notional than real.
Formal regulation of rates on bank overdraft loans and commercial bills,
corporate bonds with maturities over two years, and long-term deposit
rates have been removed. But in effect, the actual rates charged on all
these assets and liabilities continued to be subject to window guldance.
Thus, there was no de facto deregulation of interest rates due to the
reasons referred tr earlier in this chapter. The governmont plan for
financial sector reform has several positive features which may carry the
Korean financial system to greater efficlency and growth. However, the
implementation of the plan is contingent upon certain macroeconomic
conditions and therefore the plan is generally perceived by domestie
market participants and international community especially lts major
trading partners as being too halting and lacking credibility. In order
for She glan to be credible it needa to have a spocific tlmetable and be
made known to all market participants so that they could gRerate freely in
a deregglatd ondXroM=t
Mm CMe for bsmd Sector Reform
53. The Korean economy has seen substantlal llborallzatlon in the
real economy, while the path it has taken In freeing controls cn the
financial sector has been cautlous and measured. The reforms that have
beer undertaken durlng the past decade have Improved the efficiency of the
financial system in many respects. Despite thls progress, however, many
distortLons remain and these have influenced the structure of the
financial system, its abLlity and efficiency in mobllizing and
Intermediating savings, and the efficacy of monetary policy. There is a
need for further reform of the financial system for the following reasons.
Firot, the Korean economy is now the tenth largest ln the world, and
approaching a developed country status. As a result, the Korean financial
market Is a part of a global market system and the major tradLig partners
would naturally demand reclprocity in accessing Korean markets. Second,
the direct control of the system which bas served so well in the past has
now bocome too cumbersome and is not the effLeient to meet the financing
of the a more sophisticated and Lnternationalized conomy. Continuation
of the control is likely to lead to misallocation of resources and
increase distortion in the system. Thlrd, the macroeconomde condition
in Korea Ls stable and ldeal for implementing accelerated reforms (Chapter
I). Fourth, as the financial system becomes large and complex, there is
no other option but to move away from direct monetary control to indlrect
monetary control procedures. This would mean that interest rate
deregulation, especially on the government securities and MSBs, must take
place sooner rather than later. Fifth, Korea needs a more competitive and
- xvil -
innovative banking sector hich can service the financing needs of the
econwmy at home and abroad. Therefore, it ia essential chat full
deregulation of the domestic financial systm take place sooner rather
than later.
ftereudtomfor Jinana Seto Reo
54. The experience of financial liberalization in other countries
poLits to 3bs0a key preconditions if the programs of financial sector
reform are to succeed. FiXzt, it is essential that there be macroeconomic
stability. See significant liberalization of the real economy should
either be completed or carried out simultaneously with the reform of the
domestic financial &ector. Ibi, it is essential that a strong framework
for prudential regulation and bank supervision be in place when financial
reform occurs.
55. In each of these three areas, the conditions in Korea today are
favorable to accelerating the pace of financial reform. The macroeconomy
is stable. Although the current account shows a deficit, it has fallen
sharply this year, and the deficit is sustainable since adequate flows of
foreign financing are easily available. The consolidated public sector
account is roughly in balance. And finally, the inflation rate is falling
after having risen to almost double-digit levels in 1991. Substantial
liberalization has already occurred in the real sector. Industrial policy
Is now less interventionist and sector-specific. It relies instead on the
functional support of industries dictated by market failure. Similarly,
the trade regime is now less protectionist. Tariffs have been lowered and
made more uniform and the coverage of quantitative restrictions reduced.
Likewise, a relatively well-developed system of prudential supervision is
already in place in Korea since the Government has historlcally exercised
strong control over the financial system. The details of this framework
are described in Chapter VII of this report.
fderlsks of Actehrated finada Refom
56. Korea has thus far made very good progress in reforming its
financial sector. However, the Korean authorities are reluctant to
accelerate the reforms for the following concerns: (a) macroeconomic
stability; (b) health of the banking system; (c) limited asset/liability
management skills in the banks; (d) over indebtedness of Korean companies;
(a) excess demand for credit; and (f) crowding out by the Chebols. These
are discussed below.
57. Macroeconomic Stability. The Korean authorities fear that the
deregulation of interest rates and rapid financial sector reform would
adversely affect macroeconomic stability. However, the macroeconomic
conditions in Korea today are highly favorable to accelerating the pace of
financial reform. Although the current account shows a deficit, it has
fallen sharply this year, and the deficit is sustainable since adequate
flows of foreign financing are easily available. Indeed, it is arguable
that Korea shou_4 be a net capital importer, when its future growth would
depend on greater capital intensity of production. Substantial
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liberalization has occurred in the real sector. Industrial policy Is now
loss interventionist and sector-specific. Similarly, the trade regime is
now less protectionist. Tariffs have been substantially lowered and the
coverage of quantitative restrictions reduced. Korea is free from severe
macroeconomic imbalances which threatened the financial liberalization In
Southern Cone countries and some Asian countvies like Indonesia and the
Philippines.
58. eathl of tof *h Banki _vst=. The domstic banks are reportedly
saddled with a high proportion of non-performing loans which are by and
large policy loans (Chapter V). Helped by the buoyancy of the stock
market and favorable economic conditions during 1987-89, the banks in
Korea have been enhancing their capital base and reducing non-performing
assets (Chapter VII). Furthermore, the interest rate spread of 4.53
percent is mnch wider than in industrial countries like Japan and the
United States.Y Both of those factors should be expected to provide
more than an adequate cushion against the risks of non-performing loans.
If, however, such loans are considered to be a formidable barrier to
Interest rate deregulation, the authorities hould move more expeditiouoly
to remove policy loans from the balance sheet of the banks.
59. Assht1,JianagnSkJllg. It is believed that
deregulation of interest rates on the liabilities of covmercial banks
without being able to adjust returns on their assets would disadvantage
them vis-a-vis the foreign banks and NBFIs. However, the evidence seems
to suggest that it ls not such a major problem as is generally believed.
However, this concern can be accommodated in the interest rate
deregulation plan by allowing ceilings on interest rates on short-term
deposits at the beginning, and their gradual removal later wlthin a
specified time.
60. Over lndetednems gf Kgrean Korean companies are
higbly leveraged. The debt-equity ratio for all manufacturing firms in
1991 was 3.09:1, and even the lowest in recent years--in 1989--was 2.54:1.
This compares with 2.27:1 in Japan and 0.83:1 in Taiwan, China. However,
Korean flrms have been replacing bank loans with securlties. In 1991, the
ratio of securities in total financing rose to 55 percent compared with 27
percent in 1987. Interest rate liberalization wil' further increase the
incentive for equity financing and therefore reducQ the leverage level of
Korean firms. Furt srmore, there is a misconception that business firms
pay the regulated intorest rates on their borrowings. Banks generally
evade the regulations by asking borrowing firms to maintain compensatory
balances, utilizing other facilities to raise the effective cost of the
borrowed funds compared to market rates. When bank credit is available at
much below market interest rates and access to capital market for raising
equity is rationed, the corporate sector has little incentive to reduce
its leveraging. Therefore, the solution is to deregulate interest rates
and allow firms unrestricted access to the capital markets with
appropriate disclosures to protect the investing public.
3/ Sung-Ree Jwa, ¶Korea's Interest Rate and Capital Controls
Deregulation: Implications for Nonetary Policy and Financial
Structure," July 1992, Korea Development Institute.
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61. hIogg DpdLUl for Credit. It is argued that demand for credit
in Korea is interest inelastic, particularly the credit demand for real
estate. It is argued that under such conditions, if interest rate
determination is left to market forces, rates would skyrocket and thus
impede investment in the mnufacturing sector And the growth of the
economy. The interest lnelasticity of credit demand appears largely based
on the observation that at coutrolled rates there is competition for
funds. The existence of excess demand at these rates is by ittelf not
surprising. The intensity of competition for credit reflects in laige
measure the extent to which policy loans to preferred sectors siphon off
credit. As a consequence, less credit is available for other sectors.
Moreover, during the economic boom of the late 1980s, the strong demand
for credit was fed by spiralling prices in the real estate and stock
markets. Given that the economy has now returned to slower growth, and in
particular the real estate and stock market booms have abated, credit
demand appears to have weakened considerably. For instance, the current
yield on three-year corporate bonds (October 1992) is 13.75 percent--the
lowest in almost four years and down from almost 20 percent a year ago,
and 15.5 percent as recently as September 1992. Therefore, the economic
environment appears to be ideal to move decisively on deregulation.
62. CrAwding-out by the Chbaols. The concern here is that the
priority sector borrowers such as small and medium industries and
agriculture will be deprived of credit from the banking sector, and the
banks would prefer to lend to the Chebols. This concern, however, can be
addressed through the prudential regulations and bank supervision. An
exposure lidit by company, group and sector should be established and
tightly monitored. Specialized banks could continue to meet the financing
needs of the priority sectors.
eoefts of Fsa loanawk Refom
63. If the GOK can implement a credible fimancial sector reform,
the following main benefits would accrue from further reform. The first
would be the potential imUrovements ln the efficiency of the financial
gystem in intermediating savigs. There are several indicators that point
t inefficiencies in many segments of Korea's financial system, which
raise the costs of financial interediation. One set of measures has to
do with the operational efficiercy of Korean banks compared to their
counterparts in Japan and the U.S. In 1990, labor productivity in Korean
commercial banks, whether measured in terms of assets, loans or deposits
per eaployee, was less than a tenth of the levels in Japanese banks.
Moreover, limited competition within the Korean banking sector has meant
that interest rate margins (the difference between loan and deposit rates)
were about twic6 their levels in the U.S. and more than three times as
large as in Japan. So it is not surprising that a recurrent complalnt
about the Korean financial system is that borrowing costs are too high.
64. An2theL measure of ec1Wc in int diation i. the
oninued ation oAIarkets. As noted earlier, there is
reason to believe that the variation of risk-adjusted interest rates
across different groups of borrowers has narrowed since the 1970s. But
the Government continues to play a substantial role in allocating credit
through requirements that banks and NBFIs allocate a prescribed share of
new credit to preferred sectors and BOR's automatlc rediscount mschanism
for loans to some sectors (Chapter VI). This means that financial markets
still remain segmented to a significant degree, with the pricing of loans
reflecting regulatory requiremonts rather than lenders' evaluations of the
riskiness of different lending opportunities.
65. ACtions to deregulate the financial system in several areas
would go grater efficiec. Interest rate deregulation would
encourage comercial banks to develop thelr expertise in asset and
liability management. Even partial decontrol of deposit rates would allow
them to compete more effectively with NBFIs in mobilizing funds. If
combined with a relaxation of the sectoral lending requirozents that apply
to banks, it would reduce significantly the regulatory disadvantage that
banks currently face relative to NBFIs. By allowing them to tailor their
Interest rat-es and products to market conditions and risk characteristics,
it would promote efficiency in their operations rather than forcing them
to operate In effect as cost-plus providers of financial services.
Reducing the volume of policy loans would also restrict the flow of
preferential oans and thereby reduce segmentation.
66. The favorable impact of these changes on the efficiency of the
banking system suggests that the rise in lending rates that follows
interest rate decontrol may not be as large as is feared. Although
difficult to demonstrate, it is probable that the large share of policy
loans in total credit has meant higher interest rates than in a
liberalized system for those without access to these loans. Those
borrowers will now see a reduction in their borrowing costs.
67. As Korea shifts from a surplus to a shortage of labor, among the
most important issues is whether to continue to restructure the industrial
sector so as to build comparative advantage based on technology rather
than cheap labor. Such a shift is already underway, with the share of
light industry in manufacturing output having shrunk by about 5 percentage
points in 1989-91 compared to 1985-87. But this transition has not been
easy, in part because capital remains expensive to most Korean firms--even
while labor costs are rising. If financial reforms succeed in raising the
efficiency of damestic intermediation a d in broadening the access of
Korea firm to etrnal cnital. industrial restructuring could opr
much more smoothly.. hLch could raise Korea's growth rate.
Proposed luandab Sector Reorms and Sequendug
68. In light of the above analysis, it ls suggested that the GOK
consider modifying its deregulation plan in regard to its scope,
sequencing, and speed. The suggested changes are indicated in Table 1.
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69. The maln thrust of the proposed reform is that the deregulation
of the domestic financial markets and current account should take place
before the opening of the capital account. Such sequencing has worked
very well in many countries such as Malaysia and IndonesiaBUY
70. The rationale for the suggested changes In the scope,
sequencing, and speed of the deregulation plan and its implementation are
elaborated as follows. ZLi. it is recommended that the period of reform
be compressed for two reasons: (i) the momentum of deregulation will be
lost if the period of change is too long; and (ii) the globalization of
financial markets worldwide and the size of Korean economy create a need
for a more rapid adjustment. Sngg, deregulation of lending rates on
loans of all financial intermediaries is proposed to take place in a short
period of time, instead of the step-by-step approach adopted by the
Government. The current effective lending rates are already higher than
the regulated ones as discussed earlier in the chapter. Therefore, even
if the loan interest rates increase as a result of deregulation, the
overall cost to the economy and the corporate sector would not change
materially. Recent experience in Thailand and the Philippines shows that
the level of Interest rates actually declined. Third, deregulation of
interest rates on deposits (except for demand deposits) of deposit money
banks is proposed to be carried out in steps on the grounds that removal
of interest rates on all deposits in one go may lead to excessive
competition among banks to increase their market share. Since the banks
are generally not very well-versed with modern asset/liabllity management
techniques and the level of non-performing assets of the banking system
could be higher than the published figures, a sharp increase in their
funding cost without the ability to adjust the roturns on the existing
loan portfolio of policy loans creates a potential risk of bank failures.
Therefore, a gradual deregulation of deposit rates with a clear timetable
for eliminating the ceiling will provide enough time for banks to prepare
themselves to cope with the new environment. It is also recommended that
the Government completely withdraw from direct or indirect management of
financial institutlcns to enable the development of professional bankers.
Prudential regulations and bank supervision are to be strengthened and are
to replace direct controls.
71. Deregulation of interest rates on government securities and MSBs
should be advanced to '993. Issuance of MSBs or T-bills at market rates
will create a benchmark for Interest rates that can be used to price other
financial instruments. Auctioning these securities will be an efficient
way to achieve this. This will foster further development of money and
capital markets and facilitate the transition from direct momentary
control to indlrect monetary control procedures. The BOK would then be in
a positlon to conduct open market operations.
72. It is recommended that foreign Investors hould be allowed to
Invest in NSBs and T.bills once the interest rates on these instruments
are deregulated. Foreign imestors are generally interested in investing
2/ See "The Impact of FLuancial Reform in Malaysia," Messrs. Yusof,
lussln, Alowi, Sing, and Singh, Bank Negara, March 1992;
'Indonesia: Financial Sector Report,' Report No. 8159-M1),
IIRD, May 10, 1990.
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mostly In risk free and liquLd financial instruments (i.e., government
securities) in emerging markets. Foreign participation in the government
securities market mould impart breadth and depth to the bond market sad
encourage incresaing domestic participation. This should also facilitate
issuance of corporate bonds for foreign investors at a later stage. It is
appreciated that the GOK has recently further liberalized foreign
portfolio investment in the equity uarket and the specific timing of the
opening of the bond market may be influenced by the magnitude of capital
inflows from the opening of the stock market. The full liberalization of
the capital account is left for the final phase when the banking system is
fully competitive and officient as a result of accelerated deregulation of
the domestic financial system.
Condkdg R_as
73. Korea has achieved an economic miracle in a very short period of
time, and it is now the tenth largest economy in the world. In the past,
the 60K has used the financial sector as an instrument of industrial
policy, and the main vehicles have been policy loans for the priority
sectors and interest rate controls. However, the financial system,
especially the domestic banking system, has substantially lagged behind
the real sector in Korea and the financial systems in other ASEAN and O0CD
countries. There is a need to make the system more efficient and more
market oriented. An accelerated financial deregulation is very timely and
should be beneficial to Korea. The main thrust of suggested reform
focusos on the deregulation of the domestic financial market and Its
iastitutions, with the objective of Improving their efficiency so that
they can effectively compete both at home and abroad. All the required
ingredients for a successful reform appear to be in place, and what is
needed is a st ng commitment to reform and the will to carry out the
reforms decisively. The risks involved in such reforms are relatively
modest and manageable given the prevailing macroeconomic conditions in
Korea and the very high level of administrative skill in the Governmsnt.
L INDTODUCTION
1.1 In December 1991, a Bank mis lon visited Korea to prepare the
proposed Financial Sector Investment Loan (FSIL). Given that the proposed
PSIL is designed as a financial Intermediary loan, the need for a
financial sector study wso recognized at that tlm. Subsoquently, ln
April 1992, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) made a formal request to the
Bank to assist the Goveroment in the proparation of a blueprint for the
liberalization of the financial sector and for market opening. The
blueprint is to be completed by December 1992 and will be the basis for
carrying out further policy changes to liberalize the financial sector. A
Bank mission visited Korea in mid-April 1992 to discuss the terms of
reference of the study and the modality of carrying out the study. To
get the best advice and fullest domestic upport, the Government of Korea
(GOK) has also sought the advice of three key domestic instltutions (tbe
Korea Development Institute or IKDI, the Korea Securities Research
Institute or RSRI, and the Korea Institute of Finance or RIP) and the
International monetary Fund (MP). Because of the ensitivity of the G0K,
it was agreed by the department managemnt that the report will be
processed only up to the Green Cover stage. To ensure high tandards of
the product, it was decided by the department management to process the
study as a regular sector study.
Macro Cmtuz of So Stud8
1.2 overall, the economic performance of Korea bas been impressive
by any standards. DurLng the Sixth Five Year Plan (1987-1991), GNP grew
at an average rate of 10 percent p. a. However, the Korean economy has
undergone rapid and significant changes slnce 1986. During 1986-88, Korea
xperienced a major economic boom, benefitting from low oil prices, low
interest rates, and the low value of the Won against the Yen. GDP grow at
12 percent per year, the current account recorded surpluses for the first
time in modern Koren history, and a large part of the external debt wa
repaid. Between 1989 and 1991, however, the trend bha changd in some
important respects. The growth of GDP continued relatively unAbated, but
the sources of growth weoe generated by domestic dmand. Export growth
became sluggish, as a result of an erosion of competitivenes due to huge
increases in labor cost. Furthermore, the appreciation of the Won,
combineG with a rapid increase In private consumption, led to a surgo in
Imports, and consequently the current account shifted into deficit. A
deficit of US$10 billion wa recorded in 1991, and a deficit of US$4
billion is expected for 1992 A rapid lacreso In private consumptlon and
a construction boom were responsLble for economic growth durlag 1989-91.
1.3 These recent developmnts have coincided with difficulties which
have emrged as the economy makes the transition to maturity. With the
weakening of the previous authoritarian rule since the Declaration of
Demoeratlzation In June 1987, labor problem hav increased. Wages have
risen much faster than the increase In labor productivity, in combination
with a sharp Increase in labor disputes and work stoppages. The
performance of Korean industry, the engin, of growth, has beon adversely
affected by the higher cost of both capital and labor in comparison with
its competitors. The effective cost of borrowing in Won is currently
about 20 percent, or 10 percent in real terms. Korean firms are highly
leveraged. The average debt/equity ratio of Korean manufacturing
companies at the end of 1988 was 3:1, and has since increased further.
Moreover, Korean firms are suffering from technology bottlenecks (recent
increases in R&D notwithstanding) due to the lack of long-term capital at
competitive cost and a reluctance of advanced countries to transfer
technology.
1.4 Although the G0O and the Bank of Korea (BOK) have had every
monetary policy instrument at their disposal over the last two decades,
they have relied heavily on direct controls to a large scale and on the
direction of bank credit to preferred sectors. The low and subsidized
Interest rates have fostered a chronic condition of excess credit demand.
The deregulation of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) combined with
tight controls on banking institutions have led to the disintermediation
of the financial system. The policies which were designed to prooto
labor intensive industries are no longer appropriate in the present
conditions of tight labor. In fact, Korea should now be promoting capital
Intensive industries and investing more in research and development o
remain competitive in the international market. Liboralizing its
financial market and giving more autonomy to financial institutions would
lead to bettex allocation of resources, improved efficiency in the
financial system, and more sustainable conomic growth in the medium- and
long-term.
Object of ta StWy
1.5 The objectives of the study are as follows:
(i) to provide an understanding of the functioning of Korea's
financial markets and its important institutions, and the
monetary policies which have been followed by the BOK;
(Ui) to identify the weaknesses in the structure of the financial
system and major components of the system (banks, non-banks, and
capital markets);
(iii) to assess the effectiveness of the policies (especially interest
rates and policy loans) used by the GOK and the BOK in managing
the financial system and controlling the economy. This analysis
will include the effectiveness of bank supervision and
regulations;
(iv) to evaluate the effectiveness of Korea's financial deregulation
program to date and the proposed deregulation plan;
(v) to assess the role of the capitl market in meeting the
Livestmnt requirement. of industry, the effectiveness of the
capital market avd its lnstitutions, and the role of foreign
investment (especially foreign portfolio investment);
(Vi) to study the functioning of the foreign exchange market and the
need for capital account transaction liberalization; and
(vii) to advise the Government on the measures that would be required
to further improve the health and efficiency of the financial
system and ltp institutions, and on the sequencing of the
liberalization of the financial markets.
O_= ofdoe Repot
1.6 This report is based on the findings of a Bank mission which
visited Korea in September/October 1992. The mission worked very closely
with the three Korean research Institutes (KDI, KIF and KSRI). The report
takes into consideration the findings and recomendatians of the
institutes whLch were presented in four papersY The report is
organLzed into eight chapters. Chapter II provides an overview of
aacroeconomLc development and the macro-financial sector context. The
structure and functioning of the money market is covered in Chapter III.
Chapter IV analyzes monetary policy procedures and assesses their
effectiveness. The rationale for a switch to indirect monetary control is
anlyzed in this chapter against the background of the experience of other
countries. The role of directed credit and its impact on the financial
markets in general and monetary policy in particular is discussed in
Chapter V. Chapter VI discusses the foreign exchange system and the
workings of the foreign exchange market in Korea. A comprehensive review
of the present supervision and prudential regulation of the financial
sector and suggestions for further improvement are given in Chapter VII.
The Korean bond market, its performance and future prospects are covered
In Chapter VIII. Proposed financial sector reforms and the
recosmendations on the sequencing of these reforms are discussed in
Chapter IX.
I/ 'The Plan for Deregulation of Interest Rates", Jae-Ha Park,
Korea Institute of Finance; OLiberalization of the Korean Bond
Market", Yeong-Ho Woo, Korea Securities Research Institute and
Bubmsoo Choi, KDI; 'Deregulation of Credit Allocation", XDI and
KIF; "Foreign Exchange and Capital Account Transaction
Liberalization in Korea,' DI.
IL MACROECONOMIC CONTEXr FOR FINANCIAL SEI'OR REFORM
2.1 During most of Korea's development process, the finacial sector
has been viewed not as important in its own right, but rather as an
instrument for acceleras-ag growth in the real econoy. This was tru
ospecially during the 1970s, which saw a return to low and often negative
real intorost rate policies. The function of the financial systen was
viewed as primarily to mobilize resources and to allocate these funds to
sectors and activities whose growth was being promoted by the Coverment.
In addition to interest rate controls, this strategy was implemented
through government ownership and control of commercial banks and detailed
credit allocation schemes.
2.2 These polLcies did not contribute to the development of the
finan¢lal sector commenurate with the vitality of Korea's real economy.
By the early-1980s, the imbalance between the financial and the real
sectors of the economy were obvious to Korean policy makers. In response,
a gradual program of financial reforms was initiated and has continued
throughout the past decade. This chapter begins by providing an overview
of the macroeconomic conditions within which these reforms have been
undertaken. Section A describes the steps that were taken in the early-
1980s to stabilize the economy and to bring about structural change. The
success of this program meant that the economy was well-poised to take
advantag of favorable external conditions in the mid-1980s. As a result,
growth in 1986-88 accelerated remarkably. These trends, as well as
economic developments ince 1988, are covered in SectLon B. Recent
changes in the financial system, particularly in light of the Government's
ongoing financial sector reforms, are discussed in Section C. Finally,
the case for deepening financial sector reforms ls made in Section D. The
preconditions for further reform, the risks they pose, as well as their
potential benefits are discussed.
A. Stab.lizatin and AdjustmentDwuing tSe 1980k
2.3 After a period of rapid growth in GNP averaging almost 9 percent
p.a. during 1974-78, it became apparent by 1980 that the Korean economy
faced severe internal and external imbalances. In 1980, GNP fell by about
4 percent (for the first time in over a decade), inflation rose to alost
30 percent, and the current account deficit reached 9 percent of GNP. The
situation improved marginally in 1981, but inflation was still about 22
percent while the current account deficit stood at about 7 percent of GNP.
External debt lncreased sharply between 1979 and 1981, from about US$15
billion to over US$32 billion. ?
2.4 The immediate causes of these imbalances were unfavorable
external factors. These included the oil price shock of 1979, the
increase in international interest rates, and the recession in the OBDO
that followed. But expansionary monetary and fiscal policies also played
a part. Between 1976 and 1979, K2 grew annually at an average rate of
between 26 and 40 percent, while the fiscal deficit during 1977-81
averaged about 3 percent of GNP. This expansionary policy stance
reflected in part the shift in 1973 in the GOK's strategy from one of
general export promotlon to one of supporting the growth of heavy and
chemical LndustrLes. Important planks of this strategy included the
pr--ision of preferential tax incentives and subsidized credit to these
industries. These measures contributed significantly to monetary growth
and the fiscal deficie in the late-1970s.
2.5 The Government reacted swiftly and decislvely to these
imbalances in 1982. The stabilization strategy consisted of tight
monetary and fiscal policies combined with a nominal depreciation of the
Won. The tightening of monetary policy is evident in the fall in the
annual growth of H2 and of net domestic credit from the banking system
from about 27 percent and 39 percent in 1981 to 11 percent and 14 percent
in 1984, respectively. Fiscal restraint occurred mainly through
controlling public expenditures, and as a result, the consolidated fiscal
deficit as a share of GNP fell from 4.4 percent in 1982 to 1.5 percent in
1985. Following a 24 percent devaluation of the Won and the adoption of a
managed float in 1980, the Won continued to depreciate in nominal terms
continuously until mid-1984. After appreciating briefly in the second
half of 1984, another nominal depreciation of 10 percent occurred ln 1985.
As a result of these policies, the real effective xchange rate
depreciated by about 18 percent between 1982 and 1985.
2.6 The effects of the Government's tabilization program were
dramatic and immediate. Inflation fell to 4 percent in 1982 and remained
at that level for the next three years. The current account deficit
narrowed to 3.8 percent of GNP in 1982 and 1 percent in 1985. GNP growth
accelerated to almost 12 percent in 1983, and although it slowed in 1985,
it was still above 5 percent. The s=rorising feature of the goveNUMnt's
program wAs not that it succeeded in restoring internal and external
alnesf. but that it did so with such little gain in terms of lower output
sad investment. Along with the acceleration in GNP growth, investment
demand grew at an average rate of 18 percent in 1983-84. The reasons for
these favorable results are to be found both in external factors and in
upportive structural policy reforms. Controlling inflation in Xorea was
facilitated by weaker import prices that reflected the fall in inflation
in partner countries and the decline in commodity prices, especially for
oil. And reducing the current account deficit was made easier by the OECD
recovery that occurred after 1982 and the depreciation of the Won during
1982-83. These favorable external circumstances were complemented by a
series of structural reforms whose implementation began during the same
period. These reforms included changes in industrial policies, import
liberalization, and financial sector liberalization. This sectlon
discusses the first two of these, with the last being discussed in greater
detail in Section C.
2.7 On industrial policy, the main change that occurred in the
early-1980s was the progressive elimination of the system that provided
preferential tax and credit benefits to selected industries. It was
replaced by a system of government intervention mainly for restructuring
unprofitable industries or firms, promoting technology, and enhancing
competition. Also, special allocations of credit aimed towards small and
medium industries (SMIs) were introduced to reverse the previous bias
towards large 'Irms. Efforts to reduce import protection during this
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period built on those in the late-1970s with the relaxation of
quantitative import controls and reductions ln tariff rates. The pace of
these reforms accelerated in the 1980Q. The proportion of imports on the
automatic approval list grow (in terms of number of items) from about 69
percent in 1980, to 85 percent in 1984, and to 94 percent In 1987. By
1984, about three-quarters of all imports in value terms were approved
automatically. In 1984, the tariff reform resulted in phased general
reductlons ln tarLffs that were aimed at moving towards greater
uniformlty. As a result, tho average tariff fell from 32 percent in 1982
to about 18 percent in 1988. Apart from agriculture, whiLch remalned
hlghly protected, these measures succeeded in reducLig the level and
variatIon ln effective protectlon.
EL Recent Econic DenelIopmets
2.8 This section summarizes the main trends in the Korean economy in
the period since 1986.!/ Two phases can be distinguished and the
discussion is organized around this differentiation--the first period from
1986 to 1988, and the second from 1989 to the present (see Table 2.1 for a
summary of macroeconomic indicators).
lh. Rad Sector
2.9 Between 1986 and 1988, GNP grew at an average annual rate of
over 12 percent, due mainly to rapid growth in exports, which averaged
about 20 percent annually (Table 2.1). This led to large (and rising)
current account surpluses in each of these three years. The rapid
expansLon of exports was brought about by three favorable xternal
factors: lower oll prices, favorable xchange rates, and accelerated
economLc growth in the OECD countries. Consistent with this remarkable
growth in exports, the manufacturing sector grew more rapidly in each of
these three years, outstripplig the growth of the servlce sector.
~/ For a more detailed .- ccount, se Korea: ftr= egnmic r ,
Report No. 10733-K>, September 30, 1992.
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Gross Savings 36.5 35.9
Gross Investment 30.4 36.7
Source: Bsank of Korea, fnomic Stat stics Yearbook, 1992.
2.10 The current account surpluses during this period, which rose to
US$14.2 billion (or 8.2 percent of GNP) in 1988, obviously corresponded to
a surplus of domestic savings over investment. Much of this surplus went
towards reducing the stock of external debt, which by end-1985 had risen
to US$47.2 billion (or over 50 percent of GCP). Consequently, the stock
of debt fell by end-1988 to about US$31 billion (or about 18 percent of
GNP).
2.11 The period since 1989 has seen less spectacular growth. GCP
growtrh slowed sharply in 1989 to 6.8 percent. Although it recovered
thereafter (Table 2.1), the sources of growth have been significAntly
different. The aIn soure of gogth in the nerlod since 1289 has be
domegtig rather than exoort dand. Since 1989 (and including the first
half of 1992), the growth of private and public consumption 1a ben
faster than GCP growth. From 1989 to 1991, the contribution of net
exports to CGP growth was negative. Exports (in Won tems) actually fell
in 1989 and recovered only modestly in 1990 and 1991. Meanwhile, average
import growth in 1989-91 was over 15 percent. These trends in the
externl sector appear to have reversed in the first half of 1992, wLth
exports growing at over 12 percent and imports rising only by 7.5 percent.
Domestically, consumption growth remained strong in the first half of
1992. While GNP growth in this period slowed to an annual rate of 6.9
percent (from 8.4 percent in 1991), this Was achieved mainly because
investment grew at loss than 3 percent due to the imposition of controls
on construction activity.
2.12 As a result of these trade developments, the current account
balance, which was so comfortably in surplus in 1986-88, shrank sharply in
1989 and shifted into deficit in 1990. Although the defieit widened to
about US$9 billion in 1991 (or about 3 percent of GNP), it narrowed in the
first half of 1992, and for the entire year is expected to be about balf
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its 1991 level. These changes in the current account balance had %..eir
counterparts in a widening savings-investment ap in 1990 and 1991..
However, as Table 2.1 shows, this reflected not a falling domestic svings
rate, which stabilized at a level higher than in 1986.88, but buoyant
Investment. Both construction and equipment investment boomed in 1989-91.
And since consumption expenditures were also rising rapidly, these kept
import growth high. During this period, the construction sector replaced
manufacturing as the fastest-growing sector of the economy.
2.13 The differences in macroeconomic outcomes during this period,
relative to 1986-88, were partly due to a less favorable external
environment. The real effective exchange rate anUreciated almost 25
percent between 1987 and 1989. and while it depreciated slightly in 1990.
its appreciation again in 1991 brought it back to its 1989 level. Also,
growth in OECD countries slowed during this period. However, the more
significant changes occurred domestically. As political liberalization
proceeded, wage demands and labor disputes escalated, leading to sharply
higher unit labor costs in Korean manufacturing that hurt its
competitiveness in export markets. Moreover, consumption expenditures
(partlcularly on durables) and housing construction rose rapidly,
compensating for their repression in earlier years.
Mometay and Fiscal TM=
2.14 As a result of external surpluses, reserve money growth
accelerated between 1986 and 1988. Although BOK attempted to sterilize
these increases, mainly by issuing monetary stabilization bonds (NSBs) at
an unprecedented pace, it was unable to offset them entirely.
Consequently, they translated into accelerated growth of the monetary
aggregates--K2 growth averaged about 18 percent each year during 1986-88,
while N3 rose by almost 30 percent each year (Chapter IV). Since 1989,
the external sector has become less important as a sour'e of reserve money
growth as the current account balance has switched into deficlt. Instead,
reserve money growth has come mostly from the expansion of domestic credit
by BOK to achieve such policy objectives as compensating comercial banks
for making policy loans to preferred sectors and bailing out investment
companies.
2.15 The 1986-88 period was noteworthy also because it saw the
emergence of a surplus in the Government's consolidated fiscal accounts
(including financial and non-financial public enterprises). The surplus
In 1986 was small and grew to about 2 percent of GNP in 1988. It shrank
thereafter, and in 1990 a small deficit of about 1.2 percent of GNP
reemerged, and remained at about that level In 1991. These deficits
reflect the substantial increases in capital expenditures, primarily for
housMng and infrastructure, and the expansion of local government budgets
that have occurred over the last three years. The 1992 budget, with
expenditures about 13 percent higher than 1991 levels, is expected to bave
a comparable deficit (as a share of (MP).
-9-
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2.16 During 1986-88, prices both at the wholesale and consumer level
remained relatively stable despite the economic boom and the large wag.
increases in the latter two years. An important reason was the
appreciation of the Won in 1988, which moderated increases in the domestic
prLce of imported manufactures. But between 1989 and 1991, inflationary
pressures intensified with both consumer and wholesale orLce inflation
registering their highest levels since 1981. This rise in the inflation
rate was due to wage pressures as well as an expanslonary monetary stance.
ManufacturLog wages rose by 20 percent and 17 percent in 1990 and 1991,
following a rise of over 25 percent in 1989. Also, as noted earlier, K2
and M3 grew annually at average rates of almost 20 and 30 percent in 1989
and 1990. Consumer and wholesale price inflation slowed in the first-half
of 1992 to about 3.5 percent and 6.8 percent, respectively. These
decreases appear to reflect a somewhat tighter monetary stancea, which saw
K2 and 13 growth ln 1991 and the first half of 1992 fall slightly relative
to 1991, as well as administrative curbs on construction activlty that
have slowed the economy.
C Recent Cahages Ih the Finanew System
2.17 Reform of the financial sector in Korea has been a deliberate
process that has boen ongoing sLnce the early-1980s. It began in 1981
with the Government's divestiture of its equity holdings in three
commercial banks, and has since involved changes in a variety of areas,
including changes in licensing requirements for new flnancial
lnstitutions, decontrol of imuerest rates, changes in credit allocation
policies, and liberalization of capital flows. These reforms have had a
signifLcant impact on domestic savings and its financialization, the
structure of the financial system, the conduct of monetary policy, the
fragmentation of financial markets, and the openness of the capital
account.
2.18 Duriag the 1970w, the deepening of the financial sector in Korea
was hampered by negative real interest rates. As a result of interest
rate reforms and the fall in inflation, financial sector development
accelerated in the early to mid-1980s. As Table 2.2 shows, several
measures of financial deepening rew rapidly during this period. The
ratio of broad money (M2) to GNP rose from 0.32 in 1979 to 0.41 by 1990.
Broader measures of financial depth rose even more dramatically. The
ratio of H3 to GNP has increased continuously from 1979 onwards, almost
tripling by 1991. Domestic financial assets as a share of GNP have almost
doubled over this period. The more rapid growth in the broader ratios of
financial depth than in the ratio of 12 to GNP shows that the pace of
financial development was dictated by factors bey1mnd the establishment of
real positive interest rates.
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2.10 The more rapid growth in £3 compared to 142 reflects the
ezpansion of BFIs as a result of the regulatory advantages that they
continued to enjoy (including less stringent interest rate controls). The
expanuion of financial assets during the 1980s also reflects the growing
role of securities markets and the introduction of new financial assets.
owever, despite these lncreases in the depth of torea's financial sector
during the last decade, the controls that remain on financial sector
activity have meant that it is less developed than in other countries.
Chart 2.1 illustrates this by comparing the ratio of £2 to CNP In Korea
with other East Asian countries. Chart 2.2 compares the ratio of K2 to
lGNP in Korea with three selected OECD countries (the United States, Japan,
Germany) and Taiwan. The development of the financial sector in Korea i
clearly behind these countries.
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2.20 Siace 1980, the gross national savings rate increasod steadily,
but the most drmatic upward shifts occurred In 1986 and 1987 (Table 2.3).
While the 1988 rate was even higher, its subsequent fall in 1990 and 1991
lndicates that the increase may have been transitory. However, a savings
rate of 36 percent, which was the average of the last three years, is
still a remarkable increase over a period of little more than a decade.
Sven more dramatic has been the behavior of household savings. This rate
almost tripled between 1980 and 1991 (Table 2.3). While the maintenance
of positive real interest rates clearly contributed to higher savings, it
appears that the sharp rise in household incomes since the mid-1980a may
have been a more Important Influence. Apart from this sharp increase In
the household savings rate, the other source of higher savings has been
the increase In the corporate savings rate, which rose from an average of
a 10 percent level In the 1970s and 1980s to an average of about 17
percent during 1988-1990. These remarkably hlgh saylng. rates. combined
with thebos tgncy of govrnment savints mean that continud high real
interest rates in Korea canot be9 full attributed to lack of cagital,
One of the reasons for the high intermediation cost in Korea is the lack
of cognetition in the finanial my. tern.
hIe2.3: Korea - Saving and mvsatneut, 19691
Gross Savinps 0.33 0.37 0.39 0.35 0.36 0.36
Household O.1S 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.17 n.a.
Corporate 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.10 n.a.
6averrment 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08
Gross Investment 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.39
Gross pvt cap form 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.34
Gross gov cap form 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
Source: Bank of Rorea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various Issues.
8trthre of tX P1ns I Systm
2.21 In 1981, the Government divested itself of the ownership of
three nationwide city banks (NCBs), and by 1983 all NCBs were privately
owned. Actions were also taken to increase the autonomy of commercial
banks by reducing the Government'a influence on managerial appointments
and eliminating the system of detailed credit controls as the principal
tool of monetary policy. A number of steps were also taken to encourage
competitLon among financial instLtutions. Two new NCBs were licensed in
1982 and 1983--both joint ventures with foreign banks. In 1985, the
licensing requirements for new NBFIs were relaxed so as to reduce entry
- 13 -
barriers .!/ The local branches of foreign banks have also been allowed
to compote w*th domestic institutlons in providing some financial
*ervices. Finally, some of the regulatory differences between comercial
banks ana HilMs, which had favored the latter, have been removed. The
Intention of these regulatory changes has been to level the playLng field
between these institutions, and thereby to promote competition. As a
roult, commercial banks have been allowed to engage in activities that
had previously been reserved for NBFIs, such as Lssuing CDs, operating
trust accounts. and dealing in comrcLal paper, as well as owning NBFIP
as subsidiaries. Furthermore, the interest rate differential between DlBs
and NBFIs (both on loans and deposlts) was progressively decreased between
1984 and 1987!/.
2.22 However, as the divergence in growth betweon M2 and M3
indicated, NBFIs have grown much faster than deposit money banks during
the 1980s. Table 2.4 sumnarizes the relative shares of various segments
of the financial system both in terms of deposits and loans. The growth
of NBFIs reflects theo Gverment's success in moving funds from the curb
msakets (which had grown when real interest rates were negative during the
1970.) into the organized financial sector. The curb financial market ha
uov effectively been integrated into the organized sector. Whereas the
curb market accounted for about 10 percent of financial savings in 1985,
it is now reportedly negligible in size. Its business both on the deposit
and lending side has been taken over by NBFIs. The main beneficiaries of
this integration have been large savers who now enjoy significantly higher
returns on funds invested in NBFIs than they did before in non-financial
assets or In the banking system.
J0k2 Korea . Tot Flhusu Assets, 19664
(BIllo of WM)
Nzowl FBo k$^i 76,204 90,204 104,664 124,723 Lie,444 187,1 6 18J,1T3
i XEY1 ~~73,874 92,224 121,172 159,893 215,809 V71,7 291,41at
Sot l 15,078 182.420 225.896 28X,*16 3n ,2J77 U 8,9 U 479,610
gnu Ia* X of Sot 49.22 5 s3.7 5.2X 57.7X 59.2X 60.8X
Mgt: S uat aeounot £Ubudd In On asSets.
8s iak ot Mou.
2/ The NBFI sector in Korea consists of development banks, investment
companies (including merchant banks, investment and finance companies,
and investment rusts), savings institutions (including mutual savings
and finance companies, credit unions, and mutual credits), and
insurance companies. The use of the acronym in this chapter should
be understood to apply only to investment companies, which most
closely resemble banking institutions.
8/ Moreover, interest rate controls on loans are applied less stringently
to NBFIs than banks.
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2.23 Some of the financial reforms of the 1980s roduced the
rogulatory advantages enjoyed by NBFls relative to banks. But these
institutions still continued to be able to offer savers higher interest
rates than banks, and faced fewer government-imposed limits on the
management of assets and llabilities. Morover, entry restrictions into
this segment of the financial market were also eased. Finally (and as
dlscussed further below), these instltutions are not constrained by
monetary tightening (which uses K2 as the litermediate target).
Consequently, corporate borrowers have turned to NBnIs during periods in
which bank credit has been squeezed. The result has been the explosive
growth in their share of total assets (Table 2.4).
2.24 Another structural change in the financial system that occurred
during the 1980s was the growth in segments of the market that are not
subject to interest rate controls--in particular, the markets for
commerclal paper and corporate bonds.±/ Despite the steps that were
taken towards deregulating interest rates on bank loans, deposit rates
have remained low and tightly controlled. In part, this has led to
disintermdiation of the banking sector by encouraging savers to deposit
funds in NBFIs. But funds have also flowed into the commercial paper,
corporate bond, and (until the dovnturn in 1990) stock markets because
yields In these markets are determined primarily by market forces. As a
result, the share of financial savings held as securities of various klnds
increased from about 21 percent (in gross terms) in 1979 to about 30
percent in 1991.!/
SegmaataUo of tlmc Markes
2.25 Among the main problems that have affected the financial sector
In Korea is its segmentation. As a result of the controls and regulations
that have been placed on it, different borrowers are charged widely-
varying interest rates on borrowed funds, even for investments that
involve the same degree of risk. Such segmentation Is inefficient because
it implies that many projects that deserve financing are rationed of
credit while others with lower rates of return are financed. Policy
makers in Korea have been aware of such segmentation and the attendant
inefficiency. Therefore, msny of the policy changes that were made during
the 1980J were intended to unify various segments of the financial market.
2.26 Some progress in reducing segmentation has occurred, especially
relative to the 1970s. One measuwe of this is shown by Table 2.5, which
compares the average cost of borrowing across manufacturing firms that
differed by size, export orientation and industrial subsector. Along all
three attributes, the gap has narrowed since 198C although there have
been swings in both directions. The largest and b.,st consistent decrease
has been in the preferential secess to funds of the export sector, and of
*/ But as discussed in detail in Chapter V, other restrictions have
stunted the development of the corporate bond market.
5/ See Nam (1992).
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heavy Industry.!/ Each of these changes is a result of the policy
changes In the early-1980s that reduced preferential lending to these
sectors and abolished lending at subsidixed rates to these sectors. To
the extent that those reforms reduced the range and coverage of
preferential interest rates on loans, the sectoral biases in the pricing
of credit have been narrowed and the segmentation of the credit market
reduced. Banks now have more freedom to price their loans according to
their riskiness.
Tabkle Kome -Averge Cost of Borrwbging I. th auatigsector, 19*-91
Export l~~~~~~~P0 1.0.. 12.7--
All Menufacturig 18.7 103 .4 6 12.7 13.0
Large 1874 3.3 1374 12.3 
Ledium 20.7 14.4 1485 14.4 14.3
.(Msdium-Large) 2.3 1.1 1.1 2.1 1.6
aveort 16.0 13.0 14.1 12.6 12.7
Domestic 21.0 13.6 13.4 12.8 13.1
(Domestic-Large) 5.0 0.6 -0.7 0.2 0.4
Heavy 17.6 12.7 13.5 12.5 12.7
Light 20.1 14.8 13.8 13.1 13.5
(Light-Heavy) 2.5 2. 1 0.3 06 08
Source: Bank of Korea, Financial Statemont Analysis, various issus.
2.27 Despite the narrowing of the interest rate differentials noted
earlier, a substantial amount of policy-induced segmentation remains
(Chapter V). The sizable volume of policy loans, stringent interest rate
controls on loans and deposits, and differential regulatory treatment of
various segments of the financial system all contribute to this
fragmntation. Somewhat ironically, the recent rapid growth of NBFIs,
although induced by their regulatory privileges, has probably worked to
reduce the segmentation of financial markets. Becguse these instltutions
are less constrained by interest rate controls and credit allocation
requirements, they are freer to finance economically viable projects and
to vary their lending rates according to the riskiness of projects and
borrowers.
Opng of te Capita Accout
2.28 Chapter VI provides a detailed discussion of the capital
6/ Cho and Cole (1992) also show that the differentials in average
borrowing costs across manufacturing subsectors narrowed significantly
between the 19708 and the 1980s (p. 130).
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account. Liberalization of capital flows has also been undertaken
cautiously since 1981. Until then, strict controls were maintained on
both inflows and outflows of capital. Since 1984, inflows of portfolio
investment have been liberalized progressively. Initially, limited
investmaent Wa allowed in Korean stocks by foreigners through investment
funds, foreign securities companies were allowed to open representative
offices, and Korean companies were permitted to raise foreign capital
through equity-linked bonds. In 1992, foreigners were allowed to invest
directly in Korean stocks subject to limits. Also, free capital
repatriation is now allowed. However, foreign borrowing by Korean
companies is still not allowed and Koreans cannot hold foreign currency
deposits. Chapter VI discusses the GOK's policy for capital market
liberalization.
D. Precondiftbos for Further Financi Sector Rtefr
2.29 Experience points to three key preconditions if programs of
financial sector reform are to succeed. First, it is essential that there
be macroeconomic stability. If interest rates are liberalized when
inflation i8 high and variable, the result is usually high levels of real
interest rates. Lenders respond to uncertainty about inflation by widening
the spread between deposit and lending rates. Also, liberalizing the
capital account in this situation leads to large capital inflows and
causes the real exchange rate to appreciate sharply with serious adverse
effects on the tradeable goods sector.
2.30 These theoretical arguments square with the experiences of the
Southern Cone countries (Chile, Uruguay and Argentina) when they undertook
ambitious financial sector reforms in the mid-1970s.!/ The measures that
were implemented included liberalizing interest rates and capital
controls, eliminating credit allocation schemes, and privatizing domestic
banks while promoting the entry of new banks. However, as their
experience illustrates, even far-reaching financial reforms can be an
expensive failure if implemented when serious macroeconomic imbalances
exist. In all these countries, real interest rates remained extrmely
high even after the financial reforms, and despite liberalization of the
capital account. Moreover, large capital inflows led to real exchange
rate appreciation that hurt exports and led to monetary expansion that
continued to feed inflationary expectations. Eventually, all three
countries were forced to abandon their reform programs in the face of the
failures of corporations and financial institutions.
2.31 Korea's macroeconomy is stable. Although the current account
shows a deficit, it has fallen sharply this year, and the deficit is
sustainable since adequate flows of foreign financing are available. The
consolidated public sector account is roughly in balance. And finally,
the inflation rate is falling after having risen to almost double-digit
levels in 1991.
t/ See Edwards and Cox-Edvards (1987) for detaile concerning the Chilean
experience.
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2.32 ESAg,d. significant liberalization of the real economy should
either be completed or carrled out simultaneously with the reform of the
domestic financial sector. If domestic prices are distorted substantially
due to protection, investment incentives or price controls, it is possible
that when liberalized, the domestic finaniLal sector will respond to the
wrong price signals. The sectoral allocation of resources could,
therefore, be worsened as a result. This happened in Chile, for instance,
during its first attempt at financial reform in the 1970s. The real
appreciation of the exchange rate that resulted from opening the capltal
account meant that incentives favored the non-tradeables sector even more
than before. Over-investment in these sectors, particularly real estate,
and a subsequent collapse were the results.
2.33 Substantial liberalization has also occurred in the real sector.
Industrial policy is now less interventionist and sector-specific. It
relies instead on functional support of industries dictated by market
failure. Similarly, the trade regime is now less protectionist. Tariffs
have been lowered and made more uniform and the coverage of quantitative
restrictions reduced. In November 1988, Korea also accepted the
obligations of Article VIII of the IMF, implying that it is comfitted to
full liberalization of the current account.
2.34 Another key consideration that points towards success in
Liberalizing the financial sector is the Government's enviable record of
implementing past reform programs. Whether in undert.t&ing macroeconomic
stabilization in the early-1980s or trade liberalization in the latter
half of the 1980s, the Government has announced its intentions with a
detailed blueprint and then stayed the course with its policy changes.
For this reason, the policy credibility of the Government is extremely
high.
2.35 Third, it is essential that a strong framework for prudential
regulation and bank supervision be in place when financial reform occurs.
A relatively well-developed system of prudential supervision is in place
in Korea since the Government has historically exercised strong control
over the financial system. The details of this framework and the main
area in which this system should be strengthened to support financial
sector reforms are discussed in Chapter VII of this report.
2.36 Proposed financial sector reforms, their sequencing, as well as
the costs and benefits of such reforms, are discussed in Chapter IL.
mL sIRucfruR AND FUNCTIONING OF THE MONEY MARKEr
3.1 A well developed money market is a precondition for implementing
indirect monetary controls. The main features of such a market would
include: (1) availability of broad range of money market instruments with
ample liquidity; (ii) market based pricing of instruments at different
maturities and risks; (iii) a large number of active market participants
i.e., inmestors, dealers, brokers; (iv) ready access to market infozmtion
by all participants; (v) well functioning credit rating organizations; and
(vi) an efficient system of clearing and settlement of trades. Indirect
monetary control procedures will function well under these conditions.
This chapter discusses the structure and functioning of the Korea money
market and identifies areas which need to be strengthened.
A. Nature and Or n k of tMe Moey Markey
3.2 The oney market is broadly defined to include all instruments
easily converted into cash that are used by goverments and financial and
commercial Institutions for short-term funAing and placements. The mony
market provides market participants with s arious instruments to
interediate their short-term demand for mid supply of funds. In Korea,
the money market developed in the 1960s /ith the issuance of Monetary
Stabilization Bonds (MSBs) (1961) and Treasury Bills (1967). It now
embraces a wide range of financial instruments, including: Commercial
Paper (CP), Negotiable Certificates of Deposit (CDs) (1974), Repurehase
Agreements (RPs), Bankers Acceptancos (BAs) (1989), and Call Money Market
(inter-bank market). The Govermenit made a conscious effort to develop
this market to bring the curb market into the organized financial systm
with the promlgation of the Short-term Financing Business Act, and the
establishment of inestment and finance companies and the call transaction
center in the Korea Bankers' Association. The laes segmns of the
money market are call money coercial paner and tUBs.
can Mony Market
3.3 The call money market was established in 1975 with a view to
alleviating very short-term shortages or surpluses of funds among
financial institutions. The participants in the call money market are
nationwide comercial banks, specialized banks, regional banks, investmnt
and finance companies, merchant banking corporations, investment trust
companies, insurance companies, the Korea Securities Finance Corporation,
the Credit Insurance Fund, and foreign bank branches in Korea. The
Goverrment dosignated six investment and finance companies and the Korea
1/ This &id other sections of this chapter have benefitted from the
study, Money and Monetary Policy in Korea," 1990, by Noon-Soo
Rang, Korea Development Institute, Seoul.
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Financial Clearing Institute (KFCI) as dealers in the call money market.
At the boginning, the market dealt with four types of transactions
according to maturity: overnight loans, 3-day loans, 7-day loans, and 15-
day loans. Coll transactions were made in multiples of V 100 million.
3.4 The call market was originally divided into two segments: the
exchange market (mainly for banks) and the over-the-counter market (mainly
for non-bank financial institutions or NBFIs). Major borrowers In the
exchange market were nationwide comercial banks, which often were short
of funds. In this market, the inter-bank rate was allowed to move freely.
though in practice its movement was hamstrung by money market regulations
of one type or another, thereby attenuating its market character. Often
times, the demand of borrowing Institutions, which were the nationwide
commercial banks, went unsatisfied. In such situations, the regulatory
authorlties intervened to allocate the funds to nationwide banks before
considering the requirements of other financial institutions. This meant
effectively a restriction on competitiveness in the money market for funds
from the NBFIs. Furthermore, there was a ceiling on borrowing by the
market participants equal to 5 percent of their sverage deposit balances
during two months prior to the transactions.
3.5 This restricted access by the NBFIs left them to rely on the
over-the-counter markets, where the funds were borrowed or lent at rates
higher than in the exchange market, which could be considered to be market
determined. Until 1989, when both these segments of the money market were
integrated, the average interest rate in the excbange market was around 12
percent, which was lower by three percentage points than the rate
prevailing in the over-the-counter market.
3.6 Since October 1989, the Government bas integrated the two
exchanges and the over-the-counter markets into a single market to improve
the efficLency of the money market. Seven dealers--six investment and
finance companies and the KFCI--were appointed to deal in the market. The
new integrated call money market has the following characteristics:
Ci) all financial institutions, about 240 institutions, participate in the
integrated call money market; (iL) transactlons can be implemented either
through designated ealers or directly between market participants;
(iii) the maturity period of transactions changed from the earlier four
categories to seven--overnight loans, and 3, 5, 7, 9, 11 and 15 day loans;
(iv) the ceiling on the maximum amount of borrowing by each participant
and the restrictions on the hours of transactions were repealed; and
(v) reserve accounts at BQK when a bank transacts with another bank could
be used for clearing purposes; in all other cases transactions are settled
through bank account transfers through dealers' notice; call rates were
freed from any restrictions. Table 3.1 details the main characteristics
of the money market before and after integration.
3.7 The consequences of the integrated inter-bank money market were
dramatic. As evident from Table 3.2, the average balances in the inter-
bank market ballooned from V 634.4 billion as of ond-1988 to v 3,118.7
billion by end-1991. At the same time, the role of NBFIs in onoy market
transactions increased in relation to that of banks. Thus, direct
transactions between banks diminished from 33.8 percent In 1989 to just
3.2 percent in 1990. However, the call rate in the call money market
differed for transactions between banks and between the NBFIs. As of June
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1992, the banks, securities companies and investment trust companLes were
net borrowers in the inter-bank market, as against short-term finance
companles and lisurance companies which have been net lenders (Table 3.3).
It wa observed that th. margins between these two rates generally hovered
between 2-3 percentage points, thereby reflecting a lack of full
competition in the money market. The reasons for this may well be that
the banks, faced with ceilings on the main items of their liabilities and
assets urder a regime of regulated interest rate policy in Korea, are
loath to face higher interest rates on their borrowing, determined
competitively in the money market.
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3.8 Commercial paper (CP) is a short-term promissory note which is
issued by eligible non-financial eompanios, ivestment and finance
companies, and merchant banking corporations. Thirty-two investment and
finance companies and six merchant banking corporations engage in the
short-term financing business as dealers In commercial paper. Only those
business firms which are selected as eligible firms by investment and
finance companies can issue commercial paper. For business firms,
commercial paper is issued usually as a substitute for short-term bank
loans. Broadly speaking, there are five kinds of instruments in the
commercial paper market: (i) the *own paper" which is Issued by
investment and finance companies and merchant banking corporations
thwmselves; (ii) the resold note with recourse which is issued by business
firms and whose payments are guaranteed by dealers; (ilL) the resold note
without recourse which ls issued by bus mness firms but whose payments are
not guaranteed by dealers; (iv) CP introduced In June 1981 with longer
maturities and larger minimum denominatL ons than other instruments
explained above; and (v) a Cash Management Account (CMA), the yield of
which Is linked to the rate of return from pooled commercial paper
(accepted by dealers) and other financial assets.
3.9 The CP, however, was integrated into the category of resold
notes without recourse in December 1988. The comercial Saner market has
.been one of the most rapidly deloning mone markets since its
establIshbment I  AuusOt 1972.. and it is fth largest gector am=n the mone
markota. At the end of 1991, the outstanding amount of commercial paper
discounted asounted to V 22.1 trillion, accounting for 8.8 percent of
external funds raised by the corporate business sector. However, there is
no active secondary market in comercial paper, though comercial paper
can be redeemed from dealers before maturity with specified loss of
Interest. ITnestment and finance companies have been the dominant plaMers
amnng dealers in the cgmmercial gaper market. accounting for 98.3 uercent
of sales as of the end of 1989. Inmestment and finance companies (IFCs)
and merchant banking corporations (KBCs) used to adjust the amount of the
de facto compensating balances according to the degree of tightness of
fund availability in the money market when interest rates were regulated
in the commercial paper market. When IFCs and HBCs discounted the
commercial paper issued by their clients (borrowers), they asked their
borrowers to set aside a portion of the borrowing and to buy *own paper"
or "resold commercial paper without recourse" that offered interest rates
lower then the discount rates of the commercial paper. Thus, the
compensating balance raised the effective discount rate, or the cost of
borrowing from IFCs and NBCse which was a cause of many complaints from
the borrowers. In 1989, the MOF asked short-term finance companies
(STFC), to abolish their practice of requlring their borrowers to deposit
de facto compensating balances when they discounted the commercial paper
of their clients. The MOF included the abolition of compensating balances
as one of the preconditions for allowing STFCs to open additional business
offices, which was vital to their competing with other financial
institutions, as well as among thmselves in the financial market.
3.10 During the first four months after the policy announcement by
the NOF, November 1989-February 1990, compensating balances at STFCs were
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reduced sharply. The abolition of compensating balances at STFCs resulted
In brliging about effective Interest rate liberalisation in the commrcial
paper market. STPCs began to charge market related interest rates to
borrowers, which were higher than before. The commrcial paper interest
rate thus rose to 13.95 percent at the end of November, from 13.41 percent
at th end of October 1989. At the end of February 1990, the commercial
paper interest rate climbod up to 14.05 percent. Since ,Orest rat an
roe-Ad naneae essntalaly market deterined. he are nrombabW b
beat avial ndctro market interest rateS in Kr
Nq_tAb Cuwu_ft ef Depost Mare
3.11 A negotiable certificate of deposit (CD) is a certificate issued
by a bank as evidence that a certain amount oi! money has been deposited
for a flxed period of time and will be redeemed with interest at maturity.
The certiflcate specifies the amount of the deposit, the maturity date and
the interest rate. The certificate is negotiable and can be traded on the
secondary market. CD business received a setback in December 1981 because
of poor performance, but nationwide commercial banks, regional banks and
the Korea Exchange Bank resumed the CD business in June 1984. In March
1985, the CD business was opened to all banklng institutions. The
reintroduction of CDs was designed to promote banks' competitiveness with
FIs in attracting short-term deposits by offering a higher interest rate
than thrt applied to ordinary time deposits. The inimum denomination of
CDs was lowered from V 100 mIllion to U 50 million in February 1987 and
the maturity period set between 91 days and 180 days. The scale of the CD
market has gradually expanded since 1984; at the end of October 1991 the
outstanding amount of CDs amounted to V 9,940 billion, compared to V 1,080
billion at the end of 1985. At the end of October 1991, speclalized banks
and nationwide commercial banks commanded shares of 40.3 percent and 33.5
percent, respectlvely, in the CD market. At the end of 1989, corporate
enterprises and individuals held, respectively, 39.9 percent and 30.9
percent of CDs issued by banks, while finacial inst1--utions such as
investment and finance companies and investment trust companies hold 21.1
percent of CDs as reserves.
3.12 Investment add finance companies, securities companies and
merchant banking corporations trade negotiable CDs on the secondary
mark t. However, the secondary market is inactive. The amount of monthly
secondary market transactions in the CD market, however, was only V 66.5
billion in 1989, or 0.5 percent of the outstanding amount of CDs.
3.13 A standard repurchase agreement (RP) involves the acquisition of
immediately available funds through the sale of securities with a
sLmultaneous commitment to repurchase the same securlties on a specified
date within one year at a specified price, which includes interest. RP
transactions have many characteristics of secured lendlng arrangements in
which underlying securities serve as collateral. Securities eligible for
RP tranactions are national bonds, local bonds, special bonds, and
corporate bonds. RPs were first introduced in February 1977 when the
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Korea Securities Finance Corporate (KSFC) made RP trsnsactions with
securities companies. Securities companies and banks have been allowed to
engage in RP business since 1980. Post offices have been licensed to
handle this business since March 1983. Banks and post offiees have been,
however, permitted to handle only the sale of government and public bonds
on repurchase agreements.
3.14 The major suppliers of bonds--that i8, borrowers of funds--in
the RP market are securities companies, banks, post offices and business
corporations. The major lenders are individual investors and non-proflt
organizations. The minimum transaction unit is V 100 million.
3.15 The duration of RP transactions differs according to the
transacting institution. The period of transaction is limited to less
tnau one year for the KSFC and securities companles. For banks, the
period of RP transaction is limited to between 91 days and one year. For
post office saving bonds, the period of transactlon is restricted to less
than 91 days. For large RPs, the minimum transaction unit is W 50 million
and the period of transaction is between 6 months and one year. The scale
of the RP market has rapidly increased in the past nine years. The
outstsnding amount of sales of repurchase agreements reached V 3,6
trillion at the end of 1991, 35 times the balance at the end of 1980. At
the end of 1989, the outstanding amount of purchases by the KSFC and
securities companLes was, however, just 3.3 percent of that of sales on
repurchase agreements.
Trmsq Bil MA*ds
3.16 Treasury bills (TBs) are short-term obligations of the
Government. Since the Treasury bills are considered to be totally risk
free they are ;enerally the most marketable of all money market
instruments and the T-Bill rates are used as benchmark for pricing other
short and long instruments. The maxlmu, amount of issuance of TBs in each
fiscal year is decided by the National Assembly as part of annual budget
deliberations. Treasury bills have tc be redeemed within one year. Since
1967, TBa have been issued to help monetary management policy, except in
1981. In that year, TBs were issued to finance a temporary shortage of
Treasury funds. The issuance of TB. was suspended from 1983 to 1985.
Since 1987, the Government has been increasingly relying on the sale of
Treasury bills to absorb excess liquidity in the financial market. At the
end of 1991, the balance of Treasury bills in the market amounted to V 2.2
trillion, compareu with the outstanding balance of the MSBs at the end of
1991 of V 13.4 trillion. Similar to ESBs (see below), TBs are allocated
by the Government to the financial institutions. Since the G0K has
followed a very prudent fiscal policy there has not been a need to issue a
large amount of the T-bills. As a result. there is no real benchmark of
ineat rXte in Korea exceut perhaps the interest xate on commercLal
paner (pars 3.10. Bescause of the lack of availability of T- bills ia
size and Uturity neither the urimrL or secondary market for government
securIties bLan dM eld. There is a need to create such a market and
benchmark for interest rates if the indirect monetary control procedures
are to be adopted. In the future, the GOK may consider issuing the T-Bills
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for its refinancing purpose or for specific new public sector investments
on market based interest rate through competitive auction.
Monby S o mb
3.17 Monetary Stabilization Bonds (MSBs) which provide BOK with a
princIpal open market instrument, when there Is a shortage of other
eligible paper such as T-bills or longer-term government bonds, are the
labillties of BOK. The BOK issues SlBe to banks, securities companies,
investment and finance companies, investment trusts and life insurance
companies. The maturity period of MSBs varies between 14 days and 546
days. Though NSBs have been in existence for many years, their use has
been activated by the BOK since 1986 in order to absorb the increasing
excess iiquidity in the financial market that initially originated in
1986-89 from the large surplus in the balance of payments. The
outstanding amount of HSBe in 1985 was barely V 504.1 billion; it shot up
to V 17,305 billion in 1989 when Korea experienced a large current account
surplus. The outstanding volume declined in 1990 due to a current account
deficit and the preference of the BOK to use government bonds to absorb
liquidity (Chapter IV). However, the use of MSBs increased in 1991 with
the need to absorb excess liquidity to control inflation. Its Importance
as paper used in open market operations is revealed in the high ratio of
lSBs outstanding to total bonds--NSBs, T-bills and foreign exchange
stabilization bonds which are employed in conducting open market
operations. More details of lSBa are given in Section C of Chapter TV.
IL Growth ndicators of the Money Market
3.18 A measure which relates the value of a money market instrument
to narrowly defined money (Ml), regarded as a close substitute for money
market instruments, is used here as an indicator of the size, and
importance of the money market instrument, and relative rates of change in
the quantity of these instruments relative to the change in Ml as an
indicator of the relative growth of those instruments. The indicators for
the money market instruments are presented in Table 3.4. Between the end
of December 1980 and end of December 1991, the nominal money supply (Ml)
increased by 276.4 percent. The value of transactions in the call money
market increased by 544.8 percent during the same period, giving a growth
elasticity of call transactions relative to Ml of 1.71. The value of
commercial paper increased during the sam period by 821.8 percent, giving
a growth elasticity of commercial paper relative to Ml of 2.45. The value
of repurchase agrees 'had a very high relative growth elasticity of
9.97 between Decembe 4 .dO and December 1985, but since then has declined.
lSBs of the BOK had a very high growth elasticity of 18.11 relative to Ml
between December 1485 and December 1989, reflecting the activated public
sale of lSBs to absorb Increasing excess liquidity in the financial
market. Thus, it is clear that money market in Korea has been growing in
size and diversity in the last few years, paving the way for a bolder
action to liberalize the interest rates which have long been constrained
in a straightjacket of regulations.
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T4ab Kom . Growt IWdt of Mo M t ns 198049
D.e 1960 
Uleatoty to r EniUi_S
UlUetty to tl
Doo_r 1988 0.osa 1.0175 0.1959 0.1442 0.09ao 1.2632
ZodUolty to "I 1.08 1.08 0.7a 0.688 0.94 1.56
Dsou g 1980-89
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Jastrumt (1) 544.8 621.$ 1,557.1 70.9 La 1,162.5 3,533.9 m
Zisity to tM 1.71 2.45 4.41 0.90 0 _ 3.41 18.11
_ , . _, _ 
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/A D.oe. 198D00-P9M 1989 for lgotiblo CDs and b1.
E: "heo-u X.,.N. I" bmketn Manet.arr Poli A" ore, 1990. D_v t lute.
C. Levd and Sucture of lnte Rates
3.19 The level and structure of interest rates prevailing in the
Korean money market are given in Table 3.5. As shown therein, the inter-
bank market and the yields on certificates of deposits are as prevailed at
end-June 1992. Despite the differences in time, one thing that emerges
from the table is that the rates in the money market proper--that is, the
Inter-bank market and CD market--are higher than those on bank deposits
and loans of identical maturities, suggesting that money market rates are
more reflective of the market forces of demand and supply. Furthermore,
there is soe empirical evidence that money market interest rates and curb
rates show a considerable integration in that the various interest rates
in the market move in tandem, either in upward or downward directions.
However, despite the rapid development of the money market in Korea in
recent years, it is not as efficient as it should be, mainly because the
financial intermediaries (especially the deposit money banks) are subject
to rigid interest rate controls, while the nJFIs are subject to informl
"window guidance" from the BOK or HOF. The efficiency of the market
should improve materially if the Government reduces its intervention in
the market and accelerates interest rate deregulation.
TJbb 1 Komea - S _tmot M _ay Mult ltset Rates, 19-92
- pi Am)
1990 7.0 10.0 10.0
19 7.0 10.0 10.0 16.04 1623 17.18 17.44 10 IO .8 17 61016
192 7.0 l o10.0 10.0 14 SS 14 0$ 14.87 14.07 7 .31 17 52 16 46 1832
Met&s Date r1 as of et -Jm.
Ibe2 DM, nwL .. _ Ides.
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D. Mmety Pocy amnb and the Money Maiet
3.20 As mentioned earlier, a well developed money market i8 a
precondition for implementing indirect onetary controls. Trough an active
money the monetary authorities can influence the level and structure of
market literest rates. In Korea, until 1988, as observed in Chapter IV,
the indirect monetary policy control of interest rates through open market
operations sidmlar to that in the USA has been minimal. This wa. because
the BOK as vell as the MOF were setting, through regulations and rules,
maxim. interest rates on each type of deposit and loan of banks, and
controlling the volume of bank credit through moral suasion and/or other
means. Even after the ceilings on interest rates were relaxed or removed
in 1988, informal window guidance has been achieving the same results as
the formal regulations as far as the levels of market interest rates are
concerned. The BOK uses rediecount policy to influence money market
rates; however, the manner in which this policy is conducted prohibits
indirect monetary control from functioning the way it would traditionally
work in a well-developed money markets, as rediscounts used to regulate
liquidity in the financial markets and to control banks, reserve posLtions
are very small. Reserve requirements (RRs) have been the other instrument
often used in Korea as an indirect monetary policy instrument, but this
Instrument is not used as frequently because the BOK is reluctant to
dLsturb the portfolio of the banking system. Onen market cggrations of a
traditional type under which government paper of different maturities is
bought and sold at varying prices has not been adopted in Korea due to the
lack of market based government securities in volume and maturities.
3.21 Korea has a reasonably well functioning money market. However,
the Government vould need to further develop money market in order to move
from direct monetary controls to indirect monetary controls of the
financial system. This will require full liberalization of interest rates
and introduction of risk free market based Lnstruments. These could
achieve through auctioning of new T-bills or refinancing of the NSBs
using market bsed interest rates as they become due. Associated
infrastructures such as the creation of a network of broker/dealer,
further development of credit rating agencies (Chapter VIII), and
creation of on-line information on government securities to market
participants for effective functioning of the secondary market, would need
to be built in order to further increase the depth of the money market and
foster its development.
E Summaydandn
3.22 The foregoing discussion of money market organization and
development shows that the money market in Korea has grown in size and
diversity in the last few years. However, the development of money market
has been constrained due essentially to interest rate controls and lack of
market bssed government securities which could be used as benchmark for
pricing money market instruments. Although many instruments like CDs, CP
and ESEs are traded in the secondary market, the rates are influenced
through informal window guidance. Of all the individual segments of the
money market, the commercial paper and inter-bank markets have been the
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most competitive egments and have functioned with a minimum of
restrictions.
3.23 Currently in the primary market, the most liquid of money market
instruments are NSBs. However, their sale in the primary market has been
managed by the BOK and the interest rates are set substantially below
market rate. * The MSJs are allocated to the NBFIs by the BOK, and as
issued now, are essentially an instrument to tax the financial sector
(especially NnPIs) in order to finmace the quasi-deficit of the BOK caused
by the subsidized policy loans. In order to be an efficient instrument
for conducting open market operations, the size of the issue has to be
large and the maturities should vary in order to enable construction of a
yield curve. NSBs meet this criteria. Therefore, it is recommended the
GOK consider advancing the lifting of control on MSBs from 1997 to 1993.
The Government can easily achieved this through issuance of MSBs which
will fall due during 1993. The Government should also consider issuing
treasury bills and treasury notes at market rates in amounts and
maturities on a regular basis. The T-bill rate as a reliable market
indicator may then emerge. Auctioning of such securities will be the
most efficient way to achieve this. Effective auctioning will require a
notwork of accredited dealers/brokers. A large number of them already
exist and will need to be accredited.
3.24 The BOK and the ROF should abstain from intervention in the
money market, directed toward umangement of sale of money market
instruments and the interest rates thereon. All papers, be they CPs, CDs,
or BAs, should be allowed to be issued by market participants at market
determined interest rates.
3.25 The Government should also encourage the development of pricing
the money market listruments based on the credit rlsks of the i8su0e. In
this connection, the credit rating agencies should be developed further,
as discussed in Chapter VIII.
3.26 The 80P, BOK, KS!, KFCI, and the association of money market
dealers should work together in developing an Information system on the
secondary market of noney market instruments to enhance the efficiency of
the market.
IV. MONETARY POLICY IN KOREA
4.1 In Korea, the financial sector has been used by the Government
as a tool to implement its industrial policy. Monetary policy, its
instruments, and their effectiveness will have to bo considered in this
overall context. This chapter starts by providing a brlef historical
perspoctive on the role of the BOK since the 1950s. This is followed by a
description of monetary policy in the recent past and the available policy
instruments. The effectiveness of each monetary lnstrument is then
assessed. The rationale for moving to an indirect monetary control system
is discussed and the preconditions for moving to such a system are
presented by drawing on international experience with indirect onetary
controls.
A. Bistoricald rpeU v
4.2 The Bank of Korea Act and the Banking Act were passed in June
1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War. The B0K Act at that
time gave the central bank full independence in conducting monetary policy
saimilar to that of the Federal Reserve Bank in the USA. Commercial banks
were all under government control until the late 1950s when they were
privatized. In 1962, the B0K Act wa materially amended to enable the MOF
to more directly influence monetary policy through the Monetary Board,
which is chaired by the Minister of Finance. As a result, the BOK does
not enjoy the same level of independence as it dld prior to 1962 ln
conducting monotary policy. At the sam time, commereilal banks were
renationalized and the voting rights of private shareholders were limited
to only 10 percent. The Government controlled the appointment of the
executives of the banks and approved their operating budgets. Along with
the specialized banks and commercial banks, the BOK also became an active
provider of policy loans to the priority sectors (small-scale industries,
exports, agriculture) which were rediscounted by the banking system.
Monetary policy is essentially managed by both the BOK and the MOF though
the influence of the latter is more pronounced.
B. Cun lt Monetary Polcy and Procedlres
4.3 In recent years, monetary policy in Korea has been conducted
with the dual goals of maintaining economic growth and stability. The
dilemma has been that even though both goals are theoretically compatible,
there are conflicts in practice. The monetary authorities, however, have
been trying to maintain a balance between these two goals by switching
targets. Price stability was the primary objective of monetary policy
from 1984 to 1985, 1988-1989, and since 1991, while economic growth was
the overriding objective during 1990 and mid-1991.
4.4 The BOK has used X2--broadly defined money, the sum of currency
hold by the public and total deposits of banking institutions--as its
intermediate target since 1979. The annual target increase for M2 is set
ln close collaboratlon with the Government in order to be consistent with
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the Goverrnent'a major macroeconomic objectives for the year, such as
desired growth rates for GNP, inflation, and the balance of payments.
Given the target for the annual increase in M2 with adjustment for the
income velocity change, the BOK staff establishes quarterly and aonthly
operating plan. that take Into consideration seasonal fluctuations in
demands for currency, Treasury expenditures and revenue collections, and
expectations for foreign trade and capital movements. These short-term
targets are reviewed continually through the year to allow for deviations
of actual H2 changes from the targets and other unexpected developments.
Within each quarter, furthermore, short-run deviations of 1M2 from the
target are permitted for the sake of moderating short-run fluctuations in
interest rates. The 5OK announces the outstanding volume of K2 of the
previous month at the beginning of the current month, but focuses on the
volume of the last month of each quarter since It ls the N2 growth rates
of those months which the BOK wants to keep close to the target levels.
In the early days of H2 targeting, the BOX found that trying to hold
precisely to monthly targets generated more short-term fluctuations In
iaterest rates than seemed desirable. The monetary base (or the reserve
money) Is an operating target In the monetary control policy of the 80K.
The desired level of monetary base is derived from the money multiplier
equation with the given target level of K2. The BOK calculates the
desired monetary base, taking into account the change in the H2 multiplier
and the othor exogenous factors such as policy loans, and seasonal
influ.-ces on currency demand, etc. Changes in K2 since 1972 are shown
in Chart 4.1.
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as9Xal: Bank of Korea.
I/ Se-Jin Kim, "A Study on Indirect Monetary Control in Korea,"
(Mimeograph), Korea Institute of Finance, 1992.
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4.5 Immediately after the adoption of N2 targeting, tler, was a slow
but st"dy rise In the year-to-year growth of quarterlyaverage K2 from
the end of 1979 through 1981. After a short period of rising growth from
the end of 1984 to aid-1986, year-to-year growth rates leveled off and
have been remarkably stable since then through the third quarter of 1992.
4.6 Recently, the choice of N2 as an intermedlate target hs been In
question as the financial products not included in K2 have been growing
very fast and the share of f2 in f3 has been falling. Financial markets
in Korea have undergone dramatic changes through the 1980s. First of all,
the growth of NBFIs during thls period has been prominent and new
financial products from the WiFll, like the Cash Management Aecount, have
been able to grow rapidly due to a high return on then and liquidity.
Also, the CD and trust accounts of banks grew fast in the late 1980s.
None of the8s financial products are included in K2. In fact, the control
on N2 promoted the growth of these new financial products since monetary
control has been primarily focused on K2, leaving the NBFIs relatively
less restricted. Using M2 as the interediate target, monetary control
has been confined to deposits at banks which impacted heavily on banks'
asset/liability management. 2 thus does not adequately reflect liquidity
in financial markets and the relation of N2 to macro variables such as GNP
growth, employment, inflation, etc. ha tended to become more unstable
than before. It is for this reason that the monetary authorities ought to
modify the current intermediate target to include the highly liquid
financial instruments of the NBFIs.
C. Ezstlng Monetary Poley euad er a_
4.7 The BOK has been using both direct and indirect controls to
target monetary aggregates. Until the 1970s, the BOK relied mainly on
reserve requiraeents (Rls) and direct measures to control monetary
aggregates and domestic credit In 1982, indirect control procedures,
which usually depended on discount window, open market operations, and
Rib, were officially adopted to replace direct control. In actual
operation, however, the tOK has limited optlons in applying lndirect
control instruments.- Now and then, the BOK has turned to direct control
measures, like window guidance and moral suasion, in seeking to mest K2
targets. These instrumnts are discussed in detail below.
4.8 Rediseoutpolicy. The 30K lends to banking institutions by
rediscounting comercial bills or by making loans on the collateral of
particular bank assets These loans and discounts serve two major
purposes: first, to accosmodate convetional liquidity management
operations of the banks like any other central bank. In the BOK, however,
thele loan (called ftwe I loans account for legs than 5 naecent of total
loans ad discountas. By far the most important use of discount lending
by the 0K is to channel credit at below-market rates into particular
industries selected for reasons of industrial policy. These include loans
for export financing, agriculture and fisheries, and Type A general loans
to banks that have participated in such selective financing as loans for
2V Se-Jin Kim, 1992, op.cit*, p. 6.
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small- and medium-sized eanterprlse., loans for energy saving equtpmt ad
others (the so-called policy loans). Even the current rediscounts on
curcil bills are limited to bills iosued only by sma1ll and medum-
sized industries. Therefore, 95 percent of BOX's loan. and discou an
b eonsidered policy loans.
4.9 In torea, there is a dhronic excess doemn for bak creit and
so banks doped heavily on borrowing from the 30K. This should not be
surprisIn, given a DK discount rate of 7-8 percent and bank lnding
rates well below market rates (partly because of ilndow gudane from the
50K or the KOF). n these cnti - the _ t _se chanea
disoun rtsto c0w0tro the voum f diacont gan flowing jxAtg_the
Vmoear base, At ost, it can xt a aio nlec n the voUMe ofl
diucotm landnas by chnan th r rtion of eligible 1gloan f
$aiaountn* Rgaediscounting at the B0R is essentially an ontitle nt
program in which bank loans that meet certain requirements of industrial
policy will be discounted. The volume of discount lending Is thus not
under the control of the BOR. During 1990 to 1991. the ineeg iJn
edisontg s acgounted JUfor 6.1 pRaent of the ices ntemntr
base ITable 4,1 . This means that the other two main instruments--URs and
open arket operations--needed to carry virtually the full weight of
controlling the motar base and the money supply.
Table81 Us m.. - LoAns ad DIscunts OustandIng la
of thw Bank of Ko 8e% 9 1
(DlImna SWa)
0M*1 L_M 3,46.2 6,115.7 7,1".8 6.416.7 X,9|0.6 3',.4 60".7
Lfor Entvl 2,039.2 1,9at.2 1,11a.0 326.7 "9.2 $91.9 Ma.
Lfaa fot 178.5 199.0 2.0 14.4 567.0 340.2 *13.6
lLwato*k
Lm som 570.0 570.0 570.0 570.0 570.0 570.0 510.0
pvaum.uat at
____________ 71.4 53.8 55.5 35.4 .7 . .
4 () 9,1.0 10 ,15.2 10,708.3 9,7.2 10,30. 1,.04A 13,551.3
Zesano now (a) 4,319.0 $,015.7 7.40.8 9,726.4 13,616. 13,6U1.2 15,321.?
an (1) 228.2 202.5 144.4 100.0 ".3 ".O aA
halides &Oms to OSwas.
suat Bank Os gm, uVal*" Isom".
4.10 Resere R auirement Policy. The BOK imposes RRs on the deposit
liabilities of banking institutions. These requirement are appled to
all similar deposits at all banks, with the reserve ratio not exceding 50
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percent. Since June 1981, the BOK has applied the sae reserve
requirement (RR) ratlo to both demand deposits oad time and savlngs
deposlts in order to prevent a shift of funds between deposits with
different RRs resulting In the instability of the amney multiplier. The
current required reserve ratio Is 11.5 percent, except for a few long-term
time and savitnp deposits and deposits for non-resdlents to which lower
ratios are applled.
4.11 Since a change in RR ratios has an Impact on the portfolio f
the banking Institutions and the liquidity of financial markets, a central
bank is reluctant to make frequent use of the RR policy to control the
money supply. The BOX, however, raised RR ratios on a number of occasions
to control the excess liquidity supplied by the foreign sector after the
current account moved into surplus, as in the late-1980s.
4.12 The BOK is also authorized to impose marginal RRs of up to 100
percent on any increase in deposits. In April 1989, the BOK imposed
marginal RRs to cope with the rapid growth in the demand for money from
the private sector. This was lifted in February 1990 when overall RR
ratios were raised.
4.13 Also subject to RRs are deposits at non-bank financial
institutions (NBFIs), which hold reserves in the form of interest-bearing
assets like bank deposits, fSBf, and government securities. This in in
contrast to the reserMes at banking institutions which do not yield
interest. Because of this, NBFIs have been able to pay relatively higher
interest on their deposits, making them more competitive than banks, which
have also been burdened with more severe interest rate regulations. In
response to this problem, the monetary authorities raised the limit of CD
issuance for banks and reduced restrictions on the portfolio of banks,
trust accounts. Banks hold reserves for both the CD and the trust
accounts in the form of interest-bearing assets. As the deposits of non-
banks and banks' CD and trust accounts increased rapidly in the later
1980s, the share of deposits subject to regular URs decreased from 70
percent in 1985 to 38 percent in 1991, which severely weakened the RR
instrument.
Ope Use Opwaton
4.14 There has not been any open market operations in a traditional
sense. What passes off as open market operations is an allocation of MSBs
or government securities or securities fully guaranteed by the Government
to the finannial institutions,,particularly NBFIs, to absorb liquidlty
when needed. The use of government securities or MSBs has been aade since
the mid-1980s, when the surpluses In the balance of payments created large
liquidity in the financial system.. When the balance of payments shifted
into deficit in 1990, the BOK could not rely simply on ISBs, and
increasingly turned to government securities to regulate liquidity. Paper
other than NSBa (like foreign exchange stabilization bonds) has also been
used for this purposes since 1987 (Table 4.2).
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TIabb Kam oea- Outndi4g Govermust SuitIes 19859
ofem ~Won, End d1 Period)
69 2.0 0. .0 304.1 04.1
(0.0) (0.0) (61t .O) _ _ 00.0)
a0 1,00000.15,00 8,174.5 10 4
(9.4) (14.1) (76.6( 100.0.
so 2 500.0 1 400.0 17 303.4 21,203.4
(11.8) '5.6) (81.6) (100.0)
to Z 500.0 3,000.0 15.240.5 a0o740.
(12. 1) (14.5) t79.6) (190.0)
91 2,07.2 13,83.9 U.496.5 201|8.0(10.9) (_2.2) (66.9) X100.0)
92 Le 1,674.6 4.4815 951.3 223909.1
(8.4) (20.1) (71.5) (100.0)
^ June 1992.
afti: Fisurz In parnthesa asr paoenttges of total.
source: Bank of tore a.
4.15 The BOK has issued and repurchased lSBl in a captive market.
Most sales of lISBs have been conducted by direct sale or acceptance.
Auctioning to the general public was very limited both in size and
frequency. In direct sale and acceptance, the operations desk
unilaterally determines the issuing rate and the size of a transaction and
allocates the MSBe among NBYIs, including bank trusts. The rapid
expansion of KSB issuance and the assignment of these bonds to financial
institutions everely restricted their asset management and caused
distortions in the financial markets. Besides, a sale of HSBa has
involved heavy losses for the BOK and in consequence led to a rise in the
monetary base.
4.16 The issuing rates of liSBe were linked to the interest rates on
time deposits with comparable maturities. But secondary market rates of
lSBs were two to five hundred basis points higher than the issuing rates
(Table 4.3). These spreads reflected the costs to NBFIs which purchased
MSBs from the BOK. In addition, the large volume of MSB issuance has
crowded out the underwriting capacities of the designated dealers among
NFIs and has caused upward pressure on market interest rates.
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7jgbb Kor M JNe Rate and Secoday Marke Rae 1"9-92
(t)
Us a" W^ 23.0 10.0 23.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 l3.0 13.0 U3.0
konda7 13.3 14.4 15.9 15.6 16.5 16.2 16.0 1.5 218.1 16.4 16.$ 16.4
(IA) 2.2 1.* 2.9 2.6 8.5 3.2 5.0 5.5 J 5.1 .* S. a.*
M: BRU1 Or 9-40
ftm: Danko twoc..
4.17 Since 1989, the BOK has made greater use of repurchase
agrements (RPs) for controlling short-term liquidLty in banking
institutions. After considering changes in the credit condition of
financial markets, the money supply, and the reserves of banks, the BOK's
operations desk determines the tiudng and size of repurchase agreemuents.
As in the case of outright sales and purchases, the BOK sets the terms of
RPs and assigns the RPs to banks at the BOK's discretion. The large
volum, of RPs in 1990 and 1991 was partly due to a shortfall in banks'
required reserves (Table 4.4). However, unexpected assignments of the RPs
at the BOK's discretion have severely restricted the asset management of
banks.
2 4As 1orNa - Open Maket Tmnnslons under Rerase 4p_
1989-91
(Boons of Won)
urchases 5,901.7 118,930.9 36,641.9
(11) (90) (11)
Sales 11,943.7 8,300.0 53,929.5
(22) (8) (59)
NMa: Figures in parentheses presents the number of operations.
blugM: sank of Korea.
4.18 The BOK cannot conduct open market operations analogous to those
of the Federal Reserve System or the Bank of England because Korea's money
and bond markets lack the necessary depth, breadth, and resilience, and
Korea does not have a large enough stock of outstanding government debt
for trading. The fiscal reforms resulted in Korea being one of the very
few countries in the world with an essentially balanced budget. However,
the changes contemplated in Korea about deregulation of interest rates aay
help obviate these restrictive conditions. Furthermore, by auctioning
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VSBs, the BOK will create a benchmark of interest rates which will
facilitate pricing of other financial instruments.
oipedt of Momebuy Po"i insthrments on M3
4.19 Table 4.5 shows the changes in K2 during the period 1979-1991,
both on account of changes In the monetary base (MB) and the morey
multiplier (MM). The NN has been large and variations therein are also
large, sometimes In the same direction as the changes In MB and sometimes
in the opposite direction. This means that for the monetary policy
Instruments to achieve their effectiveness in terms of maintaining a
target of K2 within the desired range, they should be capable of
controlling the value of MM as much as the amount of MB. However, of the
three instruments, only reserve requirements can control to some extent
the value of NM along with the MB. The other two--rediscount policy and
open market operations--have little power to influence the behavior of the
UK. The discount rate, as observed earlier, is not varied as much, and it
is often below the market rates of interest. As such, it has little
effect on the market rates. The sale and purchase of central bank or
government securities too have no reach beyond the banks' interest rates
(which too are limited in view of regulated Interest rates) to the
Interest rates in the unregulated financial markets--NBFIs, foreign banks,
and the foreign exchange market, etc. Even the RRs can influence the
multiplier only to the extent it raises or lowers the ratio for bank
reserves to bank deposits. But M0 also fluctuates due to changes in the
ratio of currency to N2 and the ratio of excess reserves to bank deposits.
The changes in the latter ratio could be ignored because of a very small
margin of excess reserves in Korea, but not the changes in the ratio of
currency to 12, which are large as a result of changes in the market
Interest rates representing the opportunity cost of holding currency.
This deficiency in the policy instruments could be alleviated if a greater
use of indirect monetary policy instruments, particularly open market
operations, is made more frequently, more flexibly, and on a larger scale,
as that instrument has greater power to influence the opportunity cost of
holding currency by targeting monetary base as well as interest rates as
the intermediate target, and by shifting the emphasis between the two as
the monetary circumstances warrant.
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Tab4leM Kom - Anua Growth to 2, Montary Base & N12 Muliplr
19791
_mml Averag, 111om of Won)
____1979 2,900 26032 2.95 0.681 8,556 26.811
. _1980 2,712 -6.481 3.97 34.53X 10,764 25.81X
1981 2,t44 1.18X 5.00 25.93Z 13,715 27.421
1982 2,841 3.532 6.19 23.77X 17,575 28.14X
1983 3,432 20.80X 6.12 -1.061 21,005 19.521
1984 3,625 5.62X 6.42 4.841 23,261 10.74X
1985 3,736 3.06X 6.96 8.521 26,015 11.84X
1986 4,078 9.15X 7.45 7.04X 30,396 16.841
1987 4,861 19.20X 7.43 -0.31X 36,120 18.831
1988 6,856 41.041 6.26 -15.801 42,893 18.751
1989 9,386 36.901 5.41 -13.50X 50,793 18.421
1990 11,707 24.73X 5 26 -2.811 61,576 21.231
1991 13,743 17.391 5.31 1.021 73,024 18.591
IgZa: Percentage changes In NM and NS do not add up to the percentage
change in K2 because of the difference in the Multiplicative terms.
For this, a corrective term given by the ratio of NM of the previous
period to the NM of the current period is to be used to multiply the
percent change in MB. In equations, thls will be: Percenth12 -
percentaMNN + percentANEB x MNN}/MNl
Source: Bank of Korea.
4.20 Apart from this, there are other reasons to switch to the
indirect monetary control procedures. The effectiveness of direct
controls was eroded by three major developments in the 1980s. First, both
financial institutions and financial markets developed ways to avoid
direct control. Nost financial institutions, including the DMBs, have
expanded their trust operatlons aer established NBFrs. Second, the burden
of direct control made banks less competitive vis-a-vis NBFIs to which
they lost market share. Third, the financial markets grew substantially
and became so complicated that the monetary authorities could no longer
exercLse direct control effectively. With the opening of Korean financial
markets to foreign countries, the monetary authorities need to enhance the
efficiency of Korean financial markets, which indlrect monetary control,
non-discrizinatLng in its Lmpact, is better suited to do. Furthermore,
* 40 -
with current account transactions being largely liberalized, international
transfers of capital funds have taken off and will accelerate in the near
future, thereby spawning greater fluctuations in money spply, whch are
lese amnable to direct monetary controls. Flially, the Korean exchang
rate system has changed from the fixed exchange rate system to a market
average exchange rate system, under which the won/dollar rate changes
daily within a permissible range. In the future, the exchange rate will
be determined more by market forces in the foreign exchange market. Under
indirect monetary control, the monetary authorities can Influence exchange
rates effectively by changing domestic interest rates.
D. lnteustUonl Expelence
4.21 Introduction. The issues relating to the procedures applied to
implement monetary policies in semi-developed and developing countries
such as Korea, Indonesia, Nalaysia, Sri Lanka in Asia; Chile, Argentina,
Uruguay and Mexico in Latin America; and Turkey in Europe have come to the
fore in recent years as many of these countries, through financial
liberalization policies, have opened up their financial systems to market
forces. In the past, most of these countries had highly regulated
financial system, and in such a financial and economic environment,
onetary cont.rol was exercised in a direct fashion)° The central
characteristLc of these procedures was the regulation both of the price
and quantity of credit. Interest rates were controlled through directions
from the central bank or the Government since the distinction between them
was almost nonexistent. Credits with preferential interest rates were
treated as part of interest rate policies. Recourse to central bank
credit was not only common but almost automatic in many cases, sometimes
constltuting the bulk of the banking system's liabilities. Other arm of
the direct methods of controls Lave been repre. ented by RRs and the liquid
assets ratios; a comon thread joining them was the provision of finance
to the Government. In addition, there have been quantitative ceilings on
loans provided by banks such that they were directed into sectors which
the authorities considered as priority sectors or the productive sectors.
Monetary control has been a particular manifestation of the wider dirigist
policies in the monetary and financial spheres, though it afforded some
scope for market forces, albeit modestly, unlike the experience in the
centrally planned economies where credit allocation between government and
the production sectors and among the production sectors themselves bas
been predetermined by central direction.)'
ax See Y.J. Cho and Deena Khatkhate, Lessons of Financial
Liberalization in Asia: A Comparative Study," World Bank
Discussion Paper 50, World Bank, washington, D.C., 1989; Fry,
Mbaxell, Money Interest and Bankin¢ in Egonoic DeveloguMt=,
The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1988; McKinnon,
R., "The Order of Economic Liberalization," Johns Hopkins
University Press, Baltimore, 1991.
*/ MoKinnon, R. op. cit.
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4.22 The direct procedures of monetary regulation, while serving the
needs of the economies for some time, led gradually to the consequence
which neither ensured efficient allocation of credit nor price stability--
the central objectives of any economic policies directed at rapid growth
of output and welfare. Regulated interest rates and credit ceilings often
make it difficult for banks to maximize their profits, thereby motivating
them to resort to widespread evasion. Ways are found to divert credit to
low priority sectors; :redit ceilings often lead to excessive undesired
liquidity which then discourages banks to refrain from deposit-taking.
The preferential credits mean ipso facto central bank credit as most of
the primary lenders rediscount those credits with the central banks. The
liquid assets ratio provides governments with low cost finance, which
encourages them to rely more on this source to finance their expenditure
than on taxes or borrowing from non-bank sources. Eventually, all this
leads to financial disintermediation, as it did in most of the
aforementioned countries in Latin America and Asia, and other countries
like India, Bangladesh, Kenya, Turkey, Ghana, etc.Y that adopted direct
monetary control procedures.
4.23 In order to obviate these adverse repercussions on the financial
system and through them on the real economy, a large number of developing
countries, and several of the centrally planned economies (in addition to
countries already referred to above, other important countries which are
reforming their financial systems are India, Pakistan, Poland, Hungary,
etc.) have initiated financial reforms. Once the financial systems are
unshackled, competitive forces are let in to determine the cost and
quantity of credit, and where this does not occur, the intervention that
becomes necessary is confined to a limited area of economic activities.
The emphasis, therefore, is placed on indirect monetary control procedures
under which Interest rates reflect the riskiness of borrowers and the
maturitLes of instruments as recently experienced in Indonesia, Chile,
Turkey, Thailand, Malaysia, and Mexico.
4.24 This sectlon aims at capturing the main elements of indirect
monetary control procedures, both in selected advanced countries and in
those developing countries where financial reforms have substantially
progressed. The experience of the former group of countries will throw
light on how the indirect methods of monetary control operate in different
indust.rial countries, and in what way they can be adapted to countries
like Korea which are moving in that direction. Though their experiences
are not uniform in pattern, there is an underlying unity in the basic
structure--that is to say that the market signals are given primary
importance in the determination of cost and allocation of credit. The
experiences of the selected developing countries have relevance insofar as
they would indicate how newly liberalizing systems formulate Lidirect
monetary control procedures when financial markets are not yet fully
developed and competitive, and what kind of impediments the countries face
si International Monetary Fund, 'Interest Rate Policies in
Developing Countries," Occasional Paper No. 27, 1983; Khatkhate,
Deena, "Assessing the Impact of Interest Rates in Less Developed
Countries," World velg=nt, May 1988; Leite, S.P. and V.
Sundararayan, "Issues in Interest Rate MaNagement and
Liberalization," MEmeo&raph, IMF, 1988.
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In Sapl.m_nting thom, without baving to walt for the financial environment
to approxlmate the situation In industrial countrles.
ndhi Moetay Cntrosb In Sledd dutlsb COuntrks
4.25 Monetewy policy procedures baslcally refer to a mechanism by
ibch the central bank lnfluences the short-torm Interest rate and bank
reserves. For many years until the mid-1970s, the central banks in the
industrial countries like the US, UK, France and Japan relied on a mix of
direct and indirect methods for this purpose. In recent years, the
emphasis has shifted in a pronounced manner to indirect methods, imparting
greater flexibility to the implementation of monetary policy. The basic
idea underlying the indi2ect monetary control procedures has been that the
central bank can influence short-term interest rates In the inter-bank.
market, given the demand for central bank liabilities in the form of bank
notes and reserve deposits held by banks whether for clearing purposes or
for meeting RUs, by utilizing the supply of reserves over which lt has
almost total control. The central bank's ability to influence short-term
Interest rates under indirect sonetary control procedures, depends on how
It can induce banks to seek central bank accommodation at the margin. A
precondition for the effective control by the central bank over bank
reserves is the pressure exrted on banks by changes in other items in the
central bank balance sheets so that they are left no other alternatlve
than to be dependent on central bank accommodationY
4.26 Accommodation by central banks Is effected basically in three
ways, though there are variations within each, depending upon the
practices and traditions in a particular country. They are: a central
bank can supply reserves to banks through facilitles for the r.d9contal&jg
of comercial bills at posted Interest rates or changing the rediscount
quotas, the conduct of own marl t oeationa, and variations In the 33
of traditional type. The last one has been in force In the Industrial
countries, even when direct methods were employed. In fact, there has
boen a debate about whether the RRs should be categorized as an indlrect
instrument of monetary control. When RRs are used in the context of
indirect monetary control procedures, their level is generally seen to be
lower than before, and only for meeting clearing requirements. In the
main, they are used not to change the supply of reserves to banks so much
as to change the banks' demand for them in a sanner that reserve movements
become conducive to the achievement of money market objectives. Thus the
URs bave become a fulerum of monetary policy. In order to smooth the
observance of the reserve requirement system, the selected countries--US,
*I See for a comprehensive discussion, Bank for International
Settlements, Changes in Mney- arket Instruments and Procedurea!
Objective. ad LInlications, March 1986, and *aMs, Jn Central
ank Money Market gnerating Poedures in the 1980s, 5IS,
Economic Paper No. 23, 1989; Bank of England, 'Management of
Liquidity,$' fank of England QuarteX]X uletin, Se;-amber 1982;
Quintyn Marc, Ptom Direct to Indirect Moneta" Poll y
Itm s: The French ixnes , IMF Working
Paper VP/91/73, 1991.
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UK, France and Japan-have adopted a lagged or seni-lagged system wbh0e
IRs are fully or partly on the level of the reserve base (usually bank
deposits) in a previous period. This gives a conaddet.able flexibility in
reserve management to barks. Table 4.6 presents the main harxacteristics
of instruments used in indirect control procedures In four selected
industrial countries.
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Cesna Bnk CredIt Facde
4.27 In the United States, a distinction is convenlently drawn
between systems lik, that in the US in wicLh the central bank makes
extensive use of outright purchases of securities on the open market for
supplying reserves to banks, and ones In whiAh the liquidLty not only of
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individual banks but also of the banking system as a whole is more
dependent on direct central bank iending. In the latter, money market
rates have been seen to be more closely influenced by rates on credit
provided by the central bank. Credit made available through discount is
rationed by administrative constraints on the use by banks of the Federal
Reserve discount window in a manner which permits the discount rate to be
maintained below the day-to-day interbank rate (the federal funds rate) by
a variable margin. However, the influence of the discount rate on money
market rates has increased ln recent years, unlike during the period prior
to 1979, when open market operations were geared to keeplng the federal
funds rate within a narrow range. The adoption in 1979 of operating
objectlves for bank riserves changed this situatlon by permitting the
banks' demand for reserves to influence market interest rates. The
operating target has been the non-borrowed reserves which is derived by
deducting the estimated level of borrowed reserves of banks from the
forecast demand for total bank reserves. Since mid-1982, non-borrowed
reserve objectives have been adjusted weekly, in llght of deviations of
required reserves from the projected level, so as to achleve the desired
degree of monetary restraint or ease, but also with a view to permitting
more stabillty ln the short-run ln bank borrowlngs at the Federal Reserve.
In effect, the incentive for borrowing provided by the margln between tie
diecount rate and the federal funds rate serves as a fulcrum for a policy
whlch has brought about more stability in the federal funds rate. In the
period following the stock market crash in 1987, the Federal Reserve
supplied liquidity generously through open market operations, targeted at
the norm of the federal funds rate. By early 1988, non-borrowed reserve
operating procedures were again brought into reckoning to be used for
encouragLng a rise in the federal funds rate.
4.28 In the UnLted Kingdom, the announcement by the Bank of England
(BOB) of a minimum lendlng rate was terminated by the 1981 money market
reform. This change formed part of an effort to overcome a propensity to
delay making changes to official posted rates by permitting market
Judgements--formed on the basis, among others, of developments in the
money stock--to exert more influence on interest rates. At the same time,
the authorities terminated the practice of deliberately creating reserve
shortages by issuing treasury bills in excess of expected Treasury cash
needs at the weekly auction and of relieving them subsequently--either by
purchasing treasury bills at posted dealing rates or by lending to the
discount market so as to make effective the chosen minimm lending rate of
the authortties. They have continued to operate an Literest based
monetary control system. Earlier, they tried to confine these operations
to very short-term arket transactions in bills at interest rates quoted
by the discount houses at the initiative of the BOE. But these
arrangements were not successful in disengaging longer-term oney market
rates from direct official influences. It came to be recognized that in
certain circumstances, the procedures which would permit a clearer
official lead In the formation of interest rates were needed. Since 1985,
the BOB lnvited the discount houses to borrow from it at a minimum lending
rate posted in the morning for one day and on many occasions later in the
day. Such lending is effected at an Laterest rate and for periods chosen
by the authorities.
4.29 In France, new money market control procedures introduced by end
1986, have operated in a manner similar to those in other Ruropean
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countries like Germany, Italy, Belgium, etc., but the institutional
arrangements are different. Noney market rates are guided by the rates
applied in perlodic acquisition by the Bank of France of paper by tender
operations. A short-term apension" (a type of reversed transaction in
securities or bills) facility available at the initiative of the bank
normally sets an upper limit to fluctuations in the day-to-day money
market rate. A lower limit is set by short-term liquidity absorbing
Opensions' operations conducted on an ad hoc basis again at the discretion
of the Bank of France.
4.30 In Jgagp, the basic official discount rate lies well below the
call money and bill rates in the interbank market. Central bank credit Is
rationed by credit lines established under the provision of the bank
credit control system. Furthermore, decisions about the daily allocation
to banks are made entirely at the discretion of the Bank of Japan (BOJ),
which may also withdraw at any time credit granted previously, so as to
impose "repayment pressure." The effective cost of using BOJ credit rises
as the period of utilization falls. Thus, central bank lending has become
a flexible and powerful instrument which is still used, in continuation
with new market instruments, either to offset daily fluctuation in bank
reserve positions or to tighten or ease these positions. This discretion
exercised by the BOJ creates uncertainty among banks about how future
reserve needs will be net. In recent years, the deregulation of the money
market has allowed these rates to move somewhat more freely than in the
past in response to cbh4ging pressures on reserve positions.
Ope Market Operaton
4.31 Open market operations as conducted by outright purchases and
sales are still on a modest scale in Japan and France. They are well
established in the US and UK. The main accent is on the development of
new techniques and instruments such as purchase/repurchases agreements or
reverse operations, directed at effecting temporary changes In a bank's
r.serve positions in the direction desired by the central banks.
4.32 The instruments used in these operations in the UnLted States
are either long-term government securities or treasury bills; no private
paper is used and these procedures are the principal procedures adopted to
provide or withdraw bank reserves. Transactions are handled over the
counter,' with the bulk of the orders being placed with so-called
Opriumay dealers in treasury securities, some of which are specialized
departments of money-center banks. Normally, dealers are required to
tender for securlties of a particular type and maturity. Allocations take
place at the most favorable bid price until the desired amount is
purchased or placed. The distinguishing characteristic of this operation
is a sharp distinction drawn between debt management operations (conducted
by the Treasury), and monetary policy operations consisting of net
purchases in the secondary market (conducted by the Federal Reserve).
4.33 In the UnLtgd Klngdo, the 1981 reforms were designed to make
transactions in treasury bills by the Bank of England as the principal
instrument for regulating the money market. Against a background of
strong pressures on money market liquidity and a depletion of the supply
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of treasury bills in the market which followed a persistent overfunding of
the government's borrowing requirements, purchases of treasury bills
be¢omes a-main and continuing source of bank reserves. The Bank's effort
to lengthen the short average maturity of its bill holdings so as to
reduce the huge volume of purchases necessitated by redemption alone
Implied that the determination of term money rates could not be left to
the market.
4.34 In France, outright purcbhses of private and public sector paper
by the Bank of France from credlt institution via dlscount houses under a
tender procedure introduced In 1973 ("achats ferme8 sur appels d'offresa)
constituted in the course of time, the principal instrument for meeting
banks' foreseeable liquidity needs, at least In periods when interest
rates could be kept falrly stable. Since December 1986, these
transactions have been replaced by similar "pension3 (security repurchase)
transactions. With partLcipation essentially confined to credit
institutions, these public tenders have never been regarded as true "open
market" operations. However, the Bank of France reserves the right to
undertake anonymous transactions in the secondary markets ln bonds and
other securities, and has since 1986 purchased and sold treasury bills on
a liited scale.
4.35 For many years in Jaoa, the BO0 followed a policy of gradually
inreasing its holdings of securities, including ten-year government
bonds, to meet the rlsing demand for central bank credit. These purchases
are made from dealers as veil as banks by means of a tender procedure
which at first took four to five days to complete, but was subsequently
simplified to permit day-to-day trasactions. Tenders have become smaller
in amount and more frequent, but the operations are still not normally
used for short-term or seasonal reserve adjustments. For smoothing
seasonal variations in reserves, the BOJ has followed a novel method,
since the early 1970s, of buying and selling first class corporate bills
and bills of financial institutions wlth corporate bills as collateral in
the market.
Ran" RequIronts
4.36 Reserve requirements, though not strictly an lndlrect monetary
instrument, have been a part of monetary policy procedures ince the
1980s. The difference between the use of iRs then and now is that their
level has been considerably reduced in the countries, more or less to a
lvel whlch can enable the banks to meot the needs of reserves for
clearing purposes. Furthermore, RRs are resorted to, under indirect
monotary control procedures, in order to lnfluence the demand for bank
reserves in ways intended to be conduclve to the achievement of money
market objectives.
4.37 The period of holdLng reserves and other technical details
related to it have implications for the management of short-tbrm oney
market rates. In the US, France and Japan, reserve holdlngs are semi-
lagged, while In UK they are lagged. In fact, there is no contemporaneous
accounting in any of the 0-10 countries. Thoes holding arrangemeuts are
considered to be good for facilitating interest rate-oriented money markt
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polilies. The length of reserve holding Is highest In the UK 180 days)
and the lowest in the US (14 days; in France and Japan, the comparable
period is 30 days. In two countries, France and Japan, the penalty rate
for reserve deficiencies above the respective discount rates is 3 and 3.75
percentage points.
4.38 It can be aeen from Table 4.6 that all four countries have gone
a long way toward a market based approach to monetary control during the
1980s. While there are several common features of the procedures, there
are some notLceable differences among the four countries. Market
operations predominate in all the four countries, but outright market
transactions are important relatively in three (Japan, the UK and US),
while reversed transactions are promlnent In France. Most of the open
market transactions are in government securities and treasury bills;
private bills are used for this purpose in Japan, France and the UK.
Foreign currency operations prevail only in the UK. As regards BRs, the
four countries are broadly similar but differ with respect to how the
reserves are held.
Te Maret-Based Mone"y Control Procedres t Selecd Devloping Couutrin
4.39 In this part, the use of market-related monetary policy
instruments in six developing countries (Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia,
Malaysis, Mexico, and Thalland) is discussed. These countries differ from
each other in regard to their stage of development, macroeconomic
balances, and degree of liberalization of economic policies. hzg2nZimD
had severe macroeconomic imbalances in the early 1980s. It undertook
financial iberalization which went through turbulence before regaining
the momentum. Brazil has high inflation, a fiscal deficit and the
financial system (though diversified in terms of instruments, institutions
and financial sophistication) is still greatly controlled. Indonesia has
been liberalized since 1983, and most of the sectors (trade, financial and
industrial) are all allowed to operate free from much government control;
it has a free capital account. Since 1973, Luterest rates have been
determined by market forces; the financial system has become fairly
competitlve since 1983. Macroeconomic policies are well controlled with
the fiscal deficit financed only by foreign loans. MKasiarn has had an
open system for many years and progressed further since the end of the
1980s. It also has a stable macroeconomic environment with a modest
fiscal deficit and an almost open capital account. Mexico, after a
serious economic and debt crisis in the early 1980s, has emerged as a
stronger economy; the fiscal deficLt has been converted into a sirplus,
and so have the external accounts. There is relative price stability
(from 2,000 percent inflation down to 20 percent in 1992), and its
external debt is now managed in a way that it will tend to be on a
dowmuard trajectory in the 1990s. Most of the interest rates are market
determined, with new money market instruments being widely used in a
competitive financial system. ThallsM, of all these selected developing
countries, had been more open with a competitive banking system. It bad a
high rate of growth and a manageable inflation rate.
4.40 Mh common fature of all thes gountries ig that tW all have
either abolLshed or diluted the direct methods of credit control. Another
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feature it that they operate a flexible exchange rate system, though the
exchango rate is a managed one leaving some scope for independent monetary
policy. As an indication of indirect monetary control, most of these
countries have used monetary aggregates as intermediate targets, while on
some occasions interest rates also have been used as such targets.
Following financial reforms, Indonesia changed from targeting the domestic
credit of the banking system to targeting money and broad money. In
Malaysia, the focus shifted from interest rates to broader monetary
aggregates. Argentina, Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico also have monetary
a gregates as their intermediate targets (summarized in Table 4.7).
Thailand uses reserve management as an operational target.
4.41 In all these countries, the main instruments used in money
market operations are either treasury bills or central bank bills, which
are all sold through auction. Generally, the auction is conducted by the
central bank and is free from discretionary elements, although in
countries like Mexico, a cut-off point In the auction prices is fixed,
using (to the extent possible) judgement based on market conditions. The
main purpose in using cut-off yields is to prevent wide swings in market
interest rates. The types of instruments used for exercising monetary
control are given in Table 4.8.
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TIbb k.7s The Policy hauerwk for Monetay Control
In a Smple of Sk Develxping Contris
. ..'.' . .*..&.**A** ..... 1.s..S..
Argentina Austral. Introduced Monetary Interest rates
in June 1985, has in aggregates. on central bank
some periods been bills, debt
fixed vis-a-vis the US sales.
dollar; in other
periods adjusted on a
continuous basis
Brazil Cruzado. Frequent Monetary Base money,
adjustments vis-a-vis aggregates, real overnight
the U.S. dollar, In interest rates. interest rates.
line with relative
inflation. Temporarily




Indonesia Rupiah. Managed Monetary aggregates Exchange rate,
float, basket of and monetary base. interest rates.
currencies used as Domestic credit
indicacor. before October
1984.
Malaysia Ringgit. Determined Broad monetary Exchange rate,
on the basis of a aggregates. long-term Inter-




Mexico Peso. Two-tier Nonetary Interest rates,




Thailand Baht. Determined on Multiple monetary Reserve manage-
the basis of a basket targets are used as ment loosely
of currencies. a guide for policy. implemented.
sagMe: R.B. Johnston and O.P. Breck, Monetary Control Procedures and
Einancial Reforms: Aimroachos. Issues and Recent Exeriences in
Developini Countries, IMF Working Paner VPI89/48, 1989,
Washington, D.C; Kiriwat, Ekamol, Financial Sector Reforw:
ThailJDA, (Mimeograph), paper submitted to a Seminar on FinancLal
Sector Reforms in Asia and Latin American Countries: Lessons of
Comparative Experiences, Santiago, Chlle, May 1992.
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4.42 The experiences of the selected industrial and developing
countries in the use of indirect monetary control procedures hs been
discussed in the earlier part of this chapter. Before coming to the
lessons from these experiences, two broad tendencies in initiating
indarect monetary policy procedures can be observed. The first tendency
is that there are some common features of these experiences, despite the
fact that the tochniques and procedures employed by individual central
banks both In developed and developing countries are different ln some
respects, belng strongly influenced by differing institutional, legal and
political environments. In general, innovations affecting the use of
central bank credit facilities, now market instruments and the adoption of
RRes have been designed to make the implementatlon of money market policy
more flexible and to ensure its effectiveness in a more complex
environment. In the US, discount rate changes were goared to make open
market operations more effective and the reserve targets have been varied
to enable the banks to influence market rates through changes in their
demand for reserves. In the UK, the changes ln the bank rate were part of
an effort to overcome a propensity to delay making changes in official
posted rates by permitting market judgements based on developments in the
money market. France introduced a penalty rate in its discount
operations, while Japan rationed credit lines by window guidance.
However the thrust of changes was n ogne direction.-to make the central
bank discount rate market-oriented to the extent possible and consistent
with market o atNions. either through outrig4t purchases and sale. gr
thro,h reverse repurchases. The developing countries covered here often
followed the lead provided by the lndustrLal countrLes, and they generally
curbed automatic access to central bank-lendLng through the introduction
of bank specific ceilings or by introducing penalty rates on extended
credit. Also, they made an effort to reduce the range of specLal credit
facilities ln favor of a generalized lender of last resort wlndow based on
secured loans.
4.43 The second tendency observed was that both industrial and
developlng countrios dld not wait for lnstitutional changes to precede the
changes in the monetary control procedures when they switched to the
indirect methods of control. Their systems were not at the same stage of
development, sophlstlcation or competltlveness. France and Japan for
instance, had a longer hlstory of controlled financial systems which
worked more on guldance, while those of the US and UK have been highly
competitive. As far as the developlng countries are concerned, the
development of indirect monetary control procedures usually dld not wait
for the financial institutions and environment to be competitive. The
process of lndirect monetary control procedures, once begun, Literacted
with the system and gradually the system tended to adept to a more
Impersonal arrangement of credit allocation and competitive prlcing of
lons.
4.44 There are several lessons that are relevant to Korea a Lt moves
towards market based monetary policy instruments. Flrst, lt is often
difficult to ensure the success of indirect monetary pollcy procedures if
the central bank either becomes a residual source of finance for
government or if It tries to control interest rates on government
. 52 -
securities by intervening In the primary or secondary market for
government debt. This means that it is necessary to place a ceiling on
direct central bank credit to the Covergmnt or to create conditions under
which the central bank will refrain from Intervening in the governatent
bond market to keep down Interest rates. It is also necessary that
seasonal or random fluctuations In a government's cash position, which can
pose a large potential source of disturbances in the supply of bnak
reserves, are avoided.
4.45 Second, RRs, though continued as a monetary policy instr;ent,
should be managed In such a way that the reserve requirement level is kept
sufficiently low so as not to constitute a heavy tax on flancial
intermediation. The main consideration is that the level of Rm should be
enough to meet the clearing needs of the system. Furthermore, the RRb,
when used as a monetary policy complementing market operations or to
shelter certain domestic interest rates from external infnuences as
controls on international capital movements, are relaxed.
4.46 Third, outright purcbases of securities in the open market,
often regarded as the purest form of open market operations, were of major
importance in well developed financial markets such as the US and UK.
These were less important in other countries where the use of repurchase
agreements was more prevalent. The -.eveloping countrles also bhve relied
on this form when they moved from a direct to an indirect monetary policy
control mechanism. Mh main advantee. of this anroAch in that th
onerations can be implemented ouickvX. without a significant effect on the
prices of the underlying securities.
4.47 Fourth, the iAstLtutional changes that occurred in the money and
foreign exchange markets following the initiation of indirect monetary
control procedures have no doubt contributed to a greater integration of
the money market dosestically and internationally. However, market
integration and the greater lnfluence of market expectations on interest
rate determination tended to impose constraints on monetary policy. While
money market strategy and instruments have been geared more to taking
exchange rate as well as domestLc interest rate determination into
account, developments in the market have increased the risk that exchane
rate and domestic money stock or interest rate objectives come into
conflict.
4.48 Fifth, in the developing countries covered in this chapter, use
has been made of a regular auction--either for central bank or treasury
bills--for monetary control purposes. Under these auctions, the public
submits bids co' tamning the volum demand and a bid price to the central
bank for treasury/contral bank bills on auction, and the central bank
accepts or rejects bids on the basis of a cut-off yield determined to be
consistent with their desired operating target for monetary policy. The
most widely used operating target has been short-term interest rates;
other operating targets have included varlous liquidity measure. Some
countries have instituted a formaL limitation on cut-off yield In the
auctions. This means that the auction is somewhat managed when the
developing countries begin a transition to indirect metary control
procedures.
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4.49 These are some broad lessons from the experiences of the
Industrial and developing countries and though they differ in broad
details, there is some underlylng unity In their experiences.
E. SluLna.y and Roadioal
4.50 Monetary policy in Korea has been ineffective since the
automatic policy loans provided by the BOK on behalf of the Government
create reserve money. The interest rate subsidy on these loans also
adversely affects monetary policy management. As a result, the OK's
ability to conduct monetary policy is very much constrained. The monetary
policy objectives in Korea have had dual goals--price stability and
economic growth. However, because of the possible conflict between them.
a balance between these objectives has been maintained by occasionally
switching the targets.
4.51 M2, one of the measures of broad money, has. been the frequently
used as the intermadiate target, and the monetary base as the operating
target. These targets are reviewed continually to take into account
unaticipated developments in the economy. The targets have been more
often than not within the desired range, though of late. M2 as a monetary
policy target has lost much of its significance due to the emergence of
substitutes for X2 from the operations of NBFIs.
4.52 At present, the BOK has basically three indirect instruments of
monetary policy--rediscount policy, RRs, and the limited degree of open
market type of operations. These have been operated in the past in
combination with other direct-instruments of control such as ceilings on
bank credit and interest rates and window guidance of one type or another.
The rediscount policy has not been very effective, not least because the
rediscounts directed towards liquidity x nagement were a small part of
total rediscounts, apart from the adoption of generally concessional
rediscount rates charged on bank access to the BOK. RRs, though
potentially a powerful Snstrument, are less frequently used in the BOK, as
they have tended to have an adverse impact on the portfolio of banks and
the Uquidity of the financial markets. It has also less flexibility
relative to open market operations, which have been resorted to in recent
years. However, the effectiveness of open market operations is attenuated
by the practice adopted by the authorities to offer interest rates on
paper such as MSBs used in open market operations which are lower than tho
market interest rates. This has discouraged the holding of MSBs by on a
wide scale, and consequently the development of a secondary market for
these bonds, essential for effective open market operations. Besides.
there is a lack of diversity of paper used in open market transactions a_
the Government's issue of Treasury bills is limited. Though of late this
gap ha ben filled, it is not on a scale desired for the conduct of open
market operation as a major indirect monetary policy instrument.
4.53 If monetary policy is to succeed in Korea in achieving its
targets of K2 or any variant of it, It has to have influence over money
multipller behavior. This is because M2 depends more on the changes in
the money multiplier than on changes in the monetary base. Of all the
monetary instruments, open market operations possess a greater power to
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Oh4ng. the opportunity cost of holding currency by targeting monetary base
as veil a the Interest rates as the intermedlate targets, and by shifting
the emphasis between the two in accordance with the needs of emergin8
situations. This in amply demonstrated by the experience of both
developed and developing countries which switched in recent years to
intdiret monetary policy instruments.
4.54 Korea would also benefit by a move towards indirect monetary
policy instruments. The easons for this are the following: (1) banks
and financial markets have developed ways to avoid direct monetary control
procedures; (ii) the use of direct controls imposes costs on banks in the
form of lose of competitiveness vis-a-vis NBiMs or foreign banks;
(lit) the complexity of financial markets makes it very difficult for the
monstary authorities to exercise direct control effectLvely; (iv) with
current account transactions being lar.gely liberalized, money supply
variations have been more frequent, w*hi%h do not lend themselves to direct
monetary controls; and (v) with a move towards a flexible exchange rate
regime, the monetary authorities can be in a better posltion to control
money supply through resorting to indirect monetary control procedures.
V. CREDIT ALLOCATION SYSTEM
5.1 The COK has used the financial sector to support Its industrial
policy. This has been achieved largely through the allocation of credit
to selected sectors and enterprises in the form of policy loans at below
market rates. This chapter discusses the scope and size of policy loans.
the sources of such loans, their cost to the financial system, and their
impact on the banking system and the BOK. Relevant International
experlence is also presented.
A. Sco and Sin ofPtUqLoyI=
S.2 The Government' s role in credit allocation in Korea has taken
the form of government-directed loans or policy loans in total domestic
credit. The Government's intervention to deliberately influence the
system of credlt allocation was officially initiated In order to stimulate
industrialization and economle activity. A large amount of the policy
loans provided by banks has also been rediscounted by BOK almost
automatically.
5.3 At the end of 1991, total policy loans amounted to V 151.2
trillion, or 39.7 percent of total domestic credit and the assets of KD8
and KUhM (Table 5.1 and Table A.1 in Annre A). The share of policy
credit climbed to 44.4 percent In 1987 and has gone down slowly.
5.4 The Government has been actively involved in policy loans and
has been responsible for all aspects of their management, including
policy-making. Policy loans sre operated in accordance with an aannual
fund raising and loan plan prepared by the MOF, while their actual
management is entrusted to the Governor of the BOK. Table 5.2 and Amnex
A 2 in Annex A show the different pollcy loans and their respective share
of total policy loans.
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InNlii Kam - O0*u_ts Polit Lms by Soucu 197441
09"TrAlt FUd1.8 1.9 2.4 3.0 2.9 2.9
IIIF 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.7
Credit to 0.9 1.0 0.6 6.3 6.1 5.4
KI>BAMM I 4.0 9.9 S5.2 6.5 6.7 6. 8
Forelgn Exchag 5.4 6.6 5.0 1.4 1.6 1.5
Trade 0.9 2.9 1.8 2.3 2.3 2.4
Mdlium Industry 1.9 1.6 1.8 2.7 2.6 2.6
Agri/Fisberies 1.8 3.6 4.0 5.3 5.5 5.5
Housing 5.3 2.4 4.3 8.5 7.9 5.0
other 23.4 31.5 26.7 37.1 36.5 32.8
Otbor Prof . 8.4 12.9 15.7 6.4 6.2 6.9
Total Policy 31.8 44.3 42.4 43.5 42.7 39.7
Domestic Credit lO0 100 100 100 too 100
+ IDB + K Im
12: Domostlc credit adjusted to include assets and KDB and KEXIK as
calculated below. The figures below are in billions of Won.
Domestic Credit 4.837 16.778 42,561 70.089 96,888 118.186
XDB Assets 3,636 8,850 14,991 i.7,525 23,341 29,212
KREIM Assets 81 557 5,159 2,214 2,723 3,819
Total 8.554 26,184 62,710 98,828 122,952 151,217
jag: Total preferential finance includes ascots of KDB and KEXIX. To
calculate current numbers, the total assets of the two institutions were added
to domestic credlt.
Source: National Statistics Office, Korean Economic Indicators, Februwry 4,
1992.
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T hL Koma She of PoltPT m, 1976.1M9
Government Fund 5.7 4.3 5.6 6.9 6.7 7.2
NIF 4.5 3.5 3.6 2.4 2.0 1.6
Credit to KDB/KX$IM 2.9 2.2 1.5 14.5 14.3 13.6
Foreign Exchange 12.7 22.4 12.4 15.0 15.8 17.3
Trade 17.0 14.8 11.8 3.2 3.7 3.8
RedLum Industry 2.8 6.6 4.2 5.3 5.5 5.9
Agri/Fisheries 5.8 3.6 4.1 6.2 6.2 6.6
Housing 5.7 8.1 9.5 12.2 12.8 13.9
Other 16.5 5.5 10.2 19.5 18.5 12.7
Total 73.6 71.0 62.9 85.3 85.5 82.6
Other Prof. Finance 26.4 29.0 37.1 14.7 14.5 17.4
Total Po1li LoansD 100 100 100 100 100 100
-~ ~ ~ ____________ .. . = --
Ngs: Other Preferential Finance represents finance to KDB and KEgIH but
rets out the credlt that appears in the Preferential FLnance data.
gagU=: Natlonal Statistics Offlce, Korean Economic Indicators, February
4, 1992.
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B. Sorcs CTPOlCY IAenS
5.5 In recent years, the major sources of the policy loans are DMe..
Fsla, and the Government. In 1991, the DHBs accounted for 53.0X of the
total policy loans, followed by the NBFI8 (40.7%) and the Governmut
(6.32). The share of DMBs peaked around 60.7X In 1978 and declined to
51.42 in 1985, but has since increased (Chart 5.1).






. *,. * * -. ,,, * . I **
i | 1N I 1k I Ion I 194 1 li f tN 1 10 
1977 179, 111 1383 135 1U7 139 ill
a swim + On-be" * O w.mmn Fwd*
hfgUa: NatLonal Statistlcal Office, oEcn Reonomic Tnd oC .
5.6 Dnosit hey Lanks (Ml. . Policy loans of DMBs are divided by
source of funds into loans from their own funds, and from government
funds. The loans are used to finance exports and imports, small and
medium enterprises, overseas constructlon contracts and exports of
services, and preparatlons for agricultural exports and aar ne products.
DHBs are allowed to obtain funds from the BOK of up to the equivalent of
30-90 percent of the policy loans they have made.
5.7 Commercial banks (DM1. and local banks) are also requLred to
extend a certaln portlon of the Lncrement in their loans from banking
funds to SKs. In the case of Dongnam and Daedong Banks, tne minimum
ratLo is 90 percent, 80 percent for local banks, and 35 neRcent for other
natinwie cmmecia banksan foreign hank branches- Ibis ratio in 2S
saecant in the case of foreigo bank branches which do not make use of the
OflK'en redinscon window.
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5.8 The composition of policy loans of DHBs as of the end of 1991
and its share of total loans were as follows: housing (V 9.7 trillion, 48
percent), equipment of export industrles (W 3.2 trillion, 16 percent), ,
agriculture (W 2.3 trillion, 12 percent), foreign trade (W 2.2 trillion,
11 percent), , fisheries (W 0.5 trillion, 3 percent), livestock (W 0.6
trillion, 3 percent) special equipment loans (W 0.9 trillion, 4 percent),
and rural private debt subsidization (W 0.4 trillion, 2 percent).
5.9 No,"Bank Financial In*tittions (NRP1s). The in continues to
operate as the financing arm of the Government's Industrial credlt
programs and principal agent for the Government's preferential credits,
upon which KDB is excessively reliant for domestic currency funding.
KDB's outstanding loans ln the form of pollcy loans amounted to W 9.3
trillion, while borrowings from the Government and from the NIF to support
these loans amounted to about 73 percent of its total borrowings at the
end of 1991. The policy loans of the KEXIH consist of medium- and long-
term financing for the export of capital goods such as industrial plant
and ships, and supporting overseas investments and major natural resource
development projects. Borrowings from the NIF to support these loans
accounted for 34 percent of lts total borrowings in 1991.
5.10 The share of NBI8s in total policy loans, which started at ver
30 percent in the mid-1970s, increased to a 40 percent level by the end of
the 1970s, and maintained this level during the 1980s (Table 5.3). &t
1990. nolicv loans of NBFIs accounted for 41 rercent of total ggligc
laM.
5.11 Central Bank Rediscountina. The BOK supplies credits to banking
institutions either by redLscounting comercial bills or by extendlng
loans against the collateral provided by selected financial assets of
banks. Commercial bills issued and/or accepted by eligible enterprises,
or guaranteed by the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund or the Korea Technology
CredLt Guarantee Fund are eligible for rediscounting up to 50 percent of
the amount discounted by banks. Loans for forelgn trade are also eliglble
for rediscounting against collateral by the BOK within 30 percent of the
loan granted by banking LastLtutLcns, or 50 percent where the underlylng
loan is granted to SMEs. Loans agalnst collateral for agrlculture and
flsheries are extended up to 50 percent granted by t*o National
Agrlcultural Cooperative Federation and the National taderation of
Fisheries Cooperatives, while loans for livestock breeding granted by the
National Livestock Cooperatives Federation are eligible for loans against
collateral within 40 percent.
5.12 As of the end of 1991, each banking instltutlon could make use
of the BOK's redlscount facilities for up to 70 percent of the total
amount lt had lent to SKEs not listed on the Korea Stock Exchange and for
up to 60 percent of that to listed SMEs. In addition, general loans are
also avallable for banks against their specific participation ln a few
types of pollcy loans such as loans to SHEs and equipment loans to export
industries, or for those which have fallen temporarily short of reserve
requLrements. As of the end of 1991. nolicy loans accounted for 95
percent of the BOK's total loans and rediscounts (para. 4.8).
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C lmpact of Directed Credt on the inslal System
5.13 The banking system was the most importamt channel for
Implementing the directed credit policies of the Government. It is the
part of the financial system most effected by subsidized interest rates,
subsidized rediscounting and preferential finance. The impact of the
Government's policy was reflected In a declining share of total loans
originating from the system. Due to the expansion of credit in the HCI
sector and the construction boom in the Middle East In the 1970s, Korea
experienced a rapid growth in its money supply. The inflationary pressure
was further aggravated by the sectoral imbalance in the allocation of
resources. As inflation accelerated, speculation in real assets became
rampant and made financial savings unattractive since real interest rates
remained low.
5.14 The system of credit allocation had an adverse effect on the
development of the financial sector, not only with respect to its growth,
but also with respect to the quality of its services. Intervention in the
banking lidustry (i.e., Ln day-to-day management and in its asset
allocation decisions) impeded the development of professional bank
managers and removed any incentive for the banks to become more efficient
In the intermediation of financial resources. Nor did the banks havo much
Incentlve to select profitable borrowers ince they were not rewarded for
doing so. Rather, banks passively accommodated the credit demands of the
government-favored borrowers. The repressed interest rates, which
fluctuated around zero or negative in real terms, made bank deposits quite
unattractive financial assets and made the holders of bank deposits the
u'ltmate bearers of the cost of financial intervention. Conseeuentyl. the
deeloumen oftefnnial sector has been retarded In ggnmarison tg the
vitalitq of the real nector. Furthermore, the large losses suffered by
many industrial groups have weakened the profitability and financial
position of commercial banks, which have experienced a decline in their
relative importance in the Koreon financial system.
5.15 Such of the discussion of the costs of credit policies,
including credit allocation, focusses on the experience of the 1970* when
the XCI drive was underway. This was influenced by the overcapacity of
many heavy Industrial sectors that suffered large losses in the aftermath
of the second oil crisis and the worldwide conomic recession of the early
1980.. The result of the Government's directed lending policy was that
the banks entered the 1980s with a substantial proportion of non-
performing loans. With their asset structure undermined, commercial banks
could have become prey to a crisis of confidence in the banking system,
but for the fact that they were largely government-owned.
3.16 The quantif'iable cost to the financial system is quite
substantial. rate subsidies extended to goliv loan borwrsi
1991 amounted to about U 2.0 trillon. or 1.0 gercent of GMN. and 6.2
neroent of ggvrnent oxnenditures, The amount of annual subsidy has
raed from a hitgh of 2.2 nlerCent in 1982 to a low of 0.8 gercent in 192l.
The cumulative subsidy during 1981-91 amounted to V 13.3 trillion, or an
average of V 2 trillion p.a. (Chart 5.2 and Annex B). The estLmated
amount of interest rate subsidies was calculated on the basis of comparing
the corporate paper rate against the average on-lending rate of three
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widely utilixed policy loam: the export promotion fund, the macineyindustry promotion fund, and the NIF. The resulting avwrage interet ratedifferetial Is then applied to the outstanding amont of policy loas to
arrive at the amout of interest rate subsidy. Tb. other cost such as
coat of carrying non-performing assets on the books of the banks and the
W0K ca not be calculated becauso of lack of reliable data.
chmt Kara - EsUmtJ'w of Subsd Provim





5.17 *=nct: on the lakflk I l(are. The rLi&tive emphasis of the
Govorrn t's cr dit allocation policy applied to the booking system hashad a major fImpact on who bears the cost and risk of inktorvention. The
use of subs d lzed rates and preferential fLoance bas trwosfrtd t th
fincaring burden from the government budget to the OK and the booking
systm. The transfer of this burden, togotber with an incre^ ing overhnag
of non-performing loans. has adversely affected not only the profitabilLty
of tho dometic deposit money banks, but also the ability of the BOK to
cnuct monetary policy.
3.18 The dLacount wlndow of the BOK plays only a limited role in
aonetr pollcy because llumy of the BOX loans are automtic redlscounts ofpolicy loms by the banklng sector. An a larso part of the pollcy loans
were eligible for redisc.nmUmSn with th O XO, the effect w an icrArmw
In r orvo noney. To absorb llquLdity, the BOK Lasued a large amount of
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N$Ba at below market rates and sold mainly to a captive market of BnFIs.
Howevr, the progressive expansion of outstading ZSBa has had some
negative effects. The interest payments required to service WSBs served
to bring about additional examion of the numey supply. This also led
to crowding out. Although the interest rate on the KSBS Ls below market,
the BOK still incurs a negative spread of 6 percent p.a.--the spread
between the IISS rates and the discount rates.
5,19 Table 4.1 in Chapter IV provides a breakdown of loans and
discounts of the BOK during 1985-91. As of December 31, 1991, such loans
amonted to W 13.5 trillion. As a percentage of the annual budget deficit
during this period, the subsidies ranged from 1-3 percent during 1975-82.
If the outstanding amount of policy loans of V 14 trillion and the
outstanding amount of ISBs of V 15 trillion aS of Kay 31, 1992 were
combined, the cost of carrying the policy loans would be roughly V 1
trillion, or approximately 2 percent of tie 1991 budget, and one-tetth of
1 percent of the GDP. However, this cost is substantial when compared to
the B0K's operating deficit of V 1.27 trillion during the January to May
1992 period, against its reserves of V 1.34 trillion.
D. m Pla for Credtr
5.20 It is well recognized in Korea that the volume of all policy
loans is large and needs to be reduced substantially over time if the
present system of credit allocation is to be replaced by indirect monetary
controls. Since the adoption of an indlrect moneta=y control golicy to
XRIS. the gresen sytgm of direct credit control is beinSi antMlaed
bythe Government. It in lmpgrtan tat the gnerating deficit of the BOX
whih eantesfon the golicy loans be RroneXlX financed through the
bW=tet. Some of the options for addressing the policy loans in general
and those handled by the BOK are discussed below.
5.21 Grandual esdction of PolXcy Lan=. Pollcy loans in the past
hae been targeted to support development of these productive sectors and
consequently contributed to the growth of the economy and significantly
changed the structure of the manufa"turing sector. However, the direction
of preforontial finance bas changed considerably in the 1980s. Although
It still reflects broad government objectives of supportLng priority
Industries, policy loan are now targeted at sectors like housing,
agriculture, fishery, and livestock, whille the credit risks continue to be
left to the banking system. One option is that the Goverment should
continue in the direction it has already taken In sharply reducing
dlrected credit activities. More specifically, it is recommended that the
Government should prepare a plan for phasing out all policy loans within 5
years. Given the magnitude of the policy loans and its broad reach It is
appreciated that this will take time. In the meantime, it is recommenoed
that the policy loans provided by the BOK be addressed on a priority
basis.
5.22 DM's PoliGy Loan. To Improve the managment of monetary
policy the Government should limit BOK's role to managing and
adiisteriag the rediscount wow, with the function used only as a
monetary policy tool for liquidity management rather than the one of
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providing policy loans to various sectors. This could be achieved in
several ways. One way to achieve thls objective would be the trasnfer of
all policy loans from the BOK to specialized fLiancial institutions. The
other option will be the creation of a special fund to take over the
policy loans from the BOK.
5.23 In some countries (Philippines, Turkey), policy loans were
lnitially promoted by the central banks, but were later transferred to
specialized financial institutions as the conduct of monetary polLcy
became more complicated. In a deregulated financial market, the role of
the central bank moves from one of direct control to one of lndirect
control. The speclalized lnstltutions are better equipped to handle such
policy loins and the cost associated with such operations can then be
financed transparently through the budget rather than through taxing the
financial system. In Korea, there are several specialized institutions
which can take over these policy loans from the BOK. All the export loans
can probably be transferred to the Export-Import Bank. The Industrial Bank
of Korea (IBK) can take over the small and medium Industries loans, and
the Agriculture Cooperatives can assume the agriculture loans. These
institutions can operate rediscounting facilities for these loans.
5.24 With the transfer of policy loans, there are several Issues
which need to be addressed. The first issue is the mechanism to effect
the transfer of these loans. The transfer of these policy loans could
probably be done in the following ways.
5.25 One example is the transfer of V 10 billion small and medlum
Industry policy loans (SKI loans) to the IBK to illustrate this process.
5.26 S1te L: BOK will either sell or transfer outright V 10 billion
portfolio of SKI loans to the IBK. Since IBK does not have resources to
purchase the loans, the BOK will provide a loan of V 10 billion on terms
on conditionw Go be negotiated. The balance sheet of BOK and IRK vill look
Like this:
BOK IBK
Assets Liabilities Ass.ts LiabliLties
S tI Loans -10 SKI Loans +10 BOK +10
Loan to IBK +1Q
5.27 Stmn 2: The Government will then provide a loan of V 10
billion to the IBK at a rate equivalent to the return on the SKI
portfolio, less a margin to cover the operating cost of such a facility
and risk. The Government will provide the loans by issuing treasury bills
(T-ills), to IBK./ IBK will then pay off its loan to the B0K by
delivering the treasury bills to the BOK. The BOK will now have treasury
bills as assets. The balance sheets will look like this:
1/ Alternatively, the Governrent can simply lncrease the capLtal of
IBK.
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Assets Liabililties Assets LiablitLtes
LoAns to IRK -10 SMi Loans +10 GOK +10
T-Bill* +10 I
The final balance sheet will therefore look like this:
IBK~~~~~~~~~~BOK IBK .-
Assets |Liabilties Assets Liabilities
T-ills +10 | SKI Loacs +10 1OK +10
5.28 Assuming that the GOK would like to gradually phase out the
policy loans, it will need to cover the cost of the policy loans by
providing the specialized institutions with adequate resources. This
could be achieved by either meeting the deficit on an annual baLsi or
through capitalization. Once the bonehmark for setting the interest rate
is established, the subsidy on policy loans can be related to the
benchmark rate and the subsidy can be phased out gradually by raising the
interest rate on policy loans to the benchmark rate.
5.29 The proposed measures will involve changes in the institutional
arrangements which may or may not require legislative changes. These
issues need to be carefully explored. The advantage of the proposed
approach is that it would reaove a major distorting element in the
structure of interwst rates and thus enable a rapid deregulation of
krterest rates as contemplated by the authorities. As a consequence.
indlrect monetary pollcy control will be facliltated without causLng any
Immediate dislocation in the provisions of policy loans. In terms of
actual costs to the Government, it has been estimated that the cost of
transferring polliy loans to the specialized financlal institutions would
be about V 1.5 trillion ln the first year and V 190 billion In the second
year.AY
5.30 ..However, it is appreciated that transforming all polliy loans at
one go may not be feasible. Therefore, the GOK should consider
transforming at least BOK policy loans whiLch are of a developmental
tatures Interest rate subsLdLes on any remaining policy loans with 30K
are to be progressively removed and the volume reduced. The carrying cost
of polliy loans transferred to the speclalized institutions is to be
,funded by the budget. This measure will remove a major distortlon In the
2/ The costs were arrived at by multiplyLng the outstanding 30K
rediscounts ret of rediscounts for liquidity control (W16,415
billion), with the average yield of MSBs (14.65) and margin to
cover the operating cost (0.51), less the weighted average of
rediscount rates (5.821). The calculation for the flrst year is
as follows: 116,415 billion x (14.65X - 5.821 + 0.51)
11,532 billion. For the second year, tbp BOK outstanding
rediscounts is to be replaced by specialized financial
institution redLscounts for new policy loans asd is calculated
as follows: 12,000 bllion x (14.65% - 5.82X + 0.51) -
1187 billion.
- 65 .
financial system and therefore facilitate the emergence of market rates on
all financial assets.
5.31 The other option which the 00K should consider is the creation
of a special fund which can be used as a vehicle to absorb the policy
loans from the BOK. The fund will take over both the policy loans and
matching HSI liabilities from the B0K. The fund could replace ESBs with
Treasury bills as they mature.
E. Summay and RecommendatAons
5.32 The GOK has intervened extensively In the financial system and
the main vehicle which is used to direct resources to the priority sectors
is through policy loans. At the end of 1991. total policy loans accounted
for 39.7 percent of total domestic credit and the assets of the KDB and
KEXIK. The share of policy loans during the last five years (1986.91) has
averaged 42.7 Rerctnt. By any standards, the amount and proportion of
policy loans in Korea is very high. The size of the policy loans is
substantially more of the rediscount loans provided by the BOK are
included. At the end of 1991, such loans from BOK rediscount window
amounted to about Won 13,5 trillion. Total cost of providing such policy
loans in 1991 amounted to 2.3 trillion, or 1.1 percent of GNP.
5.33 The use of policy loans as an industrial policy tool worked
reasonably well initially but ran into difficulties when a lrge amount of
policy loans were made available for developing and financing HCIs. This
led to large non-performing loans in the banking system which took a while
to work out.
5.34 There are several major drawbacks of the directed credits in
Korea. First, it is essentially a tax on the banking system and small
depositors. Policy loans at below market rates reduce the profitability
of the domestic banks and retard the development of robust financial
markets. Second, the existence of large policy loans at below market
rates combined with the controlled eposit rates adversely affe:t the
efficiency of the banking system. Third, the existence of policy loans
increase moral hazard and impede the development of professional banks as
the credit risk is implicitly assumed by the government. Fourth, large
policy loans made available through the rediscount window of the BOK at
below market rates constrain the ability of the BOK to conduct monetary
policies and adversely affect its profitability.
5.35 Therefore, it is recommended that the GOK consider: (i) reducing
the amount of policy loans and size of interest rate subsidy through a
step by step approach over a period of 4-5 years; (ii) confining the role
of the rediscount window of the 3OK to that of a traditional central bank.
At a start, policy loans of a developmental nature on the books of BOK
should be transferred to specialized financial institutions or a special
fund and the cost of maintaining such policy loans by the specialized
institutions should be financed by the GOK through the budget. Interest
subsidies on any remain:Lng policy loans with BOK are to be progressively
removed and the volume reduced. Budgetary impact of such a transfer
appears manageable and the net impact will be no more that what is being
financed nOW by BOK.
VL iORNGN EXCHANGE SYSTEM IJIERALZION AND
FORIGN EXCHANGE MRIS IN KOREA
itrodtcto
6.1 Korea initiated a financial liberalUation program beginning in
1981, but it was not type of liberalization strategy familiar In economic
literature or in the Southern Cone countries;J where it reached Its apogee in
the late 1970. and oarly 1980s. Two features distinguished financial
deregulation in Korea from the strategy pursued In other countries. First,
Korea achieved positive real Interest rates or competitive conditions in the
financial market more by utilizing market-oriented regulations than by
eliminating them. Second, Korea has maintained (even during the controlled
phase of financial iberalization) strict restrictions on the capital account
on the grounds that a free capital account would Induce capital flight and
spawn more serious macroeconomic and financial system instability. There was
some basis for the economic rationale underlying this approach as will be
discussed later in this chapter, but a greater support for it stems from the
historical experience of Korea in the mid-1960s, when lt started financial
deregulation. Since that time, Korea has moved a long way towards the
liberalization of the capital account through a series of small steps, though
the capital control mechanism remains in place. However, the current accov-nt
of the balance of payments is considerably free to a point that Korea has
formally accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the INF Agreement,
effective November 1988.
6.2 In this chapter, a succinct description of current and capital
account liberasLzation is presented in Section A. This is followed by a
description of the emerging foreign exchange market in Korea in Section B.
Section C proceeds with the analysis and implications of the full opening of
the capital account In the context of the proposed deregulation of interest
rates In Korea beginning from 1992. A summary and recommendations are offered
In Section D.
A. Fwre Exchange System - Its IAl Bass and Sture
6.3 Foreign exchange arrangements in Korea are governed by three
interrelated Acts--the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FMEA), the
International Trade Act (ITA) and the Foreign Capital Inducement Act (FCIA).
The FEMA covers management over foreign exchange transactions, tho exchange
rate system, concentration of foreign exciange, payment and receipts of
foreign exchange including credit or liability transactions, contracts, etc.
that initlate such payments or receipts, and certain particularly short-term
capital movements. It specifies the business and responsibilities of the
exchange regulatory authorities uch as the Bank of Korea (BOK), and foreign
exchange buslmess carrying Lnstitutions like foreign exchange banks and money
changers. Basically, It sets forth the essential principles for regulating
v See James A. Hanson, "An Open Capital Account: A Brief Survey f
the Issues and the Results,* March 1992.
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forsign exchange transactions. Owing to the varioty and ¢onstant changes In
foreign exchatge transactions, this Act is kept flexible in scope and
application so that changes in transactions are easily accommodated without
having to amend the FEA. As in the came of all other laws, the FMA is
complemnted by presldential decrees and regulations which define the
frameork of exchange arrangements. The actual administration of the exchange
system is performed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) through regulations,
though the MOF also delegates a part of this regulatory authority to other
institutions.
6.4 The basic role of the ITA is to regulate commodity flows (as
distinct fro the money flows which are regulated by the PFMA). However,
since the money flows accompany the commodity flows, both these Acts overlap
in respect of certain provisions, though a consistency is maintained in their
application. The FCIA is concerned with encouraging investment of foreign
capital and with the regulation of inward direct investment, long-term loans
of US$1 million or more with a repaywnt period of more than three years. In
the event of any conflict arising between the FEMA and FCIA, the provisions
the latter hold.
B. Eu=p hg in Korea
6.5 Until 1965, the Korean economy had been severely repressed, with
pervasive controls on foreign trade and payments, industrial inmestments,
prices and financial inscitutions. In such a system, the central bank had to
make the market for foreign exchange. Private foreign exchange dealers, banks
and multinational firms were powerless to facilitate market transactions in
the foreign exchange market because exchange controls prevented them from
aoving capital in and out of the country. Potential private dealers could not
freely assume positive or negative positions in foreign exchange (against
domestic currency), nor were they collectively capable of establishing a
market-clearing exchange rate. Government intervention became unavoidable in
such circumstances, since without it the exchange market would have tended to
be highly liquid and extremely unstable. For any government intervention, it
was necessary for it to establish an exchange rate--fixed, floating or managed
float, dependlng upon what the authorities desired at a particular juncture.
6.6 However, the situation in Korea has changed radically since 1982,
when a guided financial liberalization was launched. The exchange controls
w,re gradually relaxed in conformity with the less restrictive character of
the financial markets and the mode of fixing the exchange rate was changed
first from the fixed exchange rate to the SDR basket-related combined with a
trade weighted exchange rate which lasted until March 1990, and then to the
market-average exchange rate as referred to later in this chapter. In keeping
with this, the exchange arrangeents also underwent radical changes.
CumT Aewud
6.7 Current account transactions in Korea have been almost totally
freed from regulations over the last fifteen years, and what now remains by
way of restrictions are more apparent than real. The current account
regulatory system can be seen in three parts: surrender requirements for
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foreign exchange earned, payments for Imports and invisibles, and holding of
foreign currency accounts. Concentration of foreign ex'hange takes four
forms: selling foreign exchange, depositing, registering and placing in
custody. All four refer to foreign exchange over US$5,000 arnetd or brought
by a resident into the country whlch must be surrendered to d foreign exchange
bank at its posted customer rate or be deposited In foreign currency accounts
in banks. Non-residents have only to register any foreign exchange brought
into the country in excess of US$5,000. This can be accomplished either by
placing the foreign exchange at a foreign exchange bank or at a customs
office, or by declaring the amount on a certification of declaration of
foreign exchange. There are a few exceptions to these procedures, but they do
not in any way affect the core of foreign exchange transactions.
6.8 The Institutions where forea.gn exchange is concentrated are the BOK
(the principal one), the Foreign Exchange Equalization Fund, and foreign
exchange banks. money changers, etc. However, eventually all foreign exchange
is concentrated in the BOK, as there are ceilingp on the foreign exchange
holdings of foreign exchange banks operated through what is known as a
p aition management system, started in 1981, under the Foreign Exchange
Control Regulations of the MOF. This system regulates the overall position
(both forward and spot) of foreign exchange banks. The foreign exchange banks
are required to comply with the ceilings on their foreign exchange holdings on
a daiy basis. The required overbought position of each foreign exchange bank
is equivalent to 200 percent of the previous month's total of foreign exchange
bills bought. On the other hand, the overall oversold position ceiling is
limited to 20 percent of the previous month's average outstanding foreign
exchange bills bought or US$10 milllon, whichever is higher. The ceiling on
oversold spot exchange position is 5 percent of the previous month's oversold
outstanding foreign exchange bills bought or US$5 million, whichever Is
higher.
6.9 Exports, barring a few items which require licenses, are freely
allowed and proceeds arising from them are to be surrendered as mentioned
above. This also holds true in regard to invisible receipts (with some
exceptions). Korean residents sre permitted to retain up to US$5,000 ln
foreign exchange. Non-residents are allowed to convert freely foreign
exchange into domestic currency.
6.10 All imports need licenses under the ITA, though they are issued
upon appli.ation almost aut7matically. Imports are divided into two
categories: automatic approval and restricted items. The latter comprises
only 278 items out of a total of 10,274 Items on the Harmonized System, or
only 2 percent of Imports. All payments for invisibles require an individual
license. Payments for invisibles connected with foreign trade and for certain
other item such as banking charges, insurance premiums and communication fees
are licensed automatically. Xorean companies are authorized to obtain foreign
exchange to meet the expenses of their overseas operations. Residents
travelling abroad can carry US$5,000 per trip in addition to exchange for
other specified expenses. Credit cards are permitted in designated
transactions. On the whole, restrictions on Invisible paymets are relatively
few.
6.11 Thus lt can be seen that current account transactions in Korea are
generally free from any serious restrictions, which explains Korean acceptance
of Article VIII obligations under the IMF Agreement. The residual
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restrictions arn more precautionary than prohibitive in nature, enabling the
regulatory authorities to monitor external transactions.
6.12 Both non-residents and Korean residents (as mentioned earlier) can
hold foreign currency accounts with foreign exchange banks. Remittances from
non-resident accounts and withdrawals in the form of currency notes upon
departure from Korea may, in general, be made freely. The approval of the
bank where the account is held is not required for remittances abroad or
transfers to other foreign currency accounts for purchases and withdrawals of
foreign means of paymeut or for payments relating to approved transactions.
The sale of foreign currency from deposits for domestic means of payments has
been unrestricted since December 1991.
6.13 The resident holders of foreign currency accounts do not encounter
as many restrictions in regard to openlng such accounts, but withdrawals from
such accounts are subject to certain requirments. Residents, while free to
change the composition of currencies in such accounts, can use them only for
conversion into Won, making payments in for z.ign currency or buying other
foreign currencies to deposit in the accounts.
6.14 Forelgn exchange banks can grant foreign currency loana for certain
purposes, such as the import of production facillties, repaymeat of the
principal of foreign loans or overseas direct investment. Untll January 7,
1993, there were restrictions on the maximm amount of such loans, with the
limit varying according t. the size and nature of borrowing. In the case of
loans for repayment of a foreign currency loan, the maximum repayment period
is three years, and eight years in regard to other loans.
Capia Amo nsmcdons
6.15 Transactions in the capital account of the Korean balance of
payments are governed by two Acts--FEKA and FCIA--depending upon whether they
are inward or outwxrd transactions. In general, all niawar foreign exchange
traw *,ctions and Imwmzd portfolio lnvestment and short-term borrowing come
under the purview of the FEA, and the rest are covered by the FCIA. Looking
at it sonewhat differently, all the short-term capital flows and the outward
foreign dlrect portfolio and other long-term loans are regulated by the FEMA.
Over the years, but particularly sincb 1981, the restrictions on capital
accounts were diluted a great deal; capital transactions are subject to the
discretion of the NOV or the BOK, or both.
6.16 No loans and overseas invastments, whether direct investment or
portfolio, are subject to prior approval of the relevant authorities. Loan
can be provided to entities outside Korea, but only to banking institutions.
Ail inward flows of funds likewis require approval of the authorities.
6.17 Until December 31, 1991, portfolio investment in domestic
securLtLes by non-residents was restricted only to funds such as the Korean
Fund and matching funds. Such investment in Korea amounted to about US$700
million by end-1990. Convertible bonds and bonds with warrants of major
Korean companies have been issued since 1985, a fact which smoothed the way
for forelgn participation in domestic portfolio investment. The
liberalization of capital transactions is being carrLed out cautiously to
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prevent large and volatile capital flows from creating a high degree of
instability in the foreign exchange and capital markets. In accordance with
the 1982-92 internationalization plan, Korean authorities bhve allowed direct
transactions among foreigners of Korean stocks acquired though equity-related
bonds and the creation of three matching equity funds to promote equity
inflows and outflows. Furthernore, the limit on foreign shareholding in
domestic securities has been relaxed, and a greater number of foreign
securities companies have been allowed to open representative offices in
Korsa, a move which suggests perhaps a greater scope for foreign investors to
invest more easily in the Korean securities market in years ahead.
6.18 Starting January 1, 1992, direct foreign portfolio investment in
the Korean market was allowed, subject to some restrictions. Investment in an
individual security is limited to 3 percent of outstanding shares and the
cumulative limit on foreign ownrship in a single security is 10 percent,
except for the companies which have issued convertible bonds. In these caes,
a higher limit of 25 percent is permitted (see Chapter VIII). Overseas
portfolio investment is not generally allowed for residents other than
institutional investors such as securities companies, iuvestment trusts and
insurance companies. -wever, the limits which are set on such Investments
vary according to tht ,ature of the business of the institutional investors.
6.19 There has been considerable liberalization in regard to direct
foreign investment since 1984. Such investment is nou allowed in all
Industries, except those specified in a wneaative list". Prior to this,
direct investment was allowed only in those industries which were included in
a positive list, and as such was largely restrictive. As of the end of April
1991, the negative list consisted of 206 out of a total of 999 industrial
sectors, thus implying a liberalization ratio of 79.4 percent. The negative
list is divided Into two parts: prohibited and restricted. In the former
category fall the activities reserved exclusively for the Government ci public
entities as well as those considered hazardous to public health. Restvicted
activities are not, in general, open to foreign investment, but specific
projects may be approved on a case-by-cass basis.
6.20 Since March 1991, a simplified procediure was introduced for the
approval of foreign. direct investment under new procedures called a
notification system. Application for foreign investment is subject to
approval or notification requiremont. If it is notification, a foreign firm
can start business 30 days after the date of submission of notification,
unless its notification is not approved. It is the goal of the authorities to
extend, by 1993, the notification procedure gradually to cover all industries
barring a few; investment approval is normally granted within 30 days. The
overseas remittances of dividends and legitimate profits accrued from stocks
or shares owned by a foreign investor are freely permitted, and so is the
repatriation of profits.
6.21 As for the residents wishing to invest abroad, they must obtain the
approval by the B0K, which is often granted as a matter of course. Where the
amount of the individual investment is not more than US$5 million, such
authorization is automatic. From January 1989, the old positive list ws
changed to a negative list, which encouraged, to a considerable extent,
overseas iestment by Korean companies. Despite all of these liberalization
measures, the capital account is still not free from discretionary control,
which is infsmally, if not formally, exercised.
- 71 -
ForIdgD Exuhange Matku
6.22 The main players in the foreign exchange market, with the existing
semi-liberalized foreign exchange and financial system, are the foreign
exchange banks, their customors, and the BOR--the last one playing the central
role because the foreign exchange is concentrated there. The bank customers,
boing engaged in trade, are the suppliers of foreign exchange and its final
users. They are involved in the purchase and sale of foreign exchange against
domestic currency or other foreign currencies, and the management of foreign
exchange risk. The foreign exchange banks are the main intermediaries through
which the foreign exchange transactions take place. They deal among
themselves and with foreign banks in other countries in regard to the purchase
and sale of foreign exchange and maintain, at the end of every day of
transactions, the foreign exchange position in a manner stipulated by the BOK.
A major part of inter-bank transactions is matched at the Fund Brokerage House
in the Korea Financial Telecommunication and Clearings Institute (KFTC), in
which all foreign exchange banks are members. The residual positions are
negotiated through the inter-bank telephone market. The BOK, in its capacity
as the custodian of foreign exchange, intervenes to balance the supply of and
demand for foreign exchange, and also to manage reserve holdings.
6.23 Spot transactions predominate in the foreign exchange market,
though their proportion in total transactions has been declining in --tent
years. Foreign exchange forward contracts and interest rate swaps were
introduced between 1980 and 1984. Some other instruments such as currency
options and swaps were initiated in 1987 to meet the growing need for advanced
hedging against future risk, unavoidable in a foreign exchange market. Such
transactions are currently limited, partly because of the limlted familiarLty
of the market players with these instruments in Korea (which was until
recently a closed economy) and partly due to restrictlons by the authorities
to prevent speculation and to ensure sound business adminlstration. Inter-
bank transactlons are free from all restrLetLons.
6.24 A forelgn currency US dollar call market was established in 1989
with minimum transactlons of US$100,000 as a complement to expanding domestic
money markets; this market was extended to cover Yen in 1991 and DM in 1992,
wlth minimum transactlons of Yen 10 million and DM 100,000, respectlvely.
ThLo market, where short-term foreign funds are borrowed and lent without
collateral, consists of national coQmmrcial banks, specialized banks, regional
banks, merchant banking corporations, and foreign bank branches. The KPTC
acts as an intermediary in the foreign currency call market. The maturLty of
lending and/or borrowing is basically short-term, ranglng from overnight to
one year. Transactions are ln US dollars and the minimum amount of
transactlons is US$50,000. Forelgn currency call money (i.e., borrowing) and
loan rates are linked to interest rates ln the lnternational financlal market,
adjusted of course for the exchange rates. There is presently no brokerage
fee.
6.25 The most dominant players in the forelgn currency call market are
presently national commercial banks, regional banks, specialized banks and
merchant banks, accounting for 13.3 percent, 79.1 percent, 4.2 percent, and
3.0 percent, respectlvely, of the call loans as of August 1992, and 64.5
percent, 18.2 percent 11 3 percent and 5.7 percent, respectlvely, in the call
money market. Foreign banks and foreign bank branches are not fund lenders in
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the market. The market grew rapidly in the first five months following its
inception, as evident from the fact that the magnitude of transactions in the
market inreaed from US$907 million in December 1989 to US$6.2 billion by
April 1990.
?nbIM: hKm - Stret of Fedl Curmruca int,
Jl -A s, 1992
eationtide 614.3 366.5 3524.2 1783.9 12909.9 1417.4
CoB ercin l (13.1) (13.3) (75.2) (5.7)
FpeciganLzd 3751.1 13. 214.3 313.0 8 336.8 1874.3
Banks (80.0) (79.1) (4.6) (11.3)
egoal 4689.2ks 185.7 4S.8 733.7 7504.2 548.0 388.7
(4.0) (4.2) (15.7) (18.2)
-~~~ -l
Marcbant 50.3 82.3 193.7 1157.8 1 143.4 1 75.51
Banking (1.1) (3.0) (4.1) (5.7) 
Corporation_ I
Foreign, Bank 87.8 13.1 23.3 | 5.8 | 64.5 | 7.3 
Branches (1.9) (O.S) (0.5) | (0.2)|||
Total r4689.2 2764.7 4689.2 |2764.7|||
S I ~~~(100.0) (100.0) (100.0)1 (100.0)
NMsa: Flgures In parentheses indicate the share of transactions.
Soucea: Mlinstry of Finance.
6.26 In a freely functloning foreign exchange market, the exchange rate
Is expected to be determined by the supply of and demand for foreign exchange.
However, Korea has not reached that stage yet, though it has moved in the
direction of a market determined exchange rate since 1990. Until 1990, the
exchange rate, as a signal of market conditi ns in the foreign exchange
market, was determlned by the KOF and the BO. on the basis of an SDR-related
basket of currencies which sought to reflect market conditions. The Inter-
bank foreign exchange market becom a vehicle for determining the price of
foreign exchange on the basi of market forces. In view of these previous
actions, antd ith the avowed objective to progress toward a market mechanism,
Korean authorities made a switch from the earlier system of exchange rate
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dterminAtion to a system. mostly lf not wholly. reflective of market
conditions. This new system allowed for a freely determined exchange rate in
tho inter-bank foreign exchange market and other exchnge rates which are
related, directly or iWirectly, to the exchange rate prevailing in that
market.
6.27 Under a new system called a market average exchange rate, the XFTC
informs the NOP, the BOK and the foreign exchange banks of the basic exchange
rate of the Korean Won against the US dollar, which is derlved from weighlng
average inter-bank won/dollar exchange rates applied in spot transactions on
the previous business day. Since it is based on the freely determined inter-
bank exchange rates, it approximates the market rate and thus changes every
day, depending upon prevailing market conditions. However, since it is the
startLig rate for the day, its market element is somewhat diminiched. The
basic rate on the market average rate is applied by the BOK in its
transactions with the ' reign Exchange Stabilization Fund and the Government.
The BOK's buying and selling rates for US dollars as applied to banks
(telegraphic transfer rates) are determined by the BOK. There are other rates
-which are determined through negotiations between each foreign exchange bank
and the customers.
6.28 The exchange rate system that emerged from the new arrangements is
a cross between a fixed exchange rate regime and a floating or managed float
regime. It is analogous to the fixed exchange rate in as mwuh as its current
value on any one day is based on the weighted average of the previous day's
Inter-bank exchange rates. It has a floating element to the extent that the
rates on which it is based are determined in the market, and these fluctuate
with the day-to-day changes in the demand and supply of foreign exchange.
C. A Case for o of the Capi Acouut
6.29 The question of liberalization of the capital account usually
centers on two issues. The first is whether a capital account freeing should
coincide with, precede, or follow the current account liberalization, and the
second is concerned with how it should be phased relative to the
liber lization of the domestic financial system. Current account
liberalization generally involves a real depreciation of the exchange rate
which counterbalances the negative effects on the balance of payments of
tearing down the tariff walls. This, however, is a non-issue in Korea because
the current account has become substantially liberalized in recent years, as
detailed in the earlier section of this chapter. It is the second issue of
capital account liberalization that needs to be addressed in detail.
6.30 There is an inherent bias against freeing the capital account in
countries which had repressed economies in the past, as Korea once had. This
is because the Governrent in such an economy finances fiscal deficits by
taxing their financial systems by instruments sueb as reserve requirements and
directed credits. Since taxation depresses yields on bank deposits,
depositors tend to substitute foreign financial assets with higher yields for
domestic currency denominated assets. Even the borrowers, who have to pay
higher rates on loans, try to avoid the tax by seeking cheaper loans abroad--
and to the extent this happens, the domestic financial system shrivels with
the consequent fall in tax revenus. Hence, such e6cnomies have imposed severe
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restrictions on the movement of short- term capital. Although Korea outgrow
that stag long ago. the psychological barriers to removing short-term capital
control. remain, whibh is why the authoritLes are reluctant to contemplate any
relaxation of capital controls.
6.31 The Korean authorities are haunted by their experience of capital
account liberalization in the *id-1960s, when Korea launched its first great
exporlment of financLal reform. As Interest rates were moved to hlgher
grounds, and the exchange rate ws sufficiently depreciated, the expectatLon
of profltability of investing in Korea soared. As a result, there was a large
amount of capital lnflow in the aftormath of financial reform. Korean
borrowers also were encouraged to increase thelr foreign indebtedness, as they
could raise foreign loans almost at a flat rate of interest during that period
when the Govervuent guaranteed virtually all credit flows. The foreign
liabilities of the Korean private sector were mainly of a short-term nature,
while tbsy typically financed long-term projects. Howver, the repayment of
short-term overeas credlt coincided with the appreclation of the exchango
rate induced by capital inflow, which adversely affected export earnLngs.
This episode may have been a consideration behind the inclusion of capital
account liberalization in the blueprint for financial reform t a later stage.
6.32 It bas to be borne in mind that Korea's capital account, as
deseribed earlier, has been liberalized steadily since 1985, though ln small
steps and only to a limited extent. The existing quantitative studies
undertaken by XDI support this. These studies also found that Korea's
regulated interest rates have rosponded, albeit to a limit extent, to the
foreign interest rate changes during the latter half of the 1980s.
6.33 A standard economic case for capital accownt liberalization is
mad& on the grounds that inflows of foreign capital into the hitherto
repressed economy depress the domestLc interest rates whlch remain high prior
to liberalization and encourage foreign borrowing by the domestLc sector at
the lower interest rates. Initially, a fall in domstic interest rates
raises domestic demand, and thus prices, and as a consequence the real
exchange rate begins to appreciate, leading to a widening of the current
account deficit. Over time, howevwr, the adverse balance of payments results
in decreases in expendituro and wealth, with the real exchange rate declinLng
to the Initial level. In the asset markets, the fall in domestic interest
rates raidSe the demand for noney which is mat by domestic market participants
borrowing abroad to convert the foreign market into domestic money supply.
6.34 In the context of financlal market deregulation, a case for
freeing the capital account rests on the premiso that the domestic financial
market, which will be free after deregulation, will have to be integrated with
foreign fitvwncial markets if the purpose of llberalization is to be achieved.
Finance is fungible and it flows to where the reward is highest and the cost
of transactLons ls lowest. This condition is fulfilled only when the domestic
financial market is linked to the international flnancial market.
6.35 The experiences in liberalizing countrles, however, did not always
conform to the textbook version effects of capital account liberalization.
the Southern Cone countries uhb as Chile, ArgentLna nd Uruguay, for example,
demonstrated that domestic interest rates, far from declining after capital
account liberalization, actually increased, leading to bankruptcies of the
weak industries and financial institutions, a fall in output and an upsurge in
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unemploymnt. Thero vere many explanatlons provlded for these Southern Cone
experiences. For one thing, the prevalence of macroeconomic imbalances ln
these countrles ralsed expectations of devaluation of the appreciated exchange
rate, which brought about the rise in domestic interest rates. Socond, the
high domestic interest rates reflected the transaction cost which remained
hlgh because banks could not arbltrate diroctly between domestlc and foreign
assets. Third, the oligopolistlc structure of the banking system
(particularly in Chile) and market imperfections accounted for the high level
of domestLi interest rates. With financial liberallzation inclusLng capital
account at full steam. industrial and trading firms closely linked with
financial instltutions constantly exerted fierce pressure on the banks to
appropriate ver larger shsres of credit to financing these ectLvities. ThLs
raised credit demand and hence interest rates. Fourth, distress borrowing was
widely prevalent, inducing firms to borrow under financlal stress and severe
cash-flow problem at any Interest rate rather than sell assets to meet
losses ./
6.36 The experiences of other countries thus do not provide any
guidance as to which course of action Korea should adopt. Whatever Korea does
has to be related to the specLficity of the Korean economic situation. An
argument often voiced in Korean official circles, and generally taken as
valid is that the removal c!: capital con.rols during the impending financial
reforms will lead to the appreciation of the exchange rate, thus Lmpeding
exports and raising domestic liquidity. This would then accentuate
inflationary pressures, but without much impact on high domestic interest
rates in view of the prevailing lnelastic demand for bank credit. However, in
the present context, these are not likely to be the consequences. Korea
currently has an inflation rate of about 7 percent, with a GNP growth rate of
around 7 percent. The fiscal deficlt is mcdest at 1.4 percent of GNP. the
external deficit is around 2 percent of GNP, and exports are growing at a rate
of 8-9 percent (though this is lower than during 1987-89). The unemployment
rate Is less than 2 percent, and inflationary pressures during the last few
years have emanated mainly from higher wage demands.
6.37 If the capital account were completely freed in the above
mentioned circumstances, it should have (if at all), a beneficial impact on
Korean growth. With the increased inflow of capital, the Won, which has been
depreciating in the last two years under the new market-oriented xchange rate
system. would initially appreciate. At a time when exports are expected to
rise from their prosont low level, the initial impact would admittedly be
adverse. However, it need not be so, as the appreciated exchange rate will
lead to a fall in the level of inflationary pressures insofar as the cost of
imports on which Korean investment and consumption is signlficantly dependent
will decline too To the extent inflation is moderated, inflationary
expectations will be dampened, leading to a decline In nominal and real
interest rates in the donestic financial markets. Thus, what will be lost by
xporters through appreciation of the exchange rates will be compenated by
lower intorest ratos Even the money supply effects of increased capital
inflow seem exaggerated. With the capital inflow, the money supply will
initially rise, but second round effects would be healthy with the restoration
v/ Y. J. Cho and Deena Khatkhate, Lessons from Financial
Liberalization in Asia: A Comparative Study," Eonomic Discussion
2er No. 50, World Bank, 1989.
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of the money supply to Its iAitial level orG3e the exchange rate has
appreciated.
6*38 )ut the most significant lpact of the incroasod capital inflow
would be reflected tn the rato of growth of output. Considering that the
unemploymnt rate bha reached the minimum possible level (i.e., 2 percent),
output growth can be maintained if labor productivity is raised, which is
possible only with a switch from labor intensive techniques of production to
more capital Intensive technlques. Korea can achieve this switch with the
import of cheaper capital goods embodying new technologles. With new output
and its pattern, it would be a short leap to increased exports in now lines.
In this scenario, the Korean econ;, will not be able to rid itself of the
external deficit for some time. B such a deficit need not cause serious
concern to the authorities in a rapidly changing and more sophisticated Korean
economy so long as that deficit remains sustainable enough to be financed by
normal capital inflows. Tho Korean ecamoy has reached a stagp in which
capital inflows to finance new long-term investment need to be encouraged so
long as the interest paid on them is equal to or less than the rate of r.tutn
earned on their use in domestic investment. If the atthorities feel the need
to reverse the flows in one way or the other, they will be able to do so with
the new instruments of macroeconomic policy at their disposal, such as the
flexible use of exchange and Interest rates made possible by the
liberalization of the financial sector and the capital account.
6.39 This a priori reasoning seems to have some support from X
empirical results relating to the impact of capital flows on the Korean
econonyYi Vith capital account opening, both GNP and inflation are expected
to increase nd the interest rates are expected to decline In the Initial
stages. However, these results should not be taken as definitive; they are
more indicative of the direction of impacts of the opening of the capital
account on the Korean economy.
D. lno PEscondIUous for Capital Acout Liberlzation
6.40 Though there is a strong case for capital account liberalization,
it is pertinent to deal with the question of whether the present environment
is congenial for taking this step on the basis of experience and economic
reasonig. It is necessary to meet two preconditions before ombarking on
capital account liberalization. First, there should be macroeconomic
stability since opening the capital account incroases the opportunity for
currency substitutes, which increase inflation rates In terms of domestic
currency. When this occurs, the domestic currency money base sbrinks while
the foreign component of the base increases. A sustainable fiscal deficit
requiring a minimal inflation tax is necessary.
6.41 If the nation has to have easy and free access to the
international financial markets, whicb is what freeing -he capital account
means, it is essential that the domestic tanking system must not be
overburdened with rules and regulations on interest rates or loan portfolio
a/ Korea Development Institute, PForeign Exchange and Capital Account
Transactions,' August 1992.
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composition, which would make them uncompotitive relative to foreign banks
operatilg in the country. Besides, the domestic banks must have independent
anagement and ,-und portfolios--no large proportion of non-performing loans.
If thesa two preconditions are not met, the removal of controls on capital
accrunts may lead to domestic financial disintermediation and also to a
banking crisis, which vould need to be addressed by the Goveurment.
6.42 On this criteria, the gravity of evldence Is ambiguous as to
whether or not Korea should free the capital account at on. go at the present
juncture. The first of the preconditions for freeing the capital account is
currently met by Korea. There is currently no serious macroeconomic imbalance
In the Korean economy with the current account deficit tending to narrow &..-d
the interest rate falling. More importantly, the fLacal deficit interpreted
in a broad way as the apparent deficit of the Governmont and hidden through
the BOX is at a sustainable level. On other hand, the domestic banking syste%m
is overburdened by a variety of regulations, and the level of profitability is
low due to 'the large amount of below market policy loans. Furthermore, some
government banks also reportedly have slzeable non-performing loans. This
means the banking system in Korea will not be ln a position to compete with
International banks on a level playing field and perhaps the complete
liberalization of the capital account will have to wait until the financial
system liberalization process is through.
6.43 A gradual approach towards capital account liberalization is also
dictated by the experiences of Japan and other OECD countrles. The capital
account controls in these countries were strongly influenced by the objectives
of balance of payments, exchnge rate variations, and the emergence of
monetary management. They tailored the removal of capital controls
accordingly, as balance of payments changed from worse or better and raised
the barrier in the former case and lowered it in the latter. They also
synchronized the phasing out of controls on the capital account with the
movement of capital flows, particularly of a short-term nature so as not to
disturb d4mestic economic balances. Naturally, therefore, capital account
deregulation occurred over a longer time and in small doses.
6.44 The second best policy if it were decided that fully opening of
the capital account was not feasible, would be to begin by removing
restrictions or the inflow of foreign capital in the government securities,
especially short-term bonds. This will have the advantage of beefing up the
domestic bond market so that a secondary market would develop apart from
providing ammunition to the central bank to use those bonds for open market
operations, as an indirect monetary policy instrument (see Chapter IV). A
complete freeing of the bond market can be postponed until the domestic
banking system is unshackled from restrictive requirments which is scheduled
for the late 1990s.
ESummay mdado d
6.45 The current account of the Koroan balance of payments has been
gradually liberalized during the 1980s, and it is now generally free from any
serious restrictions, which accounts for Korean acceptance of ArtLele VIII
obligations under the IHF Agreement. The residual restrictlons are aore
precautionary than prohibitive ln nature, enabling the Korean foreign exchange
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regulatory authorities to monitor external transactions. Both non-residents
and re0idents can hold foreign currency accounts with forilgn exchango banks,
though the latter's withdrawal from thess accounts is subjout to cortaln prior
requirements.
6 46 The capltal account of the balance of payments, though made freer
than bofore In reeont year , has been subject to sveral restrictions (both
formal and informal) over the years, but particularly since 1981, the
restrictions on capital account were diluted a great deal. It is generally
subject to the discretion of the KOF and the BOK, or both.
6.47 A foreign exchange market has developed since 1989 with minimum
transactions of VU$100,000 as a complement o the expanding domestic money
market; this markot was extended to cover Yen in 1991 and DM in 1992, with
minimu transactions V 10 million and DX 100,000, respectively. The market
where short-term forelgn funds are borrowed nd lent without collateral
consists of national comercial banks, specialized banks, regional banks,
merchant banking corporations, and foreign bank branches. The RFTC acts as an
lntermediary ln this market. The BOK plays a central role because the foreign
exchange is concentrated there. The foreign exchange market was strengthened
in recent years by the modification of the exchange rate determliation system,
which is a cross between a fined excharee rate regime and a floating or
managed float regime. It is analogous c the fixed exchange rate in as much
as its current value cn any one day is bao 4 on the weighted average of the
previous day's inter-bank exchange rates; it has a floating element to the
extent that the rules on which it is based are determined in the market, and
tr3se fluctuate with the day-to-day changes in the demand and supply of
foreign exchange.
6.48 Though in general there is a case for capital account
liberalization, Korea will bave to adopt its own approach to this problem.
There are two conditions precedent to embarkLig on capital account
liberalization. First, there should be a macroeconomic balance. Second,
opening the capital account renders access t9 the international financial
market easier and freer, and for that reason, it is essentiœI1 that the
domestic banking system must not be overburdened with rules and regulations on
interest rates or loan portfolio composition, which would make them
r"icompetitive r lative to foreign banks operating in the country. Korea
fulfills the first condition of macroeconomic stability, while it is far from
fulfilling the second condltion of having a competitive banking system.
6.49 It is therefore recommended that the opening of the capital
account is to start by removing controls on the inflow of foreign capital in
government securities. especially short-term bonds. This will have the
advantage of beefing up the domestic bond market so that a secondary uarket
could dsevlop. A complete freeing of the bond market can be contemplated when
the doestic bankiag system is fully deregulated. In other words, the
approach to capital account liberalization should be gradual.
VIL BANK SUPERVON AND BGULTOR FRAMEWOK
_ Eb
7.1 Tho financial soctor In Rorea ha udrgonm rapid cbamp In the
1980a. Unlike many deeloplng countries, where the banking sector dominate
the provision of funds to the dometic no-financial sectors of th% economy,
the rapid growth of A soeurltles makots in Kor", as well " the growth *Z
non-banks, ha transformed the flow of fund in the economy (Table 7.1).
Table Ka - Souces of Fuis of th Dwmukc NomEM S_ &t,
1970-91
BaOks 29.2 23.2 13.4 22.5
You-Danko 1 8.8 22.4 |32.7 |34.8|
Securities markets | 11.1 |20.0 39.9 26.5 
i te*^ke 9 .7 U l.9 14.9 7 .1 
Bonds & CP 1.3 8.1 18.1 15l.2 
-orls 13. _ . _ 1 2.7 
'TOTAL 100.0000.01 100.0
IA Includes trade credit, governent loans, ate.
Souroo: Bank of Korea.
7.2 The rapid changes in the financial sector, togethor with the
attainment of economic maturity as Korea approachs OJ CD status, warrant a
changing role for the supervision and regulation of the financial sector.
This chapter proposes to examine three related questions: (i) Is the present
legal and supervisory framework appropriate for the changing Korean financial
sector? (ii) What are the implications of the proposed financial sector
liberalization on the solvency and safety of the financial sector? (ILi)
What are the recomended changes to the rgulatory and supervisory framework
that would encourage the growth of a dynamic and yet stable financil system
that in responsive to the needs of the countr.y?
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A. L4ul and R _gulary Fsuwork
7.3 The legal and regulatory framework of Korea is embodied in a
series of lawv and regulations that have been extensively amended over a
period of time. The twa key pieces of legislation are the Bank of Korea Act
and the General Banking Act of 1950. The Bank of Korea Act established the
Monetary Board and the Offlce of Bank Supervision and Ezamination (OBS)
located in the lank of Korea (BOR). The OBS is responsible for the
examination of tke business condition of the each banking institutiot at least
once a year. The banking institutions under the purview of the BOK comprise
the banks established under the General Banking Act, as well as the National
Agricultural Cooperatives Federation, the National Federation of Fisheries
Cooperatives, and th,# National Livestock Cooperatives Federation.
7.4 A new financial institutions appeared, however, their
establishment was promulgated under separate legislation, with supervision
delegated mostly to the Ministry of Finance (MOF), so that supervision ba8
been dichotomixed between the BOK and the MOP. The four specialized b.nks
which were criated under statute, the Citizens National Bank (CNB), the
Industrial lank of Korea (IBK), the Korea Housing Bank (RHB), and the Korea
Development Bank (KDB) are required by law to be audited by the Bureau of
Audit & Inspection, which has delegated the inspection work to the OBS.
7.5 The NFIs grew rapidly in the 19709 with the promulgation of the
Short-term Financing Business Act of 1972, which logitimized the growing curb
market and created licensed finance and investment companies. TNhese
institutions are regulated by the MOP, although examination work (but not
supervlsion) has been delegated to the OBS. Similarly, mutual sAvings &
finance companies were legitlmized under the Mutual Savings and Finance
Company Act 1972 to absorb small-scale curb market money. The Credit Union
Act of 1972 also licensed credit unions which grew up in offices, churches and
other private groups. The Saemusl (New Community) Finance Association is
another type of rural cooperatives savings irstitution which came under the
regulation of the New Community Finance Association Act of 1983. These
institutions are all under the supervision of the MOF.
7.6 The dicbotomy of supervision is more clearly shown by the sharp
inroads which the NBFIs have made in the financial sector. By June 1992, they
accounted for V 162.5 trillion in deposits, compared witS' M2 of V 86.2
trillion. The total market share of the commercial banks has fallen from
nearly half to just over one-qiarter between 1975-91, while the market share
of NBFIs has risen from one-quarter to more than half (Chart 7.1). The rapid
growth has been particularly spectacular in the savings institutions, such as
short-term finance copsanies, mutual credits, and mutual savings & finance
companieos, which are under the supervision of the MOP. While the monetary
institutions' credit to the private sector has been growing at an average
annual rate of 19.5 percent, the t4lPIs have boen increasing their loans at an
annual rate of 28.7 percent, fuelled largely by their freedom to offer higher
deposit rates and to cbarge higher lending rates.
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1975.91









Sog.Qe: Bank of Korea.
7.7 Indeed, the supervisory structure (Table 7.2) over the Korean
financial system has been divided!/ into tbree parts with progressLvely
weqker central regulation and control:
(i) The banking system and .acurities market which are directly under
the central bank and/or NOF, with *control by the MOF bnyond the
mere monitoring and supervisory functions usually exercised by the
official bodies and has Included allocation of financial resources
and setting of interest rates*;
(ii) The NBFIs which are generally not subject to as many controls from
the NOF; and
(iii) A coWpletely unregulated lcurbu market whlch has always been an
important source of finance for enterprises unable to gain access
to the more recognized institutions.
1/ OECD, 3 Financial Systems and Financial Regulation in Dynamic Asian
Economic8 s, n EaUnial Trends, 1991.
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TIble Kame - SupOVIsr.- Jurudctlm oft Ulaud Sutw
General sari Suporintond4nt of Banks Superintendent of Banks
(Natlonal, Regional&
Foroign Banks)
Specialized Banks Ministry of Finane= Board of Audit 6
(IBK, CNB, XHB, Iu, Inspection
Superintendent of Bank.
Ron-Bank Minanci MNinistry ef Flnance Board of Audit &
institutions Inspection
(DFI., Iwestment Ministry of Finance
Companies, Savings Superintendent of Banks
Institutions except
Postal Savings)
Other Non-bank MinLstry of Finance Superintendent of Banks
Financial Institutions
(KCGF, KRC, etc.)




Insurance Companies Mnistry of Finance Insurance Supervisory
(Life Insurance and Insurancy Supervisory Board
Non-life Insurance BoardCompanies)
Imaes: Office of Superintendent of Banks.
7.8 The historical rationale for the tight supervision over the
official financial sector (other than the curb market) was the *conventional
wisom' that it was necessary for the Governrent to intervene in the operation
of the banking system to enswe the channelling of limted financial resources
to priority sectors such as export and basic industries. The tortiary or
service industry received the least esphasis, being regarded as "non-
productive* or non-essential'.!,
7.9 The precedence of industrial policy over financial development was
embodied in the amendments to the Bank of Rorea Act in 1962, which enebled the
Minister of Finance to request reconsideration of resolutLons adopted by the
Monetary Board. Official supervision over the growing curb market ia the
1960. culminated in the August 1972 Presidential Decree which froze the curb
market and required curb market creditors to swap debt for equity In firm.
2/ Nan Duck Woo, "Korea's Economic Take-off in Retrospective,' Sepond
Washington Conference of the Korea-American Sconomic Association,
September 28-29, 1992.
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In addltion, the establisbment of short-term finance compades @officializee
mot of the curb arket under the Short-term Fliace 8ldness Act, 1972.
Nertheless, an Interesting dchotomy has arisen Ln the Korea financial
system: the momtary" Listitutons regulated by the BOX (through the 038) on
the one hand, and a growing group of NBFIs with lower economic regulations
under the purview of the IIOF on the other. A legitimate question to "ak i
whethor lt i9 healthy for the financial "stem to develop and be supervised in
thli dichomotled maner?
Suprvium our Monulymtuao
7.10 The legal framework for the supervision of banking institutions.
under the charge of the OB is qulte comprelhenve. In 1991, the General
Banking Act, the Industrial Bank of Korea Act, and the Long Tern Credit BsDk
Act were amended, and the Act concerning the Merger and Conversion of
FinancLal Institutlons was promulgated.
7.11 The major amendments to the General Banking Act concerned the
following:
* Iodroving autonomy in Sanaaement of banks. Raised ceiling on
investment of stocks and securities with maturities exceeding 3
years and allowed issue of debentures up to 5 times equity.
* Imnroxmnj sunervision & calital adekuaoy. Banks are required to
mintain minimum liquidity and capital adequacy ratios, and the
Xonetary Board is now eapowered to liit business of problem banks
and to suspend repayments of part or all of deposit liabilitie.
* Consumer arotecti. Establishod a Financial Disputes Office
within the OBS.
* L$mits on londin to subsidiaries.
* Clarified sgjervision cver foreign banks.
7.12 Other major amendments to the Industrial lank of Korea Act and the
Long Term Credit Bank Act were almed at increasing their capital and to
improve their capacity to intermediate in their development activities. The
maost significant legislation enacted during 1991 was tho Merger and Conversion
of Financial Institutions Act, which facilitated the merger or conversion of
Mills. In March 1991, five investment and finance companies converted into
securities companies, two merged and became Bora Bank, while one converted
Into Rana Bank.
S caM
7.13 The OBS currently has 700 staff, of which about 200 are examiners.
The Superintendent is supported by one Deputy Superintendent and three
Assistant 8uperintendent", with eleven departnts. There are six examination
departments, one &xaminatLon Controlling Depatent and departent involved
in Ranking Improvement, Credit Supervlsion, Bank Supervision (research and
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policy formulation), and a General Affairs Department. The efficiency and
capacity of the OBS is very high by international standards. Comrcial banks
have very detailed reporting requirements under the am, and the 0BS not only
inspects them at least once a year, but also conducts two surprise visits
annually. The OB has recently issued camprehonsive guidelines on management
for banking institutions, geared towards increasing the efficiency of bank
management.
Major Prudmd Rh
7.14 The General Banking Act, strengthened by a series of regulations
issued under Presidential decrees, imposes supervisory regulations that
conform broadly to international standards, and are certainly enforced very
rigorously.
7.15 CaRital Adqagsa. Korean banks are required to maintain capital
and reserves equal to a minimum of 5 percent of their total liabilities,
including guarantees or assumed obligations. To increase their capital bcse,
banks must transfer a minimum of 10 percent of their net profit to reserves
until they equal total paid-in capital. Korean banks are expected to comply
with BI8 capital adequacy standards of 7 25 percent of risk-weighted assets by
end-1993, and of 8 percent by end-1996. Only two domestic banks were unable
to comply with BI8 standards in 1992.
7.16 LUi1gUi&U Korean banks are required to maintain minimum reserve
requirements against deposit liabilities, this being 11.5 percent for domestic
currency deposits of less than 2 years maturity, and 8 percent for time
deposits of maturities more than 2 years. Foreign currency deposits also
attract a reserve requirement of 11 5 percent for resident accounts, and 1
percent for non-resident accounts. The OBS monitors the loans/deposit ratios
carefully, and banks may not invest more than 100 percent of their equity
capital In stocks, bonds and othor securities of more than 3 years maturity.
The OBS is encouraging the banks to improve their asset/liability management,
and to monitor their interest rate, exchange rate, and maturity risks.
7.17 Credit Restrictions Korean banks are subject to several credlt
restrictions. The main ones are:
(i) Single customer loans in excess of 20 percent of the bank's net
worth, except government agencies, or those approved by the OBS;
(ii) Guarantees & assumption of obligations in excess of 40 percent of
net worth, with exceptions as In (i);
(iii) Granting loans, directly or indirectly, on pledge of own shares,
or pledge of shares more than 20 percent of issued shares of non-
banks;
(iv) Possession of real estate, except for banking operations, limited
to 100 percent of net worth. Real estate acquired from defaulted
loans should be disposed of quickly, subject to approval of OB;
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(v) Purchase of shares in excess of 10 percent of the shares Issuod by
any non-bank;
(vi) loans for speculation in commodities or securities;
(vii) Loans to buy the bank's shares;
(viii) Loans to the bankes officers or employess, except petty loans;
(ix) Loans for non-essential or luxury-oriented activities; and
(x) Loans to finance, directly or indirectly, political activities.
7.18 Smll and Medium nter"riJe (SHE) loans. Nationwide banks are
expected to extend 35 percent of their increase in domestic deposits to
finance SW9s; regional banks have to extend 80 percent. Foreign banks that
soek rediscount facilities from the BOK have to comply at the 35 percent
level, while those that do not need comply only at the 25 percent level.
Supwesomvw Non-Bank F_dI -
7.19 The JOF has fairl, wide powers over the onerations of the NiMs.
&lthou1 economic xeiltinsovr these instituions are ubtantiall%y Mo
relaxed than over the bankiUggn; sst. Very similar prudential guidelines aro
imposed on the NBFIs. Short-term finance companies must have a
llabilities/capital ratio of 15 time capital base, as against 10 times for
merchant banks, and 20 times for general banks. Short-term finance companies
are also subject to single customer credit limits of 25 percent of their
oapital base, and are barred from owning real estate except for their own
operational purposes.
7.20 The laws regulating the operations of these NBFIs are all
sufficiently broad to allow the MOF to approve or disapprove any changes in
business operations (such as branching, merger or sale of part or all of the
business) and for the NOF to pass any rules to enforce the laws by
Prosidential Decree. Furthermore, the NOF may inspect any of these
institutions or delegate such powers to the Superintendent of Banks. If any
BPIIs were to violate the provisions of the law, or their property condition
and managemnt was unsound, thus harming the public interest, the NOF may
suspend all or part of their busines. Short-term finance companies also
partilipate in a voluntary deposit insurance schoe.
7.21 In conclusion therefore- the legislative famework agnears to
orovide sufficient overs to the Korean authorities to ensure that the
financal institutin operate in a sound and safe manner. As the bank-
centered Xorean financial system broadens with newer NBFIs and the deepening
of the sewurities market, the laws have been adequately amnded to ensure
strong guidance over the system as a whole Table 7.3 shows that new
institutions and new instruments have indeed broadened and deepened the
financial institutions significantly in the second half of the 1980s. The
market capltalization and amount outstanding of the stock and bond markets,
which amouted to only 5.6 percent and 10 percent, resp. -tively, of total
assets of the financial system in 1986, had increased significantly to 13.8
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percent and 14. 5 percent, respectively, by the end of 1991. The Korean
flnancial system can no longer be termed a bank-domluated system.
7.22 An interesting development over the last five years (1986-91) Is
that while the capital asset ratios of the deposit money banks have improved
from 3.3 percent to 6.6 percent by the end of 1991, the capital asset ratios
of the NFIs have tended to decline, with investment companies becoming
negative, and savings institutions falling from a healthy 11.5 percent to 7.6
percent of total assets (Table 7.3). As cAnital asset ration begin to
converg2. and different financial lnstitutions begin to comIaet with each
other over the limited nogl og domestic avine. tho auetlion arises whether
the nublic ngliev of samented5 financia intermedation and diffeiren~tiated
regulatory treatment continues to make ansue.
Table 73: Kome- F_uId Sysebm, As I8 & 1991(fiik5sumi We*)
Ban of Koroa." 18.6 8.8 46. 8.8 0.7 3.3
DeposLt Money Banks 97.2 45.7 220.4 41.7 3.6 6.6
Specialized Banks 36.0 16.9 58.9 11.1 3.4 1.5
Development Institutions 21.1 9.9 43.2 8.2 7.1 6.5
Savings Institutions 21.2 10.0 81.5 15.4 11.5 7.6
Investment Companies 9.0 4.2 38.1 7.2 3.6 -0.5
Life Insurance 9.5 4.5 40.5 7.7 n.a. n.a.
TOMAL 212.4 100.0 528.9 100.0
Source: Bank of Korea, Nonthly Statistical Bulletin.
IL Economi Rteglaton veris Ptuidesti Sup Wo
7.23 As stated earlier, Industrial policy in Korea took precedence over
the development of the financial sector. Strong economic regulation by the
Government was imposed in the early stages of development to ensure that
scarce domestic savings were chamelled to priority sectors. The success of
the industrialization of Korea ince the 1970s bears adequate testimony to the
fundamental correctness of that strategy. Nevertheless, in the words of the
prime architect of that policy, uwbat is most regrettable is the fact that
goverAment intervention has retarded development of the banking system toward
becouing a more responsible and effLeient moblzer of domestic savings and
regulator of the resource allocation on the basis of sound banking principles
and dLscipline enforced on the business community." (Nam, 1992, ga. Si.) The
basic Lssue is whether strong governmeat economic regulatLon is still
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necessary during a period when the Korean economy has become more complex,
mature and market-oriented. An Important corollary i8 wbeh er economic
regulation should also be accompanied by prudential 4sragurton or
r-egulatlon.
7.24 Policy-based loams provided by deposit money banks and NBFIs play
a slgnificant role in total credit in Korea (Chapter V). The principal danger
of excessive government intervention ln the financlal sector, particularly
through policy-based lending, is or lhar4. Moral hazard exists at two
levels: the borrowers and the banks. Borrowers who have relied significantly
on the availability of cheap funds from the banks at government directives may
take excessive risks in the knowledge that the government would always bail
them out. Banks which are subject to credit allocation directives do not
develop significant credit or treasury skills. They assume that the
Government will always relieve them of bad policy-based loans and that cheap
refinancing from the central bank will always be available. The economic
consequence of moral hazard and government intervention is that Igases in the
banking sy8tem are ultimtely guasi-fiscal deficits. In other words, since
governments are generally unwilling to allow large enterprises or banks to
fail, the government is forced to absorb the losses, inefficiencies or bad
business judgement of the borrowers and the banks. These moral hazard costs
are not new to Korea.
7.25 In the wake of the second oil shock and the international
recession of 1980-81, many highly-geared firms which had borrowed heavily
under policy-based lending became insolvent, particularly those in overseas
construction, shipping, textile, machinery and lumber industries!/. This in
turn created large non-performing loans in the banking system, with such loans
peaking at around 7 percent of total assets in 1984-86 (Chart 7.2). The
Government balled out the distressed firms by holding down interest rates,
providing financial incentives to creditor banks to write off debt and
interest payments, extending debt maturity, and rescheduling at cheaper
interest rates. To assist the banks, the BOK provided a special loan of about
'- 1.8 trillion at 3 percent per annum to the banking system. Between 1981-87,
BOK credit to deposit money banks rose from 18.3 percent of total bank credit
to the private sector to 28.1 percent.
9/ Joon-Kyung Kim, Oct,ober 1992, M. gU., p. 7.
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* CLL KOM. - Bad lasu of Kamm Cammordal ukb
as a ph atap of tbir Totl Asets, 1991
7)3 /~--.r -o a, -11 a a _ 
Yom
: ~Office of Bank 8upervLsion, 'kat* of KGorea;
7.26 Rtecent international experisnce suggests that these quasi-fiscal
deficits can be large enough to destsbilize the macroscone d c onviro ent.
The lessons of the dangers of rapid financial sector liberalization, based
u pon the xperience In a =Wmbar of countries in Southeast Asia, Austral"si
and Latin A"erica, appear to be the following:
* Vhere there is Qxcessive concentratiou of wealth in corporate and
bank ownersh1p, complete financial sector liberalization wlthout
proper sup rvision may exacerbate wealt'h concentration;
* Fin7acial *etor liberalization in a d tuation of low capital
adequacy (or high bad debt levels) iu the bankitng system say lead
to excessive risk-taking by banks in pursuit of higher profits;
* Such risk-taking worsens with bank-ent rpriz c nlnrtS. hoen
such *conomic groups take large risks, knowing that in the and
goverA nts eanot allow large baaks to fail; ad
* 3inaclal sector libaralization has a sociated with
speeulative bubbles, *spucLally when bank credit has been used to
speculate in stocks and real estate Such bubbles beeoee
diffieult to dsflate ani control, and have sometimes led to
d t asive capital outflow, when the capitel account has been
liberalizodb
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7.27 The above lessons suggest that financial sector liberalization
should be exercised with some degree of caution, and th. speed of
liberalization would depend whether elements of the above risks exist within
the country conditions. As will be shown later, some of the elements of risk
are present in Korea, even though the acroeconomic conditions and the quality
of supervision are mwuh stronger In Korea than in many other developing
countries.
C. PerforM at the Baning Secr
7.28 This Section review the performance of the financial sector in
Korea and its capacity to withstand competition from deregulation. Key
performance ratios of the Korean banking sector are given In Table 7.4. The
net income of Korean banks has generally been higher than for banks in G-7
countries!/, averaging about 0.6 percent of total assets. The never banks,
especially joint-ventures with foreign banks, appear to be more profitable
than the S large banks, which are privately owned but still government-
directed. The profitability of these 5 large banks was particularly hurt in
1985-87 as a result of their high non-performing loans during this period.
7.29 Non-2erformin assets. Total reported non-performing loans of
banks in Korea are vwll below international standards, with total non-
performing loans at only 1.76 percent of total loans at the end of 1991,
compared with 2.57 percent for national banks in the United States. However.
the defintion of no-prfor2Ming loans is differen from the US standard.
since the col1ateXAl value is deducted against the total value of loans which
are not being serviced. In Korea, loans are classified into 5 categories:
normal, precautionary, substandard, doubtful and estimated loss. Bad debts
are defined as those in doubtful and estimated loss. Normal loans are those
that are serviced by customers with good debt-servicing capacity, and debt
servicing has not been delayed more than 3 months. Precautionary debts are
those that experience debt servicing delays of between 3-6 months.
Substandard debts are those that are covered by collateral, but whose loans
have been overdue for 6 months (housing loans - one year or more). Doubtful
loans comprise that portlon of substandard loans that do not have sufficient
collateral, which are expected to be losses, but such losses have not been
realized. Estimated loss loans are those substandard credits that have
inadequate collateral and collection is not expected. This classification
mthodology understates the size of non-performing loans. Under international
classification standards, the definition of a non-performing loan ignores
collateral values. If a loan is not being serviced on time, even though it is
fully collateralized, the loan is still non-performing, and the value of the
collateral only affects the level of provisioning. However, since collateral
Is deducted from the loan outstanding in order to arrive at the level of
doubtful or loss loans, the actual exposure of the bank to non-performing
loans is therefore subject critically to a subjective valuation of collateral.
If collateral value is added back to the definition, the size of the non-
performing loans could be considerably higher.
4/ France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, United Kingdom and
United States, data for 1990, Bank Profitability. 1981-1989, OECD,
Paris, 1991.
.90,
7.30 1 orean bank, do not provide as heavily for non-performing loam as
OZCD banks (Table 7.5). Net provisions as a perentae of total &"*ts ad
gross ncom have been generally lowr than for 'US or Britih banks, although
the ratios are roughly compable vith that of German backs.
lhb.74KOM..a i Bmh1, 193.91 Ia
RorAn Bank 0.49 0.66 0.93 118 148 1.39
Regional Banks 139 0.52 0.30 0.59 0.80 1.33 1.05
All ComercS.al Bankts 0.86 0.21 0.23 0.43 0.71 0.77 0.73
B. Bad loans as a percentage of total loans
Fve Large banks .79 .14 7.20 6.31 3.72 2.63 2.36
Shinhan Bank ... ... 0.25 0.64 0.40 0.22 0.33
KorAn Bank ... .49 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.17
Regional Banks .39 ... 4.87 4.18 2.40 1.42 1.00
All Commercial Banks 0.8 0.. 5.40 5.01 3.09 2.11 1.76
C. Allowance for doubtful debts a a percentage of total loans
All Natlonide Banks 2.06 1.25 1.28 1.36 1.54 1.51 1.59
inve Large anks 2.06 1.24 1.25 1.33 1.49 1.46 1.57
Regional Banks 1.80 1.85 1.81 1.87 1.93 1.93 2.00
All Commercial Banks 1.88 1.57 1.36 1.4 1.59 1.57 1.65
D. Average Interdot rate on loags
Five Large Banks 18.8 10.0 8.7 9.1 10.3 10.4 11.1
ShiLban Bank .06 11.9 12.1 13.3 13.2 12.7 13.1
KorA r lank .06 11.1 11.3 12.2 13.1 13.8 14.5
Regional Banks 19.8 11.6 11.2 11.5 12.1 11.9 12.3
All ComrciLal Banks 19.0 10.3 9.3 9.8 10.5 10.7 11.4
Z. Average interest paid on deposits
Five Large Banks 12.0 6.6 6.4 5.7 5.8 6.1 6.7
Shinhan Bank ... 6.0 7.0 6.6 6.9 7.4 8.0
KorAm Bank ... 7.5 7.6 7.2 6.6 6.6 7.2
RegiLonl Banks 12.2 6.1 6.9 6.7 6.1 6.2 6.7
All CommercLal Banks 12.0 5.7 6.5 6.0 5.9 6.2 6.8
F. Spread 7.0 5.6 2.8 3.8 4.6 4.5 4.6
i Excludes foreign banks.
ik Excludes trust "sets from total assets.
jaKna: Superintendent of Banks.
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IbZl? Nam - Net rfoesfiems us a Pmsmts ofe
Totd Astb s& Gnus IwomD U19N65N
Not Provisions/Total Assets 0,S 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.41
~ ES iiiin ti e, - eweT,^e_16 .8 11.5S 10.*9 94. 6 16.5S 11. 9|
Australia
Net Provisions/Total Assets 2.8 0. 9 O 5 0.8 1.1 0.7
Net Provisions/Gross Income 40.2 17.6 12.8 16 8 23.6 1.84
N t Provisions/Total Assets 0.5 0.6 0.4 0 3 0.4 0.5
Net Provisions/Grosa Income 13.4 15.1 13.3 7.8 13.1 16.5
Norway
Net Provisions/Total Assets 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.6 1.6 2.0
Net Provisions/Gross Income 17.2 20.7 24.1 40.2 36.0 55.1
. .__ _. ..... . .
Not Provisions/Total Assets 0.6 0.5 1.6 0.3 1.7 1.0
Net rvZfsions/Gross Income 11.7 11.0 I31.0 C.2 32.7 20.1
Net Provisions/Total Assets 0.7 0.8 1.3 0.6 1.0 1.0
Net Provisions/Gross Income 14.3 16.3 26.3 11.1 18.9 18.5
Soura: Bank of Korea; OECD, agk ProfitabilUit. 1981-1990, Parls, 1992.
7.31 The commerclal banks are however not as profitable or afficient as
the UBFIs. Since the short-term finance companLes do not maintain large
branhs and service mainly large cllents whlle at the same tim enjoying less
economic regulation, their profitabLlity bhs been considerably hipher.
Profits per employee of the finance companies are on average 16 tlmes higher
than the banks in 1991. Average profits aM a pereentafg of total a*sets for
the finance somaniesm was 2.2 reent - nearly 3 time. I igie than that of the
bank (Table 7.6). In recent months, however, non-performing loans of the
short-term flnance compav'es bave begum to increase, from only 0.9 percent of
total assets in the year to June 1991 to 2.4 percent of total assets in the
year to June 1992. Provisitons against bad loans, however, still exceeded the
level of reported non-performing loans.
7.32 An interestlng aspect of Korean credit allocation pollcies is the
restriction of bank lending to large business groups (chasbols), which was
first introduced in 1987 to induce more equitable access to credit.
Specifically, to reduce corporate gearing and to lncrease credit access by
asmll- and medium-sized enterprises (SMs), the authorlties "moral suaded the
30 largest chaebols to reduce their shareboldinga ln affiliates and real
estate, and to raise capital in the stock market. In the stock market boom to
1989, this was highly successful in reducing the chaebols gearlng. At the
saw time, the share of banks' loans to the 30 largest chasbols has fallen
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from 23.7 percet in 1988 to 19.8 percent in 1990, while the share of NBFIh
credit has risen correspondingly frm 6.5 percent to 43.6 jercent over the
same period (Kim, 1992, op ott). Over the same period of time, banks are
required to imcrease their le1ding to Sll equivalent to 35 percent of thelr
lreae to deposits (80 percent La the case of the regional beaks). Table
7.7 hove that desplte the moral suasion" against lnvestment In real estate,
the 30 largest chaebols continued to increaso their holdings In land and
buildings, fnancng these initially through internal funds, and by 1990,
mainly through bank borrowings.
MTi 7h KO Short-tWr 11.... CoU*su a 
Sdeded Por,mauc bdks, 1991.92
Total Revenue | 3,163 |100-0 | 3,096 | 100.0|
Operating Ixpenses 2,368 74.9 2,309 74.6
Overhead 356 11.3 414 13.4
Total Expenses 2,724 86.2 2,723 88.0
Profit before Tax 439 13.8 373 12.0
Tax 124 3.9 162 5.2
Profit After Tax 315 9.9 211 6.8
Total Profits/Assets 2.2 2.2
Reserves for Bad Debts/Total Loans 1.8 3.2
Ron-performing Loans/Total Loans 0.9 2.4
ZA Year to June 1992 data excludes 8 companies which were merged and
converted to securities companies and banks.
fiwgU: Ministry of Finance.
7.33 The above analysis suggests that tbere wa the beginning of a real
estate bubble between 1987-90, with increasing investvents In land and .
buildlns, and a sharp rise in the value of real estate. One of the dangers
of the *moral suasion* to the cbsebols to divest their real estate is that
tbhy may have disposed of these real estate to the Sils, at a time when the
Oovermsent wa also encouraging banks to lend more to the Sies. Thus, those
SMl that bought real estate at the height of the real estate boom may be
extremely vlnerabis to deflation In real estate prless, especially if they
bought them on borrowings carrying real interest rates of more than 10 percent
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per anum.
T"bk.7t Kw=ea Top 30 CiaseoW _uwls Re Ii.t. Hdi
~~~~M M




Total Reel PAtato (1,000 U#) [... 
Land 374,089 398,78 406,501
Total ste ( 025,438 28,043 31,809
Total j 399,527 426,821 438,310
Value (Billions of Won) *1M'
millions of Von/Square Meter r 19.448 | 23.594 2 __ _
Mor~andum Items:
Increas in Real Estate
(Billions of Won 2,300 3,069
Increase in Borrowings 892 6,087
Fercent Inor. in land Prlce 21.3X 27.11
R-el Estate/Debt Ratio 31.2X 39.1S 41.2X
Suce: KDI An Analysis of Korea's Chaebol Economy,' by Chung Byoug-hyu and
Yang Young-shik, 1992, quoted in Korea Economic eek S, eptember
28, 1992.
D. Vulebilit of the Kama Jinadl Stem ti a Bubbe
7.34 This Section axamlnes the possible vulnerability of the Koren
financial system to a share and real estate bubble currently evident in the
Japanese and the United States banking system. The sharp decline of the
Korean stock market since its peak of 1,005 In 1989 has had a significant
Impact on the liquidity and solvency of many borrowers in Korea. The effect
of a stock market decline iL more significant in a hlghly leveraged
enviroument han a market where leverage i low. The Seoul stock market index
at the end of July 1992 has declined by nearly 48 percent sinc Its peak in
1989. Based upon the ownershlp distribution of shares, it is estimated that
the wealth losses to holders from the share price declin was the equivalent
of 9.6 percent of GNP ia 1990 and about 4 percent of GNP in the first 7 montbs
of 1992. -The largest losses were borne by indivlduals ao private companies
(including securities companies and investment rust companies). Government
attmpts to shore up share prices have resulted In large losses to the
invstment trust companies, requiring a V 3.2 trillion rescue package from the
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IK to rescue the inestment trust companes (and ultimately to lending
banks) in Augut 1992.
7.5s ?Te full lpact of the market decline (or any rise io interest
rates from interost rate liberalixation) on the value of the stocks and bonds
held by the financial institutions is not fully transparent, because currently
banks and other financial institutions still reflect these at cost nd not
sarket price. The OBS hsJ already requlrod banks to make provisions for the
shortfall between market price and costs, and so far banks have provided up to
80 percent of such losses. Because of various policy loans at below market
rates, It is clearly of concern to the supervisors that any interest rate
liberalization vould not subject financial institutions to solvency pressures
if bonds or long-term securities held have to be marked-to-market.
7.36 Although the decline of the stock market was damaging to
individual and corporate liquidity and solvency, the larger damage could arise
from thb exposure of the bankLig system to real estate. Nearly 40 percent by
value and number of bank loans are secured by real estate (Table 7.8). After
increasing by 32 percent In 1989, annual land prLces growth began to slow.
recording a 0.5 percent decllne ln the second quarter of 1992. House prices
In Seoul peaked ln April 1991, and fell 1 percent in the first quarter of 1992
and 3 8 percent in the second quarter_J. Apartment prices fell by 5.8
percent, while single famly permits for new constructlon in Seoul fell 52.6
percent from a year earlier, as against a nationide fall of 25.1 percent.
The increasing trend towards Investments in real estate, despite moral uasion
by the authorities, can be seen from Table 7.9, compiled from the Flow of Fund
Accounts. ince 1986, there wa a noticeable swin of investments In land,
rising to 3 percent of GNP by 1990, financed increasingly by debt. The flow
of debt/equity had risen from a low of 78.3 percent in 1988, in a rising stock
market. to 306 5 percent by 1990* The movment towards rel estate was
understandable given the under-investment in houing and offie accodtLon
In earlier years. Initial imestments in real estate yielded high returns.
It was estimated that between 1974 to 1987, investment in land produced a
profit of 1.004 percent, while the same amumnt invested in business
investments would haie yielded about 331 percento.
7.37 The shift towards non-tradeables, 4rising from an appreciation in
the red exchange rate and declining profits in the export sector, is also
detectable in the profits and debt ratios between manufacturing companies and
real estate and business services. Between 1983-1990, the Income to equity
ratio for manufacturing had fallen from 15.5 percent to 9 1 percent, while the
ratio for real estate and business services rose from 20 percent to 27.6
percent. In contrast, while the manufacturing sector bad lowered its debt
ratio from 360.3 percent to 286.3 percent, the real estate and business
services sector's debt ratio had doubled from 162.1 and to 377.5 and (Table
7.10). Thus, this sector bas becom vulnerable to a bubble deflation.
5/ KoreJA Wnuolm VoeWkly, October S, 1992.
, E¢conomic deport, 'Riddle Class Hardest Hit as Bubble Burst,"
September 1992.
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nlblk Ka= Clatl hr Bik an k Lumdihgb 1961 & 1991
|Ru- Estate 42.3 49.6 39.6 42.3
Trust 49.2 39.9 46.0 41.3
| Personal EBtate |_ 0.2 | _1.6 0.8 2.3
Depositsi 7-7 | .0 9.0 4.3
Otber 0.6 3.9 4.6 9.8
JA Includes guarantess by Korea Credit Guarantee Fund
Source: BOK, RegzAnc:E Staistics Ybogt, Table 32.
7.38 Thor* are isuffcicent Indicators that the g*lowdown in econowle
growth and high real lnterest rates are begimning to hurt business and also
their leni financial insStitutlons. In the first half of 1992, 3,391 8Ks
declared bankruptcy. compared with 6,154 in the wbole of 1991. In the sw_
period, 18 maJor listed companies a-lao went bankrupt. The tlihonored bills
ratio rose to 0.12 percent in June 1992, which v" lst reported at the wAd of
the 1980-82 recession. Indee4, with resl Interest rates In Rore avenraging
9.4 percent per annum in 1991, varsus 4.2 percent in Japan. 3.8 percent in
Taiwan and 1.1 per¢enut in tho USA, It was surprising that tbo bubble deflation
In Korea has not been more severe, since it ban hurt banks considerably in the
otber 3 countriess
- 96 -
Tmabl Nwo= . Fbmc of Nou-fladai Cotoatl Swo , 1966490
(Iua e GNJP)
Gross Flxed Cbpltal ForBation 17.3 17.4 16.1 18.2 22.1
Stocks 0.7 1.8 1.3 1.9 0.6
Land 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.7 3.0
Total 18.8 20.2 18.7 21.7 25.7
Financed by:
Loans 6.8 6.3 4.1 9.6 11.4
Short-erm bllUs 1.0 -0.2 0.9 1.5 1.0
Long-term bonds 2.0 0.7 1.1 3.0 5.5
Noet foreign liabilities -0.4 -0.3 0.8 -0.7 1.6
Equity & Duetto
Depreciation 8.0 8.4 8.2 7.9 7.4
Savings 3.0 4.0 3.6 1.7 2.0
Capital participation 0.7 1.3 0.9 0.9 1.0
Stocks 1.0 2.8 4.2 4.8 3.3
Trade credit -1.1 -0.7 -0.9 -1.1 -0.7
Currency & deposits -2.2 -3.4 -4.5 -5.8 -5.4
Other ... 1.3 0.3 -0.1 -1.4
randus _=.
Gross interest expense 9.2 8.4 7.8 8.4 8.5
Net interest expense 7.1 6.5 5.6 5.7 5.8
Debt/Equity flow during year La 199.8 78.7 78.3 181.1 306.5
(Percent)
Ja Excluding depreciation.
figUM: now of Fund Accounts, 1986-1990, BOK.
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Tbkbi.J Ka. - Sdoted NIusacl IndIatas_ Copoat Sece, Mm9
tLOWauufOMM 15.5 15.2 13.2 20.2 9. 20.6 101 9.1
Meal. i.t.t.G asiase.s sewo. 20.0 15.7 32.3 13.5 32. 29.9 34.1 37.
llu0aol i.pS_ to TOte lov ias
_mntsotuelas 13.6 14.4 15.4 12.5 2.5 13.0 13.6 33.7
Re_ i.tat. & UM. kzvlee 9.5 11.1 14.3 as.0 1.4 14.3 .a 3.9
Debt Ratio
Hm.f.otuzia ~~~~340.3 34 .7 340.4 350.9 340.1 296.0 254.3 266.3
But I.t.te a_ es seavices 162.1 235. 3241.5 270.3 26.7 336.0 o 24.5 377.5
MM% FluenciaL Sttte4 Aualia. Bln of KXe. 1993.
IL Weak ofe E PFck
7.39 The above analysis suggests that whil, the Xorea finacial systea
can be complimented on its strong legal poers given to the authoritie to
supervise the sstem, and the success of economic regulation to date, there
are some areas which need to be strengthened to prepar for a broad-based
financial sector liberalization. These are discussed below.
7.40 &AstMIG risks. This is due to the sepgentation of the financial
system and its supervision. The sbort-term finance companies, for ex mple,
appear to have very good credit monitoring and low risks because they
typically do not lend on collateral. but on sound evaluation of cash flow.
Accordingly, they tend to concentrate on the Urger borrowers, with more than
half of their loans to the chaebols, supported by cross-guarantees. They do
not have long-term debt, but are limited to short-term debt which is rolled-
over. On the other hand, the banks operate a Prim Bank ystem, where the
lead bank assumes the function of lender of last resort to a borrower group.
Although the banks take collateral, they are vulnerable to a sharp declin in
general economic activity and to falls in real estate prices, as was evident
In the 1980-81 recession. Thus, there is a funda ental systemic risk, in
which adroit short-term finance companies can quiekly withdraw credlt from a
faltering debtor, leaving most of the risks to the Prime Bank. However, ince
the Government is unwilling to allow the larger banks to fail, there will be
considerable pressure on the central bank to intervene to support banks with
more soft loans, as was the practice in the 1980s.
7 41 Accou Lnt . ta0 zd. Reporting standards for Korean financial
instltutions are still not yet fully up to international standards, so that
the impact of market changes are not completely transparent to the investor or
depositor. Loan clmasification standards need to be harmonized with
international standards by elimanating the deduction of collateral values from
the measurement of non-performing loans. Collateral values can be deducted
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from the outstanding values of =n-performing loans In the computation of the
level of provisioning. Transparent non-performing loan data would force bank
management to be more vigilant In credit evaluation and monitoring, while
allowing investors to evaluate mors accurately the performance between
dlfferent bank. Moreover, the valuation of securities (shares and possibly
corporate bonds) should reflect market prices rather than cost. At least, the
market value of such holdings should be disclosed, thus forcing management to
provide for such losses.
7.42 igh fearIng in the st=. The Korean financial system differs
from many other developing country odels since Korean enterprises typically
have significantly higher leverage than their developing/developed country
counterparts. Korean firms have succeeded in achieving stability through
growth, since growing market shares and rising cash Inflows have financed
their hoavy investment program and their leverage. However, such high
leverage exposes the enterprises (and their lender financial institutions) to
higher risks due to economic slow-downs. A major challenge In the 1990s is
the ability of the financial system to help de-gearl the enterprise sector,
such that overall risks are better supported by higher capital levels, and the
whole financial system would be more stable and less vulnerable to external
shocks or internal bubbles.
7.43 D.sintermediatloa Although the banking systes is precluded from
financing real esuate and consumer finance, considerable disintermediation was
occurring as chasbols and SMEs obtained funding from the banklng system under
policy lending and funntlled these towards real estate investments and lending
for car purchases. In other words, enterprises became housing and consumer
financiers, instead of the banking system. The problem with this trend is
two-fold. First, the banking statistics did not reveal to the policy makers
the real danger of over-lending in these sectors. Second, it deprived the
banking system of 'rofits in a legitimate area of busines.
F. Sua mad Rn s
7.44 Government supervision over the financial system in Korea has been
historically strong for economic regulation purposes. However, with the
advancement of the Korean economy into the ranks of the OECM countries and the
increasing market-orientation of both the real and the finuncial sectors, the
degree of 'window-guidance or government Intervention will have to decline.
7.45 Such withdrawal of the Government from direct credit allocation is
required in order to allow the financial sector to exercise better credit
discipline on enterprises and to play a more efficient role in resource
allocation according to market forces. Withdrawing from economic regulation
does not mean that the Government should reduce prudential supervision.
Indeed, the move towards greater market orientation would require the
Governvent to be more transparent in the following:
e Rules of the game ln the financial sector, particularly greater
freedom of entry and oXftrlX exit and level playing field;
0 Clear capital adequacy and liquidity rules, which allow the
financial institutions to Improve their own risk management;
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* Avoid usage of prudential supervision as surrogate economie
regulations; and
* Generate timely and reliable ayV g=-ide information on
performance of the financial institutlons, such as sectoral
lending and profitability/solvency indicators.
7.46 Korea already has a strong supervisory structure in place, with
tight leadership from the MOF. However, suggested improvements are as
follows:
(a) Consolidate gsuervislon over the entlre financial system under a
single independent body which is directly responsible for systemic
monitoring and solvency of the financial system. The present
system of supervision with the OBS being responsible for roughly
one half of the system, and the HOF for the other half, with some
delegation of examination functions to the OBS, implies that r.o
single agency will have at all times a global or systemic view of
risk trends in the financial system. Segmented supervisory myopia
can arise because each half of the system assumes that its half is
relatively safe from risks, while both halves are exposed to risks
in the real sector that may not be readily apparent to both. A
clear example of this is the fact that NBFIs have no collateral
lending and have only short-term loans. This appears to have low
risks, but in reality, NBFIs cannot "pull the plug" on credit to
their borrowers without inflicting damage from the credit crunch
on the real sector and the prime banks.
There is no perfect institutional solution to an artificial
separation between the objectives of industrial policy, monetary
policy and supervisory policy. All of the above have fiscal or
quasi-fiscal implications. However, placing supervisory policy
within the MOF can easily subject the financial sector to
continued policy lending or economic regulation. Since the
objective of financial sector liberalization is to separate
industrial policy from financial policy (in order to achieve more
market-oriented financial discipline on the usage of funds), then
it would be natural to coordinate monetary policy with supervisory
policy, which are both sides of the same coin.
In several OECD countries, the monetary policy function and the
supervisory function have been vested in the central bank, since
the central bank must be in a position to know when it is
providing lending of last resort, lf it is also providing wcapital
of last resort'. In other OECD countries, such as France and
Japan, the bank supervisory function has been vested with a Bank
Commission within the Ministry of Finance. Some countries vest
supervision with a body independent of the Ministry of Finance and
the other government ministries, such as in Canada, Chile, Hungary
and Germany. The concern is to separate prudential regulation
from economic regulation. This trend Is also seen in the
securities industry, where the Securities Exchange Commission is
an autonomous body from the Ministry of Finance.
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(b) ^SY EWSLa&atmd&M in Korea should move closer to OECD standards
as soon as possible. Specifically, loan classification and loan
provisioning standards, as well as marking securities values to
market should be amended fairly quickly, to make the performance
and solvency of domestic financial institutions more transparent
and comparable with international standards.
tc) ~gsIsnrased & .aM9. landing to real estate and durables by
the banks and finance companies should be allowed within a
prescribed limit, so as to make the actual flow of funds more
transparent. Currently, enterprises encourage disintermediation
from the banking system by borrowing bank loans to finance
(through inter-company loans or commercial bills) the non-priority
sectors of real estate and consumer durables (such as car loans).
The result is that the authorities are not able to monitor more
accurately the ultimate usage of funds through the banking system,
and therefore prevent on a timely basis excesslve risk
concentrations in any particular sector (e.g., real estate). In
the absence of strong and independent outside supervision, the
Government at times reverts to direct intervention (such as the
1991 rule on chaebol's picking three major business activities) to
control credit access by the private sector and encourage
*productive as compared to "speculativeu borrowing.
(d) Mismatch In maturits. From a sectoral risk management
perspective, the Korean financial system still relies heavily on
using short-term deposits to finance long-term investment. This
fundamental maturity mismatch occurs partly because of the late
development of the securities and long-term bond markets, and
partly because of the lack of strong and deep contractual savings
institutions, such as prlvate pension funds and strong life
insurance companies. Recent liberalization efforts to increase
competition tbrough entry of foreign life insurance companies have
helped partly, but from a strategic point view, system-wide
stability and soundness can only be strengthened through the
narrowing of the maturity mismatch and the strengthening of the
capital base of the financial sector, as well as the enterprise
sector.
MMIL KOREA& BOND LMARNED
MrS CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE PROSPECT8
8.1 Korea has one of the largest fixed Income securitie markets
4ooqg the emrgiag capital markets. At tho end of 1991, the total fixed
income securities outstanding mounted to US$80.8 billion, or 40 percent
of GNP. This compared well with the debt market capitalization of US$17.3
billion in TaiLan, US$26.9 billion in Malaysia, and US$5.8 billion in
Thailand. The fixed income securities market in Korea consisted of
US$42.4 billion in government securities and US$38.4 billion in corporate
bonds. Although the si2e of the Korean fixed income securities market is
very large, the secondary market is very shallow. In 1991, the total
volume of trade mounted to only US$2.8 billion, an average turnover ratio
of 3 4 percent, compared with 14 percent in Xalsysia and 23 4 percent in
Hong ong. This chapter describes the structure of the Korean flxed
income securLties market, presents an analysis of the markets, both
primary and secondary, and identifies the causes of slow development of
the secondary market. Recommendations for improving both primary and
secondary markets are given. Finally, the role of foreign portfolio
investmet in the bond market is discussed.
8.2 The development of the flxed income securities markot in Korea
dates back to the 1950s when the Government first issued bonds to raise
funds for the reconstruction of infrastructure after the Korean War (1950-
53). In the 1960., foreign official loans and commiercial bank loans were
the ain financing vehicles for economic development and growth of the
private sector. In 1963, Ssangyong Cement Lssued convertible bonds, the
first corporate bond issue in Korea. As the increasLog Importance of
securities markets as a means of utilizing domestic capital resources was
recognized, the Korean government offlcially establlshed the bond market
In 1968, pursuant to the CapLtal Market Promotlon Act, to further promote
the development of the domestic securities markets. Under the act, the
Korean Investment Corporatlon (KIC) was formed to oversee the Lisuanee,
underwrLting, distrlbutilon and secondary market activitles of fixed income
securities. Most notably, the KIC introduced the guarantee system for
corporate bonds in 1972, which resulted ln a considerable expansion of the
bond market.
8.3 With the successful LitroductLon of floating rate bonds and bond
transactLons under repurchase or resale agreements (RP bonds) ln 1980,
bond Lssues accounted for as much as 80 percent of the total funds raised
in the capital market ln the early 1980s. Durlng the second half of the
1980s, activities ln the primary bond markets were dominated by government
bond lssus in the form of MSBs and an Licrease ln new bond Lssues by
corporate borrowers as weak stock market condltions became unfavorable for
new equity lssues.
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A. Markt Struue sad t Asptb
P"8=7 m!rit
8.4 rrnmt Bonds. Government bonds were first Introduced as a
means of supporting large fiscal deficits ln the early 1950. and of
providing finance for recw_zcruction works in the aftermath of the Korean
War. Government bonds to financo reconstruction and development dominated
bond markets in Korea through 1963. During 1964-67 new government bond
isues were drastlcally curtailed in response to the growing need for a
fiscal balance. Starting in 1968, however, the Governments ambitlous
econouic development plan called for huge lavestment funds, particularly
to expand lnfrastructure. This brought a serles of government-guaranteed
special bonds, lacludlng government bonds for road constructlon, followed
by various bonds for electricity, housing and development financing.
8.5 The second half of the 1980s witnessed a dramatic surge in the
w issues of government bonds in Korea. The size of the primary bond
market has risen substantially. From 1985 to 1991, total outstandlng
bonds increased about six times, the ratio of new bond issues to GOP rose
2. 5 tines, and the ratio of bonds outstanding to GNP went up more than
five times to over 40 percent by the end of 1991.
8.6 Among the various types of governuent bonds in Korea, MSBs
dominate the primary market activities. The SBes are short-term
securities that are issued on a discount basis. The maturitles range from
63 days to 546 days, and the NSB series with a 371 days' maturlty is uost
active. The BOX is the issuing entlty for the USEs, which are largely
allocated to financial institutions (Chapter IV) at below market interest
rates. New MSB issues in 1991 amounted to V 22.6 trillion, representing
{bout 70 percent of the total non-corporate bond issues, or 42 percent of
the total new bonds issued in Korean markets. USBs were used to absorb
excessive monetary expansion caused by a sudden jump in the country's
trade surpluses during the period of 1986-89. As the trade surplus
disappears, the MSBs became the instrument for absorbing liquidity from
the market.
8.7 Other government bonds include public housing bonds (with
maturities of 5 or 20 years), public Investment bonds (3 year maturity)
and foreign *xehange stabilization bonds (3 year maturity). The 1OF
administers the issuance of these government bonds. There are various
municipal bonds (mostly linked to specific projects rather than general
obligation) issued by local governments, particularly large cities like
Seoul and Pusan. In support of various government or public utility
programs (e.g., telecommunication and electricity) requiring large scale
funding, a series of special bonds is also issued. Long-term financial
institutions such as the 1DB and the Korea Long-Term Credit Bank can
issue, subject to the approval from the OF, special financial bonds to
raise funds for their lending.
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.Mb. Ka Nw Jsm of Gifmmmt mm Pobic B.= =1699
I Isis I 25,762.1 8091 22,590.11 71.1
Other Government Bonds 4,157.3 13.01 4,922.6 15.5
Municipal Bonds 800.0 1,100.0
Special Public Bonds 1,141.6 3,156.4
Total 31,861.0 100.0 31,769.1 100.0
I9YX9g: Ministry of Finance.
8.8 Courtoa zgInda. The most profound development In the corporate
bond market in Korea occurred in 1972, when the KIC introduced the
guarantee system for corporate bonds, catalyzing a considerable growth in
new corporate bond lssues. Under this program, Dong-Ah Pharmaceutical Co.
successfully floated a V 250 million bond issue, which marked the
beginning of a more balanced development betwoen goveronmet and corporate
bonds in Korean securities markets. Subsequently, various governrant
measures (e.g., the government general plan for the promotion of the bond
market, released in 1977) to encourage direct financing, as opposed to
finuancing through comercial banks, and to promote domestic capital
markets, gave additional impetus to a rapid expansion of new corporate
bond instruments as well as the bond investor base ln Korea.
8.9 The upward trend in new corporate bond issues continued through
the 1980., which was In part facilitated by the Government's gradual
deregulation measures. In December 1984, the Government began to adopt a
partial deregulation of interest rates on new corporate bonds and
convertible securities. This was followed by further liberalization in
commission schedules and coupon rates applied to new issues in 1986. For
the last few years of the 1980s, however, the growth in the corporate bond
sector was outpaced by the public bond sector, as a huge supply of ISBs
dominated the activities in the primary market. Since then, new corporate
bond issues jumped as a weakening stock market could not absorb new equity
offerings.
8.10 Bond issuance has become an important vehicle for Korean
corporations to raise direct debt funds. Corporate bond issues also
helped Korean firms to diversify their funding sources; bank finncing,
aside from private iaformal markets, has traditionally been the primary
source of funding in Korea. During the ten year period endIng in 1991,
the number of new corporate bond issues increased about five times, and
the amount of funds raised jumped more than ten times.!/ One of the
~/ Annex Table A. 1 provides time series data for Korean corporations'
securities offerings, including both bonds and stocks.
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Important latest developments to facilitate this growth was the
Goverament'a deregulation measures in 1991, intended to allow autonomous
rate determlnation for new corporate bond issues.
8.11 There are two major channels through which new corporate bonds
are floated: private placements and public offering. Prsvate nlaBuaa
are used in cases of relatively small size of Issues and issues by
unlisted companies. The underwriting business associated with private
placmentsbas been limited to several specialized banks, including KDB
and Korea Long-Term Credit Bank, and some life insurance companies. But
since September 1990, city and regional banks have been allowed to
underwrite private placed securities. The share of private placements in
the primary bond aarket has increased sharply over the last several years.
It was only around 3 percent of the total in 1987-88, but exceeded one
quarter of the total new corporate bond issues in the first half of 1991.
8.12 hore than 80 enrcent of the outstanding coroorata bonds ad now
iosues are guaranteed bX various tnaMial institutions (see Annex Table
2i2. As of end-1991, securities companies were leading guarantors of
corporate bonds, representing about 30 percent (or V 7.7 trillion) of the
total outstanding guaranteed corporate bonds (W 26.8 trillion), followed
by city banks (24 percent) and Credit Guarantee Fund and Surety Companies
(20 percent). Korean branches of foreign banks also provided guarantees
for Korean corporate bonds worth V 1.5 trillion, or almost 6 percent of
the total outstanding corporate bonds.
8.13 About two thirds of new corporate bonds brought to Korean
markets are issud by the exchange-listed companies. One of the most
notable developments in the primary bond market over the last several
yers has been the increasing number and amount of bond issues by small-
and medium-sized companies. These companies accounted for almost 30
percent of total new issues in 1991 (see Annex Table C.3). The proceeds
from bond issues are used for various purposes: refunding, opersting
capital, and fixed capital. While their shares vary year by year,
operating capital has been the primary use of the bond proceeds through
the 1980s. Over the 1990-91 period, however, fixed capital was the most
significant purpose for bond fLnancing, representing 48 percent (in 1990)
and 37 percent (in 1991), compared with operating capital (34 percent In
1990 and 33 percent in 1991) and refunding (18 percent in 1990 and 30
percent in 1991). More than 90 percent of corporate bonds issued in Korean
markets have maturities of less than 3 years. ane matL=urLi srcture of
Korean bonds has becoe sore skewed to a shorter end in the recent years
(see Tible 8.2J.
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TMUhKan - Offeugs of Corporats Bonds by Masturty 198541
(Qumlons etWm)
1,360.9 43 352. 1,094 3,319
~~~~~ ~~~~ 1.516 2 12 155.4 1.019 I 3,19.6
196 9" 3400 2tMM_?iIM
1,476.3 9 200.5 1,1 ,959.0
469.6 6 111.0 1.74 11095.?
1991I 2440 11763.? 3j__ 410.2 4 7. 377 31,773.4
S :R Sog gult8.1A.5. Uumw_ 3gai_
*L" 216 1 7 |
8.14 A credit rating system is in place and a credit rating In
required for the lssuane of certain types of corporate bonds. Corporate
bonds that are subject to mandatory credit ratings are non-guaranteed
long-term bonds (with more than one year's maturity) and short-term bonds
to be sold to the general public. There are three major Korean rating
agencies: Korea Credit Rating, Korea Credit Information, and Korea
Eaterprise Rating. They have been active since 1987. Currently, foreign
rating agencies are not allowed to carry out credit rating of Korean
bonds. Since the majorlty of bonds are guaranteed by financial
institutions, the credit rating agencies have not developed wuch, and
their role in differentiating the credit risks of the issuers of corporate
bonds has been negligible.
-v idwMukal
8.15 gverrmt Bonds. The secondary market in government bonds is
relatively underdeveloped and the turnover In 1991 accounted for less than
4 percent of the outstanding volume. The thinness of the secondary market
is attributable largely to a lack of general public demand for flxed
income securities, which are either issued by the Government below market
rates or allocated by the 30K to the NBFIs, as in the case of the ESSs.
Interest rates on the government securities are not market-determined and
there is no auction process In plce. Even when the price of these bonds
moves to reflect market Interest rates, the illiquid market condition
presents risks to short-term traders as well as investors because of large
spreads between the bid and ask quotes.
8.16 Secondarv market transactions of Korean bonds arn cncens trat e
in the OTC market. accounting for a much as 90 nercen of tha totAl
trading volume in 1991 (Table 8.3). This represents a sharp incresse over
the did-1980s when the Exchange and the OTC had about equal market share.
Increased activity in the OTC market was facilitated by the Government's
gradual deregulation of bond trading outside the kEchange in recent years,
and by the institutional investors' preference for OTC trading due to its
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conveidene (see Annex Table C.7).!/
TMMLU &* Kom SswMnaq Mrt TdIug of B, 19859
1985 3,533.2 3,623.1 23.5 12,456.2 3,556.7 16,079.3
1986 3,127.3 3,208.6 16.8 5,936.9 3,144.1 9,145S.5
1987 7,116.1 7,300.2 40.1 12,443.5 7,156.2 19,743.7
1988 8,587.8 8,508.9 731.7 33,900.9 9,319.5 42,409.8
1989 5,174.9 5,148.8 30.4 35,780.0 5,205.3 40,928.8
1990 3,246.2 3,187.1 42.2 35,581.0 3,288.4 38,768.1
1991 2,233.7 2,080.0 618.2 58,577.8 2,851.9 60,657.8
ource: Korea Securities Supervisory board.
8 17 .gQt«t Ao;. In order for a bond to be listed on the MS,
except for government bonds or debentures issued by a corporation
establisbed under special lava, prior approval must be obtained from the
SEC. As of th end 1991, a total of 5,527 corporate bonds with a total
value of V 29.2 trillion were listed on the exchange.
8.18 Secondary market trading of Korean flied income securities on
the exchange bas been stagnant, and in fact bas fallen since 1988. The
total sales value in 1991 (V 2.1 trillion) was the lowest In ten years and
only one third of the trading volume recorded in 1982, when the total
bonds outstanding was less than one-tenth of that In 1991. This means
that the secondary market turnover ratio bas declined precipitously--108
percent in 1982, 25 percent in 1988, and 3 percent in 1991. In contrast,
OTC trading of bonds has been on the rise, representing more than 90
percent of the total. 81nce 1986, the majority of bond sales was executed
outside the Exchange, despite the fact that most bonds are listed on the
XSZ. Indeed, bond trades dominate the OTC market wbere very limited
transactions of stocks take place. This unique pheno mn may be
attributed to several advantages afforded by OTC trades, Iucluding greater
fleibtillty, anonymity (to avoid exposure to close public scrutiny), and
relatively low cost.
8.19 A Re of t=a bonds i. in the hands oi finani
institutions. nartieularly investaent trUSt COmBnAies and ==xoLer&L19baks
2/ The subsequent section on corporate bonds will further discus
secondary bond market activities in Korea.
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(Table 8.4). The concentration of bond holding appears to make OTC tradbe
ccnwenient for particlpating lnstitutions. Furthermore, most investors
are not actively eogaged La frequent bond transactions for ahort-term
yield pLek-up as they tenad to take buy-and-hold positions, whieh lit
trades on the ESchange. ConsriderLng that bond trades are generally
motivated by changing prospects for intereat rates in established atd
well-functioning markets, the lack of socondary market liquidity In the
excbange mrket may reflect a fundametal shortcomdng of controlled
interest rates, and institutLonal deficiencies in the Rorean securitoe
markets.
3hjqJA Kome - Me*orfoieds ofiKamem Bonds, 1965-91
Financial 80.1 86.2 87.1 89.9 87.0 85.9 82.1
uovernment 1.3 1.4 0.4 0.4 OJ5 1.3 1.4
Sector
Corporate 10.1 5.1 5.1 2.8 4.2 4.5 7.3
SectorI
Individuals 8.5 7.3 7.4 6.9 8.3 8.3 9.2
Foreign _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Sector
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Amount 17,321 22,391 | 31,204 42,302 53,779 66,312 75,668
BL I1.)I
Saourwe: Bank of Korea, Dong-Sub Securities Co.
IL Patten of Bnd iss
8.20 Despito the rapid expansion in primary issues over the last
several years, the Korean bond market continues to confront various
structural difficulties that impeds efficient intermediation of financial
resources in Kora. On the macro level, the most fundamental problem
facing the bond markets is that bond rates are not completely determined
by market forces. The large spreads between bond rates artifLcially
applied to certain new issues and effective secondary market rates make it
impossible for the bond market to function by controlling the supply and
demand of fixed licome securities through the interest rate mechLaism,
resulting Ln distorted resourcq distrlbution. Unde: this environment, the
bond market fails to provide a reliable benchmark for interest rates in
the economy.
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1986 1987 198 1989 1990 1991
£o3xs: Ministry of Finance, Securities Spervisory Board.
8.21 The size of Korean bond markets grew substantially in recent
yeas, *as Chart 8.1 illustrates. But the share of fixed-income securities
In total financial assets has not increased proportionally because of
1areg savigsp in the form of bigh-yield short-tera financial products
(issued by short-term finance companies). In addition, compared with
industrial countries, the ratio of total bonds outstanding to GNP is much
lower in Korea--39 percent in Korea, 60 percent in Germany, and 66 percent
In Japaa.!/
6.22 Te ogean bond market has a narrow investor base. As was shoff
inU A Tabe .4 ndivdal LMvestor zMarsent less than 10 nernUt of the
total. and a dominant share of q=ut tadig bonds ig held by a relAtively
sall number of fiancial institutions and institutional investors. The
dominance of finncial institutions as primary bondholders is virtually
comon across countries, but its degree varies widely. On the basis of
1990 figures, the share of Korean fLnancial institutions was 87 percent,
considerably higher than the United States (61 percent), Germany (50
percent) and Japan (73 percent).!/ The single largest group of Korean
bondholders is investment trust companies, were financial condition bas
a/ Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Planning Agency (Japan), Tokyo
Stock Exchange, and Deutsche mund sbank.
'/ Figures are based on flow of funds data prepared by central banks
of the respective countries.
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deteriorated in recent years.!/
8.23 The maturity otructure of fixed-income securities, partIcularly
corporate bonds, is concentrated in the short-end of the spectrum. Most
issues have maturities shorter than 3 years, and few exceed 5 years.
Iong-term corgorate bonds are virtuallv non-existent In Korea- contrasting
tidutrial marketg where lgnf-terms b nd uesue .uport corporate tflie
ivatmes,. As a result, there has been no development of maeningful
yleld curves that provide a basis for efficlent investment and flnancing
decisions.
6.24 Guaranteed bonds dominate the fixed-income securities markot for
corporate bonds, let alone public bonds that are guaranteed by the
Government. Most corporate bonds are lssued under the umbrella of
flancial institution guarantees. The credit rating system for corporate
borrowers (except for large conglomerates) is not yet well established,
and public confidence in corporate ratings asslgned by rating agencies is
lacking. The reliance of corporate bond issues on guarantees also raises
concerns about potential wide-spread repercussions of adverse financial
oonditions at major coamercLal guarantors.
8.25 There are very limited types of instruments avallable in Korean
bond markets, Straight bonds represent almost all of the new corporate
bond Issues in recent years; only a little over 1 percent of the 1991
total was convertible bonds. The lack of diver.lty in the tye of flxed-
income securities further limits apontansous investment bx the general
ublia. Derivative securities, such as optLons and financial futures, are
not currently offered in Korea. These contingent instruments could
facilitate -he growth of fixed-income instruments, as the proper use of
derivatives can help Improve the management of the portfolio comprising
underlying securities.
8.26 During the 1980s, the corporate bond yield gradually decllned to
12.6 percent in 1987. Since then, excessive lnvestments (some speculative
In real estate) and the associated high demand for credit pushed the yield
up to almost 19 percent in 1991. Entering the first quarter of 1992,
however, interest rates started to fall modestly, reflecting lower
expected lnflation as a result of tight fiscal and monetary policies to
contain rising inflatlon in Korea. Recent empirical studies show that
yields on Korean corporate bonds are most closely linked to consumer price
indexs; for every one percentage point change in consumer prLce index,
bond yield. change roughly one-half a percentage point.
8.27 Bond yields continued to decline since the second half of 1991,
as the sluggish performance of stock and real estate markets resulted in
substantial new investment funds into bond markets. Recent government
statistics show that as much as P 10 trillion of new inmstment has been
5/ The Korean government envisages a special rescue financing for
investment trust companies in the order of P 3 trlIlion at a
subsidized rate of 3Z. The planned financing from the Bank of
Korea is intended to revive these financially depressed companies
whose role as leading institutLonal investors has been hampered by
fir mcial problems.
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added to bank trust accounts and other vehicles targeted at fled Income
securtle for the first half of 1992. Compared with this siLable
inrease is lvestment flows, chanlges in market yields appear to be
relatively modest, exhibiting the dowside rigidity of Interest rates In
8.28 It Is Interesting to observe that over the 1988-92 period, the
spread 4etween secondary market yields on government bonds and corporate
bonds has generally widened (see Chart 8.2). The rise In the premium
attached to corporate bonds may have reflected, among others, heightened
corporate default risk under deteriorating macroeconomic conditions.
Although the torm structure of Interest tates is not well established In
Korea, the current yield curve is largely upward sloping; for corporate
bonds, the maturity premium for a 5-year bond is about 100 bais points
over a comparable bond with a one-yer maturity.
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8.29 Flxed-income securities markets in major industrial countries
are considerably larger than that in Korea, not only in absolute terms but
also in relation to the size of the economy. As shown in Table 8 5 below,
for exampl, U. S. government bonds outstanding (as of October 1, 1992)
amounted to US$1.77 trillion or 31.2 percent of GNP, compared with US$42.4
billion of government bonds or 15.7 percent of GNP in Korea.
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Tabb 4Ghnm ft Wo
ctamm sad Ho Ruda to GNP
lJSited 8t es 1 1,771,950 31.2
Japan 700,959 19.2
Germany 426,017 24.7
France | 252,372 19.8
United Kingdom 215,319 20.0
orea 42,400 | 15.7
N"e: As of October 1, 1992 for market capitalization figures, and
end-1991 for GIP data.
Source: Salomon Brothers (for bond markets); IMF (for GNP).
8.30 The Japanese yen bond market--perhaps the most useful industrial
country comparator for the Korean bond market-.is the second largest In
the vorld, exceeded in size only by the U.S. market. It is roughly 40
percent of the total capitalization of the U.S. bond market and almost
twice as largo as the German market, licludLng all types of publicly
offered bonds. The Japanese government bond market expanded rapidly ln
the 1980s, with the introduction of primary market reforms and derivative
instruments. The secondary market for Japanese governrnt bonds expanded
dramatically in the mdd-1980s, -after banks were permitt.d to trade
seasoned public bonds in short-term trading accounts In 1984. In
addition, the lntroduction of the government bond futures market in 1985
facilitated sophisticated arbitrage transactions. Ten-year governmant
bonds are by far the most actively traded fixed-incone instrumont in the
Japanese mrket. Market volatility and turnover have declined In recent
years, due partly to the growing conservatism of investors. The non-
government yen bond market has remalned illiquld relative to its
government counterpart. A series of market doregulatory easures has
prompted liquidity and arbitrage trading in the money markets.
8.31 Japanese government bonds are distributed through both auctions
and a fixed underwriting syndicate, whLih consists of major securities
houses, banks and insurance companies. In response to forelgn requests.
the Japanese Ministry of Finance introduced a prLce-competitive auction
system for ten-year government bonds in 1989 through which 40 percent of
all new issues are distributed, with the remaining portion allotted to the
syndicate. The share was subsequently raised to 60 percent in 1990 and is
expected to increase to 100 percent in the future.!/ In recent years,
6/ For further details of the Japanese bond market, see 'A Primer on
Yen Fixed-Income Markets, Saloon Brothers, June 1992.
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the net issuance of government bonds has declined as a result of the
GOvernment's efforts to reduce the fiscal deficit, About one-fourth of
nw government bonds are placed with public institutions (such as the
postal savwigp system) each fiscal year.
8.32 The OTC market dominates the trading of Japanese government
bonds, although bonds wlth an original maturity of 10 or 20 years are also
listed on the exchanges. Traditionally, the buy-and-hold investment
pattern of Japanese investors in high-coupon bonds kept the liquidity of
these bonds low. However, the accountlng change in 1989 required banks to
include capital gains from bond transactions in operating profits (i.e.,
the key measure of bank profitability), which fostered a shift in bank
portfolio preforence from current Income to total rate of return. In
addition to the growing conservatism on the part of investors, market-
inherent and institutional factors are restricting activities In the
Japanese secondary market. But the secondary market trading may expand in
the future because, for example, insurance companies are expected to trade
public bonds in short-term trading accounts by fiscal 1994. Derivative
securities available in the Japanese bond uarket include long-term
government bond futures (listed with the Tokyo Stock Exchange sLace 1985),
options on government bond futures (listed with the Tokyo Stock Exchange
since 1990), and OTC options on yen cash bonds (since 1989).
8.33 Among the developing economies in Asia, however, Korea leads the
primary bond market activities and tops the size of fixed-income
securities outstanding (see Annex Table C.6). But its secondary market
turnover is much lower than in Taiwan, Singapore, or Hong Kong (see Annex
Table C.7).!/
8.34 A total of US$64 billion (equivalent) of fixed-income securlties
ws" raised in Korean markets in 1991, substantially larger than in other
neighboring Asian developing countries. Of thi- amount. gogernmenL bonds
ad rornorate bonds rep ented a roughly eaul ohr. As discussed
earlier, the growth in the primary bond market was facilitated by the
government policy toward expanding HSB Lssues and encouraging corporate
bond issues by deregulating the yields on new corporate bond issues. The
COK also allowed commercial banks to lssue certificates of deposit so that
the proc"eds could be used to purchase corporate bonds. Primary bond
market activity ln Korea ws supported by rising private placements
through deposit money banks authorLzed lately for underwriting fixed-
income securities.
8.35 Malaysia raised a little over US$2 billion (equivalent) In Lts
domestic bond market in 1991. MalaysLan Government Securities (MOSs)
accounted for about two-thirds of the total, with -he remainder Issued In
otbor forms, including Bank Ne8sra Malaysia (Bl) nds and corporate
bonds. In recent years, the BuM has offered a wider range of maturities
to meot different Livestor preferences. Short-term securities with
maturities of less than five years accounted for only 14 percent,
7/ For a more detailed comparison of bond markets ln major Asian
developing counzries, refer to lFxed-Income Securities Markets of
Six DynamLc Asian EconomLes, by S. Ghon Rhee, OBCD, Septesber
1992.
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contrasting with the maturity structure of Korean bonds. Medlum-term
securities (of 8 years' maturlty) and long-term bonds (of up to 21 yearx'
maturlty) represented 23 percent and 63 percent, respectlvely.
8.36 Hong Kong has a very small fixed-income securities market with a
total outstanding of about US$1 billlon (equivalent), representing a tiny
fraction of the total market capitalization of lts equlty securities
amounting to more than US$120 billion (equivalent). This is in sharp
contrast with Korea, where the total flxed-income securities outstanding
reaches almost the level of the total capLtalization of its equity market.
Government bonds have a maturlty of two years, but the authorities plan to
diversify the maturity structure.
8.37 Like Hong Kong, the size of primary bond markets in Talwan and
Thailand is very small, compared with their respective stock markets.
Long-term debt securities in Talwan amounted to US$17 billion (equivalent)
as of end-1991, with the government bond sector representing a major share
(more than three quarters of the total). The bond market in Thailand,
with a total outstanding value of almost US$6 billion (equivalent), is
completely domlnated by government bonds.
8.38 The relative size of fixed-income securities arkets, as
measured by the ratio of aggregate bonds outstending to GNP (based on
market value as of end-1991), varLes conslderably among developing
economles ln Asla. The ratio is the highest in Malaysia (59 percent), and
the lowest in Hong Kong (a little over 1 percent). Korea's ratlo reaches
almost 30 percent, followed by TaLwan (9.2 percent) and Thalland (7.2
percent). As noted in the preceding section, these ratios are much lower
that those in major industrial countries: for example, Japan (66 percent)
and 6ermany (60 percent). Moreover, these are also in drastic contrat to
the comparable ratios for the equity markets; the ratio of total stock
market capitallzation to GNP ranges from 172 percent in Hong Kong to 35.5
percent in Korea.
D Strut Imedmts to Korean Bd Mrkt D
8.39 The structural and institutional wekness in Korean bond markets
must be viewed from the broader perspective of macroeconomic policies and
thelr interactions with fLnancial systems and markets. irst antd
foremost. ZgZovnmen nolicies on interest rates directly affet the
activities in bond markets. Improvement has been made, especially since
the Government began to implement partial deregulation of Literest rates
in 1988, and more recently ln 1991.!/ But the prospect for further
development of fixed-income socuritles markets in Korea is elusive, unless
rates are expected to be determined by autonomous market forces.
8.40 The discrepancy between the primary bond rate and the secondary
8/ In November 1991, interest rate deregulatLon measures wer
expanded to several fLnancial products. They include ihort-tern
instruments such as CDs and large RPs, and corporate bonds with
maturitles of longer than 2 years.
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market yield has been a source of distortion in the Korean bond mrket.
Unlike industrial arkets where rates applied to nw issues ar largely
determined by competitive bidding. below-market rates are artificlally
assigned to new government bonds by the montary authority, in order to
reduce the fiscal burden. The rate difforence has been most pronounced in
the case of ISBs, which are absorbed mostly by financial lnstitutlons
through the Government's compulsory allotment. In fat, almost 70 percent
of all bonds Issued in Korea (based on 1990 statistics) were absorbtd
tbrough non-voluntary demand. Goverment lnterventlon is still prevalent
in the market for corporate bonds, even though their yields have been
liberalized. The artificial yield differential and irregularities
affecting demand for new bonds ha created an environment that limits
expansion of the investor base in the bond market.
8.41 Existlng regulations limit flexible supplies of fixed- Iome
securities. Aside from government bondb, new issues of which are subject
to prior approval from the Assembly, the size of new Issues of cortain
financial bonds (e.g., industrial financing bond issued by RDB) has to be
agreed upon by the Assembly. Therefore, once the annual new issue size
has been determined, it is difficult to alter the supply of those issues
even if market conditions varrant such changes. The supply of corporate
bonds is administered de facto by securities authorities (ultimately MOW)
on a monthly basis. These controls and Listitutional rlgidities often
induce supply-demand imbalances ln the bond markets, resulting in the
failure of the market to reflect conditions of the real economy and credit
and interest rate trends.
6.42 Compared with the substantial growth in the primary markets, the
institutional framework and trading system in the secondary bond markots
remain rudimentary. Bond prices are often set by a handful of large
mnstitutional investors, and systematic bid-offer price quotes are not
available electronically. Illiquidity causes large spreads between bid
and asked prices, coupled with comaissions, resulting in prohibitively
high transactions costs for individual investors. Furthermore, price
information on OTC trades is often not publicly available.
8.43 The financial liberalization and financial sector reform plans
leading to market-determined interest rates will be a crucial first step
towards attainLng growing and properly functioning bond markets in
Korea.!/ Aside from supportive macroeconomic and deregulation measures,
there are several specific areas where improvements can be made. The
development of securities markets depends on the deepening and broadening
of the markets. This means first that the investor base should be
expanded to promote more competitive and transparent bond market
conditions. More active participation from not only lndlvidual investors
but also long-term oriented investors like life insurance campanies and
pnasion funds should provide greater stability to bond markets.
8.44 An important missing element in Korean bond markets is the
9/ Related issues of flnancial sector reform and liberalization,
lncluding interest deregulation, indirect monetary control, soney
market development, and liberalization of foreign eachange
markets, are subject to separate coverage.
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preseneo of the foreign sector. In Industrial countries with globalized
financial markets, foreign investors hold roughly 10 pereent of domestic
bond Instruments. The Korean bond market Is currently closed to foreign
Investment, except for a very nominal smount through International
inewstmont rusts managed by domestic institutions. The partielpation of
foreign investors will help broaden the domestic bond market. In
addition, Korean corporations should be further encourag to iLau bonds
(Including convertibles) In overseas capital markets o./
8.45 lkewise, the type of corporate bonds must be diversified.
There should be more corporate bonds Issued without guarantees from
financial Institutions. Guarantees often retard direct market access by
issuing entities , and prolonged dependency on guarantoes is detrimental to
the establishment of a corporation's own creditworthiness in the market
place. The heawy reliance by corporate bonds on guarantees means that
bond instruments become almost indistinguishable (from the investor's
point of view) from financial products Issued by the lnstitutlons
providing the guarantees, which also makes it imposslble for the market to
differntiate corporate bonds in different risk classes. For the bond
market to develop as an efficient intermediator of risk capital,
increasing the issues of non-guaranteed bonds should be encouraged with
appropriate prudential guidelines. In this connection, the accountability
of the rating agencies needs to be strengthened.
8.46 A characteristic of bond markets, which distLpguishes this
market from money markets, is that bond markets can lntermediate long-term
funds. As discussed before, the maturity of corporate bonds in Rorea is
confined largely to 3 years or so. Considering that Korean corporations
rely increasingly on short-term indirect financing (from comuercial
banks),!/ longer-term bond issues must be promoted, along with
appropriate pricing of maturity premiums. Increasnlg the usage of hybrid
securities, such as convertible bonds and bonds with warrants, will not
only help deepen the bond market, but also irprove the highly-leveraged
corporate capital structure in Korea.
8.47 Institutional reforms designed to improve the efficieney of bond
markets should be another important task. A transparent pricing system,
with frequent and continuous public disclosure, will enhance public
confidence in the econdary market. A standardized and computerlzed price
quote mechanism would improve liquLdity. In this connection, lessons
could be learned from the development of, for example, the NASDAQ syste
in the United States. More fundamental in this regard Is the
establlshment of an adequate dealer system to remove price distortions In
the primary bond markets.
I/ See Annex Table A.4 for a sumary of overseas convertible bonds
and bonds with warrants issued by Korean companies.
e/ Rcent Bank of Korea flow of funds statistics show that the
proportion of indirect financing has been on the rise: 36X In
1989, 40X in 1990, and 54X in the first half of 1991. For the
same period, domestic direct financLig has declined from 54X to
35X.
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E. kwes Iolved to Bond Miarket Ibeion
8.48 The first pigrity of the ovrMMn should be on MM
iUroBemont in the functi1ning of domestc hond maresba. As a first step.
the Government should consider creating a benchmark for interest rates by
auctioning ESBa or Treasury bills. This would create a benchmark interest
rate that could be used to peg other Interest rates in the financial
markets. Subsequently, interest rates on corporate bonds should be
completely deregulated and corporations should be allowed to issue non-
guaranteed bonds based on market determined rates. Credit rating agencies
should be encouraged to issue ratings based on the assessment of credit
risks to foster the development of the bond market. Regulatory control in
the form of disclosures and reporting should be simultaneously
strengthened. Once the domestic bond market is deregulated and is
functioning well, the Government should consider opening the market to
foreign investors. The internationalization should be implemented within
the context of broader monetary and foreign exchange rate policy
liberalization and the proposed sequencing of which are discussed in
Chapters IV and VI.
F. Optios for Bond Mark lblai
8.49 There are basically two optior for effecting the bond market
opening: step by step or big bang. In %iie case of Japan, the
internationalization of the bond market was brought into effect gradually
throughout he 1970s. The complete opening took place in 1980, after
several years' experience of consecutive current account surpluses and the
rapid growth of domestic financial markets. Three conditions are believed
to have contributed to its success: a stable and sound macroeconomic
environment, sufficiently competitive domestic institutions, and a
gradual but effective implementation.
8.50 In contrast, Spain took a different approach and moved in a much
faster track. Since the reforms of the government bond market in 1987,
the Spanish bond market has become quickly internationalized. The
admittance of the peseta into the European exchange rate mechanism (DRN)
in 1989 greatly facilitated its internationalization. Non-residents are
estimated to currently hold more Mm 20 percent of the total outstanding
in the Spanish government bond ma*Iet.
8.51 The desirable policy option for Korea appears to lie between
these two extremes. Market opening measures could be phased in over a
-period of 3.4 years. The first step should involve a partial opening of
domestic bonds, confined to selected instrumsets in government securities
such as NSBs or treasury bills. Given the lack of an established yield
curve, foreign investors would most likely be interested in investing in
short-term government securities. The convertible corporate securities
would be another logical choice once the domestic market is deregulated
and the issues are allowed to be priced based on the credit risks.
Closed-end bond funds could be explored at this initial stage.
8.52 The Korean authorities hould also consider developing domestic
derivatives markets--such as futures, forward, swaps, and options--to
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support effective management of financial risks associated wLth
international securities transactions. The instltutional capacity to deal
with contingent instruments should also be fostered. At the same time,
Korean firms should be encouraged to tap internatlonal bond markets,
leading to the issuance of Won-denominated Eurobonds.
G. Sumay andc
8.53 Korean securities markets have grown significantly through the
1980s. The excellent macroeconoamic performance and phenomenal growth in
new equity securities, especially during the second half of 1980s, made
the KSE one of the largest emerging bourses. Although market activities
have become sluggish over the last two years, the Korean stock market now
ranks thirteenth in the world in terms of market capitalization.
8.54 in the process of domestic market growth, Korean authorities
have gradually taken measures to open the stock market for foreign
inewstment. Since investment rust funds for non-residents were first
-established in 1981, Korean trust companles have set up a number of
International investment rusts. The introduction of the Korea Fund, a
pLoneer country fund, in 1984, brought a series of country funds for
International investment in Korean equitles on the KSE. Finally, the
stock market opening for direct purchase by foreign investors became
offective in January 1992, attracting nearly US$80O million for the first
three months in 1992.
8.55 The Impact of the market oponing on Korea's domestic economy has
been relatively inconsequential, erasing some of the concerns about the
internationalization. Although observations are too limited to warrant
definitive judgement, the foreign investment flows have not destabilized
the domestic market. The market opening was an important milestone, but
many restrictions remain. There appears substantial room for improvement
ln foreign ownership limit, regulatory arrangements (including capital
gains tax), and administration and procedures.
8.56 The Korean bond market has also grown rapidly in recent years,
but the growth is confined to the primary market for relatively few
issues. New bond issues are dominated by KSBs and guaranteed corporate
bonds. The secondary bond market remains largely underdeveloped due to
interest rate control and the control of capital issues by the Government.
There is no benchmark for interest rates in Korea, and the bulk of
government securities and MSBa are allocated.
8.57 The first priority of the Government should be to develop the
domestic bond market. This will require both policy and institutional
changes. At the policy level the Government will need to: (i) deregulate
interest rates on government securities starting through the issuance of
the xSis at market rates. Auctioning of MSBs may be the most efficient
way to achieve this. In this connection, the related issues of the
profitability of the BOK and the policy loans will need to be addressed in
Chapters IV and V; (ii) deregulate the interest rates on corporate bonds
and allow the market to determine the interest rate for each issue based
on the credit risk and rating assign by the credit rating agencies. In
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this corection, the credit rating agencies should be developed further.
Guarantees of the securities should be voluntary and the guarantee fee
dhould be market based; (iii) deregulate the control of capital Issue by
allowing the corporate sector to issue securities based on market
considerations; (iv) a network of primary dealers should be activated for
making markets in the government securities; (v) the clearing and
settlement system for corporate bonds should be improved; and (vi)
information on the bond market for investors should be improved.
EL TBE POSED FINNCIAL SECTOR REZORM AND S SEQUENCING
9.1 The Korean economy hus been one of the fastest growlng economie
In the world. As discussed earlier, the Government has used the financial
sector to support its SAndstrial policy and thb development of the real
sector. The success of the lnterventionist policy was ensured by its
dependence on market signals for the development of the real sector.
However, the financial sector was burdened with excessive Interest rate
controls, policy loans, ownership of banks by the Government, and undue
interference In the management of financial institutions, especially
banks. As a result, the development of the Korean financial sector was
retarded and substantially lagged behind the real sector (Chapter II).
arler At_epts at lan&a Rleorms
9.2 The need to revitalize the financial sector so that it could
more effectively serve the economy was appreciated by the Korean
authorities. This recognition led to adoptlon of a financial
liberalization program in 1979. Interest rate ceilings were adjusted
upward in 1979 to yield positive real interest rates, though this move was
frustrated by the acceleration of the inflation rate in 1980 and 1981.
following in the wake of the oil price crisis. In 1981, banks were
privatized and preferential lending rates were abolished; coumercial paper
was allowed to be issued for NBFIs at market interest rates. In 1981, the
band system for bank lending rates was introduced and further widened,
together with the liberalization of short-term inter-bank rates and the
introduction of cortificates of deposit for banks in 1984, Cash Nanagem.nt
Accounts by short-term finance companies and household trust accounts, and
the paying of market interest rates was introduced; primary market
interest rates were freed from formal restrictions on corporate bonds and
CDs. In 1987, securities companies were permitted to issue the bond
management fund, similar to but more restrictive in asset management than
money market funds in the United States.
9.3 With all these liberalized measures, however, progress was
generally half-hearted and faltering. The authorities feared the impact
of higher interest rates on the business sector, which made them intervene
whenever they thought the market interest rates overshot the level
perceived to be sustainable. Although the deregulation program was de
facto abandoned, the limited experiment during this period made the
authorities and the market participants aware of the positive impact of
financial deregulation. This set the stage for a fresh impetus for
deregulation by the authorities in 1988. Coincidentally, these moven
towards financial deregulation were induced by the notable improvement In
macroeconomic conditions in Korea during a major part of the 1980s, and by
hi 5 h savings in excess of domestic invstment which narrowed the disparity
between the regulated and free market rates, i.e., curb market rates.
9.4 A somewhat bolder stop toward financial liberalization was taken
in December 1988, when most bank and non-bank lending rates and some long-
term deposit rates were decontrolled, except for the rates on policy loans
and short-term deposit rates--the latter on the grounds of preventing
excessive competition among financial intermdiaries. However, this
measure was not allowed to run its full coure. As soon as the interest
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rate moved upward from the repressed level in response to deregultlon,
the authorities clasped down on the rates, giving tacit onsent to
collusion among the financial institutions in fixing lnterest rates. Ti
wa achieved through "window guidance".
lb Goevaaet Plan b lutaeltut Rafe
9.S It Is realized by the authorities that local banks have been
greatly bandicapped in conducting their operations competitively, while
foreign banks are not subject to interest rate ceilings, and 3BF7s bave
been given greater freedom in regard to interest rate determination.
Further, it was felt that a global financlal environment has evolved In a
manner that the Korean financial system has to strengthen its links with
It in order to enhance the efficiency of credit allocation and savings
mobilization. The Government, therefore, announced a plan in 1991 for
gradually deregulating Interest rates and increasing the competitiveness
of the banks. The plan began to be operative In November 1991, and was
expected to be fully implemented by 1997. Subsequent discussions with the
authorities indicated that the process of interest rate deregulat4on might
be extended beyond 1997 by a couple of years, depending upon several
unexpected developments. The main elements of this plan are summarized in
Table 9.1.
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9.6 Though the deregulation policy was formally launched in the
second half of 1991, its implementation has been more notional than ral.
Formal regulation of rates on bank overdraft loans and commercial bills.
corporate bonds with maturities over two years, and long-term deposit
rates have been removed. But In offect, the actual rates charged on all
these assets and liabilities contlnued to be subject to vindow guldance.
Thus, there was no de fZ"g deregulation of interest rates due to the
reasons referred to earlier in this chapter. The government plan for
financial sector reform has several positive features which may carry the
Korean financlal system to greater efficlency and growth. However, the
implemontation of the plan is contingent upon certain macroeconomic
conditions and therefore the plan is generally perceLved by domestic
market participants and the international community (especially its major
tradLig partners) as being too halting and lacking credibility. La grder
for the 2lan to be crodible. it needs to have a specific timetable and be
made ktnwn to all market participants so that they can operate freely in a
Te Can for ilnna Sector Refom
9.7 The Korean economy has seen substantial iberalization ln the
real economy, while the path it has taken in freeing controls on the
financial sector has been cautious and measured. The reforms that have
been undertaken during the past decade have improved the efficiency of the
financial system in many respects. Despite this progress, however, many
distortions remain, and these have influenced the structure of the
financial system, its ability and efficiency in mobilizlng and
intermediating savings, and the efficacy of monetary pollcy. There is a
need for further reform of the financial system for the following reasons.
First, the Korean economy is now the tenth largest in the world and is
approaching developed country status. As a result, the Korean financial
market is a part of a global market system and the major trading partners
would naturally demand reciprocity in accessing Korean markets. Second,
the direct control,of the system which has served so well ln the past has
now become too cumbersome and is not efficient enough to meet the
financing of a more sophisticated and internationalized conomy.
Continuation of control is likely to lead to misallocation of resources
and increase distortions in the system. Third, the macroeconomic
conditlon in Korea is stable and ideal for implementing accelerated
reforms (Chapter II). Fourth, as the financial system becomes large and
complex, th..re is no other option but to move away from direct monetary
control to indirect monetary control procedures. This would mean that the
interest rate deregulation (especially on the government secur tLes and
XSBs) must take place sooner rather than later. Fifth, Korea needs a more
competitive and innovative banking sector which can serviee the financing
needs of the economy at home and abroad. Therefore, it is essential that
full deregulation of the domestic financial system take place sooner
rather than later.
Pard Rks ot Acated Thmna orm
9.8 Korea has tbus far made very good progress in reforming its
financial sector. However, the Korean authorities are reluctant to
accelerate the reforms for the following concerns: (a) macroeconomic
stability; (b) health of the banking system; (C) limited asset/liability
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management skills in the banks; (6) over indebtedness of Korean companies;
(e) eXCess demand for credit; an (f) crowding out by the Chebols. These
are discussed below.
9.9 I mn aLo s iaULI.zU. The Korean authorities fear that the
deregulation of interest Votes cad rapid financial sector reforu would
adversely affect macroeconomic stability. However, the macroeconomic
conditions in Kore today are highly favorable to accelerating the pace of
fiuancial reform. Although the current account shows a deficit, it has
fallon sharply this year, and the deficit Is sustainable since adequate
flows of foreign financing are easily available. Indeed, it In arguable
that Korea should be a not capital Importer, when its future growth would
depend on greater capital Intensity of productlon. Substantial
liberallzation has occurred in the real sector. Industrial policy is now
less interventionist and sector-specific. Similarly, the trade regime Is
now less protectionist. Tariffs have been substantially lowered and the
coverage of quantitative restrictions reduced. Korea Is free from severe
macroeconomic imbalances which threatened the financial iberalization in
Southern Cone countries and some Asian countries like Indonesia nd the
Philippines.
9.10 Health of the yanking Ss te. The domestic banks are reportedly
saddled with a high proportion of non-performing loans which are by and
large policy loans (Chapter V). Helped by the buoyancy of the stock
market and favorable conomic conditions durlng 1987-89, the banks in
Korea have been enhancing their capital bae and reduce non-performing
assets (Chapter VII). Furtherore, the interest rate spread of 4.53
percent is much wider than in industrial countries like Japan and the
United States.y Both of these factors should be expected to provide
more than an adequate cushion against the risks of non-performing loans.
If, bowever, such loans are considered to be a formidable barrier to
interest rate deregulation, the authorities should move more expeditiously
to remove pollcy loans from the balance sheet of the banks.
9.11 AMOe.t/iabinu MM . It is Aieved that
deregulation of interest rates on the liabilities of commercial bank
without being able to adjust returns on their assets would disadvantage
them vis-a-vis the foreign banks and UBFIs. However, the evidence seem
to suggest that it is not such a major problem as Is generally believed.
However, this concern can be accommodated in the interest rate
deregulation plan by allowing ceilings on interest rates on short-term
deposits at the begianing, and their gradual reawoval later within a
specified time.
9.12 Over Indebtedness of Korean Companies. Korean companies are
highly leveraged. The debt-equity ratio for all manufacturing firms in
1991 wsm 3.09:1, and even the lowest in recent years--in 1989--was 2.54:1.
This compares with 2.27:1 in Japan and 0.83:1 in Taiwan, China. However,
the Korean firm have been replacing bank loans with securities. In 1991,
the ratio of securities in total financing rose to 55 percent compared
with 27 percent in 1987. Interest rate liberalization will further
increase tho incentive for equity financing and therefore reduce the
leverage level of Korean firms. Furthermore, there is a misconception
1/ Sung-Hee Jwa, Korea s Interest Rate and Capital Controls
Deregulation: Implications for Monotary Policy and Financlal
structure," July 1992, Korea Development Institute.
- 123 -
that business firms pay the regulated Interest rates on their borrowinps.
Banks generally evade the regulations by asking borrowing firms to
maintain compensatory balances. utilizing other facilities to ralse the
effective cost of the borrowed funds compared to the market rates. Uhen
bank credit in available at much below market interest rates and access to
capltal market for raising equity is rationed, the corporate sector has
little incentive to reduce its leveraging. Therefore, the solution is to
deregulate interest rates and allow firms unrestricted access to the
capital markets with appropriate disclosures to protect the investing
public.
9.13 Exaess Doman fdor C_ dit. It is argued that demand for credit
In Korea is interest inelastic, particularly the credit demand for real
estate. It is argued that under such conditions, if interest rate
detsrmination is left to market forces, rates would skyrocket and thus
impede investment in the manufacturing sector and the growth of the
economy. The interest inelasticity of credit deawnd appears largely based
on the observation that at controlled rates there is competition for
funds. The existence of excess demand at these rates is by itself not
surprlsing. The intensity of competition for credit reflects ln large
measure the extent to which poliey loans to preferred sectors siphon off
credit. As a consequence, less credit is avallable for other sectors.
Moreover, during the economic boom of the late 19809, the strong demand
for credit was fed by spiralling prices in the real estate and stock
markets. Given that the economy has now returned to slower growth, and in
particular the real estate and stock market booms have abated, credit
demand appears to have weakened considerably. For instance, the current
yield on three-year corporate bonds (October 1992) is 13.75 percent--the
lowest in almost four years and down from almost 20 percent a year ago,
and 15.5 percent as recently as September 1992. Therefore, the economic
environment appears to be ideal to move decisively on deregulation.
9 14 Crowdvag-out by the Chbols. The concern here is that the
prLority sector borrowers such as small and medium industries and
agriculture will be deprived of credit from the banking sector, and the
banks would prefer to lend to the Chebols. This concern, however, can be
addressed through the prudential regulations and bank supervision. An
exposure limit by company, group and sector should be established and
tightly monitored. Specialized banks could continue to moet the financing
needs of the priority sectors.
Umelt of Fhskr PhumOW Reform
9.15 If the G0K can tmplemeat a credible financial sector reform, the
following main benefits would accrue. The first would be the potential
imrovemnts in the efficiency of the financial system in intermediating
savnga. There are several indicators that point to inefficiencies in
many segments of Korea's firancial system, which raise the costs of
financial intermedltion. One of the indlcators is the operational
Inefficiency of Korean banks compared to their counterparts in Japan and
the U.S. In 1990, labor productivity in Korean commercial banks, whether
measured in terms of assets, loans or deposits per employee, was less than
a tenth of the levels in Japanese banks. Noreover, limited competition
within the Korean banking sector meant that interest rate margins (the
difference between loan and deposlt rates) were about twice their levels
in the U.S. and more than three times as large as in Japan. So it is not
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surprising to hear a recurrent complaint is that borrowing costs are too
high.
9.16 Ale gf ffic in diation is the
gontinued segmanttion of InanIAl . As noted earller, there is
reason to beloeve that the variation of risk-adjusted interest rates
across different groups of borrowers has narrowed since the 1970s. But
the Government continues to play a substantial role in allocating credit
through requirements that banks and HBFIs allocate a prescribed share of
new credit to preferred sectors and BOW' automatic rediscount mechanism
for loans to some sectors (Chapter VI). This means that financial markets
still remain sep=nted to a significant degree, with the pricing of loans
reflecting regulatory requiremonts rather than lenders' evaluations of the
rlskiness of different lending opportunities.
9.17 Actions to dersguate the finnial sysem in several areas
would age &aX efficinc. Interest rate deregulation would
encourage comercial banks to develop their expertise in asset and
liability manement. Even partial decontrol of deposit rates would allow
them to compete more effectively with NBFIs in mobilizing funds. If
combined with a relaxatLon of the sectoral lending requirements that apply
to banks, it would reduce significantly the regulatory disadvantage that
banks currently face relative to NBFIs. By allowing them to tailor their
Interest rates and products to market conditions and risk characteristics,
it would promote efficiency in their operations rather th&n forcing them
to operate in effect as cost-plus providers of financial services.
Reducing the volume of policy loans would also restrict the flow of
preferential oans and thereby reduce segmentation.
9.18 The favorable impact of these changes on the efficiency of the
banking system suggests that the rise in lending rates that follows
interest rato decontrol may not be as large as is feared. Although
difficult to demonstrate, it is probable that the large share of policy
loans in total credit has meant higher interest rates than in a
liberalized system for those without access to these loans. Those
borrowers may well se a reduction in their borrowing costs.
9.19 As Korea shifts from a surplus to a shortage of labor, among the
most important issues is whether to continue to restructure the industrial
sector so as to build comparative advantage based on technology rather
then cheap lAbor. Such a shift is already underway, with the share of
light industry in manufacturing output having shrunk by about 5 percentage
points in 1989-91 compared to 1985-87. But this transition has not been
easy, in part because capital remains expensive to most Korean firms--even
wille labor costs are ri If I financial reforms succeed in raisin8 the
efficiencr of domestic inc_rmediAtiogn and in roadenina the access of
Koran i m toextrna caital, nustial restructuring could occu
much mr sAoothly, wiLch could raise Koreas growth rate.
Pr.pou Ieana Seetw 8 o wm and Sequmd
9.20 In light of the above analysis, it is sugg=:ted that the GOK
consider modifying its deregulation plan in regard to iWs scope,
sequencing, and speed. The suggested changes are indicated in Table 9.2.
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9.21 The ubln thrust of the proposed retorm is that the deregulation
of the domestLc financial markets and current account *bould take place
before the opening of the capital account. Such sequencing has worke
very vell in many countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia .1
9.22 The rationale for the suggested changes in the scope,
sequencing, oad speed of the deregulation plan and its implementation are
elaborated as follows. IL=, it is recouended that the period of reform
be compressed for two reasons: (1) the momentum of deregulation will be
lost If the period of change is too long; and (ii) the globalization of
financial markets worldwide and the size of Korean economy create a need
for a more rapid adjustment. h*4 deregulation of lend;ng rates on
loans of all financial intermediaries is proposed to take place in a short
period of time, instesd of the step-by-step approach adopted by the
Governrent. The current effective lending rates are already higher than
the regulated ones as discussed earlier in the chapter. Therefore, even
if the loan interest rates increase as a result of deregulation, the
overall cost to the economy and the corporate sector would not change
materially. Recent experience in Thailand and the Philippinos shows that
the level of interest rates actually declined. Third deregulation of
interest rates on deposits (excopt for demand deposits) of deposit amney
banks is proposed to be carried out in steps on the grounds that removal
of interest rates on all deposits in one go may lead to excessive
competition among banks to increase their market share. Since the banks
are gonerally not very well-versed with modern asset/liabillty management
techniques and the level of non-performing assets of the banking system
eould be higher than the published flgures, a sharp increase in their
funding cost without the ability to adjust the returns on the existing
loan portfolio of policy loans creates a potential risk of bank failures.
Therefore, a gradual deregulation of deposit rates with a clear timetable
for eliminating the ceiling will provide enough tim for banks to prepare
themelves to cope with the new environment It is also recomended that
the Government completely withdraw from direct or indirect management of
financial institutions to onable the development of profossional bankers.
Prudential regulations and bank supervlsion are to be strengthened and are
to replace direct controls.
2/ Se "The Impact of Financial Reform in Malaysia,w Messrs. Yusof,
Hussin, Alowl, Sing, and Singh, ank legara, March 1992;
0Indonesia: Financial Sector Report,' Report No. 8159-IND,
ZIhR, may 10, 1990.
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9.23 Deregulation of interest rates on government securities and (SB3
should be advanced to 1993. Issuance of KSB. or T-bills at market rates
will create a bencbmark for interest rates that can be used to price other
financial instruments. Auctioning these securities will be an efficient
way to achieve this. This will foster further development of money and
capital markets and facilitate the transition from direct momentary
control to indirect monetary control procedures. The BOK would then be in
a position to conduct open marset operations.
9.24 It is recomended that foreign investors should be allowed to
invest in NSBs and T-bills once the interest rates on these instruments
are deregulated. Foreign investors are generally interested in investing
mostly in risk free and liquid financial instruments (i.e., government
securities) in emerging markets. Foreign participation in the government
securities market would impart breadth and depth to the bond market and
encourage increasing domestic participation. This should also facilitate
issuance of corporate bonds for foreign investors at a later stage. It is
appreciated that the GOK has recently further liberalized foreign
portfolio investment in the equity market-and the specific timing of the
opening of the bond market may be influenced by the magnitude of capital
inflows from the opening of the stock market. The full liberalization of
the capital account is left for the final phase when the banking system is
fully competitive and efficient as a result of accelerated deregulation of
the domestic financial system.
Concluding Remws
9.25 Korea has achieved an economic miracle in a very short period of
time, and it is now the tenth largest economy in the world. In the past,
the COK has used the financial sector as an instrument of industrial
policy, and the main vehicles have been policy loans for the priority
sectors and interest rate controls. However, the financial system,
especially the domestic banking system, has substantially lagged behind
the real sector in Korea and the financial systems in other ASEAN and OECD
countries. There is a. need to make the system more officient and more
market oriented. An accelerated financial deregulation is very timely and
should be beneficial to Korea. The main thrust of suggested reform
focuses on the deregulation of the domestic financial market and its
institutions, with the objective of improving their efficiency so that
they can effectively compete both at home and abroad. All the required
ingredients for a successful reform appear to be in place, and what is
needed is a strong commitment to reform and the will to carry out the
reforms decisively. The risks involved in such reforms are relatively
modest and manageable given the prevailing macroeconomic onditions in
Korea and the very high level of administrative skill in the Government.
- 128 -
ANEKE
TicAkkk Kames- Outstadlug Polic Lims by Soein,. 1976-9














-Paatle C.edt 150 100 10 10 10 100 10 10 10 10 10 10 100 100 100 5m - m * urn m m~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i i m i
Now Dommed waft a_ b _d. sof USud 
_ W *i" .I_hVm Noun an h bEr dFW
D_mC.* 1 4 1t fm 1 167I 1221617 1 SW l m s O m 461179g1* e jiMG l M 4 1 NM " 9I MM100 1 10 12216114991 L59 15347 10MM 17 5 2541 22 _MXD&kf a 1 # 161 2 86 SW7 1141231 SQS 1401 515915364 f J 22 2M M t ' 141d 1 low 
_4 NM 261 SM SW 4m i me am9 "n Om NM15 mm 7" | 0
was totL. 
_sot.exatal tises luolaiss asts oa US e I. to omlu omna 
_ , the total ast. of the t alIbtutms adedto dome""o 4:ocIt.
Ib : 1aus LbtLsa Otao 1wr 4 IM.
TWAML ba Kamu - Shave of polic Ians, 1976-1991
Santa"" 17.0 15.4 15. 15.2 .S 15.4 13.4 13. 11.1 11.6 16. 7.2 3.4 6.2 3.7 3.6
*uff hat.5. 5.5 4.1 3.9 3.6 3.2 3.0 4.1 4.8 4.1 4.0 5.4 3.0 2.3 2.2 6.6
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PVotheg d 16.5 12.7 32.3 71.3 52.5 6.7 78.3 7.6 63.6 16.2 14.5 15.5 17.5 19.5 16.5 12.7
Total 73es.6 78.0 75.6 73.0 71.0 69.4 65.1 65.0 64.3 42.9 4.0 75.0 63.3 6.3 55.5 62.6
Other ?%*I. VSiaamw 26.4 27.0 24.4 27.6 29.6 80.6 84.9 35.0 3S.7 37.1 32.2 22.0 UA.7 14.7 14.5 17.4
Total UoUo Loams 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 160 10 100 100
baa: Ot,h. ftetoem"als inen..O Zqwgsenta finance to UD8 ad suMs but nate out the ozndit that appear In the fzatez.ntial Financ, data.
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Table B.1: Korea - Estlmation of Subsidy P1nlded by Polfcy Leans, 1980-91
_asm i' -06~iko .A . . ,,.,- : .. _-g 
Polucy L.oans -oicy Rtwi
(A) QC Bt..| ..
1981 14.498 17.42 15.0 2.41 348 45.528 0.81 8,045 4.31
1982 17,030 19.32 12.5S 6.82 1, 1S8 52,182 2.21 10,115 11.41
1983 20,177 14.42 10.O 4.41 see 61.722 1.41 10,682 8.3S
1984 22.805 13.61 10.02 3.62 821 70,084 1.21 11,875 6.92
1985 26,603 13.42 10.01 3.41 905 78,088 1.21 13,336 6.81
1986 29.637 13.31 10.0 3.31 978 90,599 1.12 14,948 6.52
1987 33,393 12.9Z 1o.o: 2.92 968 106,024 0.9X 16.944 5.71
1988 35.719 12.81 10.0 2.81 1.000 126,231 0.82 19.454 5.11
11589 *3,019 15.72 10.02 5.71 2,452 141.794 1.71 23.776 10.31
1990 52,457 13.32 10.02 3.3S 1,731 171,488 1.02 29.004 6.01
1991 59.983 13.41 10.01 3.43 2,039 206,027 l.02 32,694 6.2t
Source: Bank of Korea, Monthly Bulletin; IMF, International Monetary Statistics, 1991.
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Table Ctt me P_ hm aqra SvX ecrte O,,,, fia o 1s80 n
198 _ 3 171.1 465 963.7 518 1,134-.8
19%1 83 306.0 458 1,036.1 541 1,342.2
1982 69 276.9 744 2,112.2 813 2,389.0
1983 105 462.6 649 1,426.5 754 1,889.1
1984 121 479.1 X 872 1,804.1 993 2,283.1
1985 71 294.6 1,096 3,176.7 1,167 3,471 .3
1986 126 840.8 900 2,728.9 1,026 3,569.6
1987 222 1,898.7 1.019 _3,189.6 1,241 5,088.3
1988 410 7,770.1 1,063 4,244.3 1,473 12,014.4
1989 409 14,669.2 1,217 6,959.0 1,626 21,628.2
1 990 205 2,917.8 1,776 11,083.6 1,981 14,001.4
1991 158 2,687.1 2,797 12,740.7 2,955 15,427.7
Source: Korea Securities Supervisory Board.
Tabk C.2: Offings of C(pomte Bonds by Type, 198"51
(Millions .Won)
Fk =1_1%
lgaJ 2,a88,015 17V,t48 2. Z905,763 T221,tll1 2.850 
- 224,561 T48.420 3,VG,744
1986 2,411.929 
-
_ 2,411,929 297,780 
-
- 7297,X80 119,162 2.728,871 l
1987 2,684,7171 94,400 
- 2,779,117 266, 000 124,000 
- 390,000 20, S00 3,189,617
1988 3,823,820 318,200 49,000 4,191,020 11,300 19,000 
- 30,300 23,000 4,244.320
1989 5,116,135 1,041,400 
- 6,157.535 492,000 137,000 162,000 791,000 10,500 6.959,035
1990 8,584,096 613,600 
_ 9,197,696 1,791,859 78,500 
- 1.870,359 15,500 11,083,555
1991 10,811,257 187,000 
_ 10,998,257 1,742,422 
-
_ 1,742.422 1 2,740,679
oburg: Norea Securitles Supervisory Board.
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Igbl C3s Offerings of Corporat Bobds by Comnpany Size, 1985.91
(Nllions of Won)
* 1h1t^$;2813- Small- £ Hmdli"-5$aed 8u ?aa*$Stl
nsti . *b.&Ut atd RM1erUd. #ib-lots&
B E:amp- - 1 ______ _ l__ _ '
1965 1,786,874 826,364 2,715,238 42,001 419,505 461,506 3,178,744
1966 1,364,482 821,090 2,185,572 59,400 4|9,899 343,299 2.728,871
1987 1,546,420 1,181,560 2.728,000 43,790 417,827 461,617 3,189,617
1988 2,331,100 1,342,930 3,674.030 81,300 488,990 570,290 4,244,320
1969 4,539,200 1,179,090 5,718,290 371,000 869,745 1,240,745 6,959,035
1990 6,385,699 1,957,657 8,343.356 982,300 1,757,899 2,740,199 11.083,555
1991 7,016.792 2,134,694 9,151,486 503,220 3,085,973 3,589,193 12,740,679
iDS*: Komu" seouzltlus Ipervisor7 Board.
Tabe C4: OTC Trading of Korean Bonds, 198-90
(BMillon Of Won)
.13 SW")a~S6* Croat od 
*E : ................... I... ... 1
1988 Securities Companies 2,600.1 1,966.1 235.9 235.9 3,100.7 2 443.8 11,700.4 6,298.3 2,875.9 1,825.5 20,512.9 12,769.6Short-term financing 198.3 145.1 - - 217.2 204.9 6,467.6 4,972.6 - 6,883.1 5,322.7
Total 2,798.3 2,111.2 23S.9 235.9 3,317.9 2,648.7 11,270.9 11,270.9 2,875.9 1,825.5 27,396.1 18,092.3
1989 Securities CompanLes 2,324,1 1,105.3 226.9 286.1 1,366.4 890.7 14,675.4 8,218.3 4,126.4 2,157.0 22,719.3 12,'57.SShort-term financing 433.4 386.2 - -
_ 
_ 12,028.1 10,006.6 5 - 12,462.0 10,.92.9Total 2,757.5 1,491.5 226.9 286.1 1,366.4 890.7 26,703.S 18,224.9 4,126.9 2,157.0 35,181.3 23,050.4
1990 Securities Companies 3,769.1 1,254.2 A92.4 382.1 854.4 401.9 11,969.5 6,087.6 6,511.1 3,423.9 23,596.5 11,549.6Short-term financing 402.6 355.4 - _ _ _ 12,013.8 10,248.6 289.0 291.6 12,705.3 10,895.7Total 4,171.7 1,609.6 492.4 382.1 854.4 401.9 23,983.3 16,336.2 6,800.1 3,715.5 36,301.8 22 445.3
SouRce: XSDA, Securities, Decmber 1990
F
U'
MOWe .S O"mses Convertibl Bonds and Bonds with Warmats
lXba2 W"~~~~~3W
Date of Dec. 19, NW 23. July 15, Aug. 11, Oct. 4. Jan. 3, Feb. 14, Dec.31, July 11, Sep 14. .lo S. Feb. 23.Issue 1985 1986 1986 1987 1988 1990 1990 2004 1990 1990 1989 V99
Date oS Dec. 31, Dec. 31. Dec. 31, Dec. 31. Dec. 31, Dee. 31. Dec. 31. Dec. 31, Dec. 31, Dec. 31. oW. 8, Feb. 23,maturity 2000 2001 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2005 1994 1995
22 months 18 mnths 18 muthsDate of after after Same Sa e so" Same S8t m Same Sama after 8aeCowersion Issued issued icauod
Coareion 30-1002 502 552 1155 65S 1051 701 152 50S 451 852 1102Prmdum




-, .Interest 52 31 32 1.752 1.755 1.252 1.25S 12 1.752 1.52 1.252 11Rate
C8aB, Hergu Merrill CSF_.Lead S.G. Goldr, Merrill Citicorp, Mchin, SC, PZN. Stanley. Niakk. Lyucb. Daiwa,Manager Wazburs Nomura 8acbs Lynch Dwoo Coryo Dogub Deliw Deisbin Sasyon Dongsuh yundei
39a: AlU issues Uited on Luxembourg Stock Erchenge.
Seurge: Korea Stock Exchange, 1991.
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Table C:PriM Bond Mariket Ativities in Selected Asian EAonomies, 1987.91
(BiMons of US$, Equm ient)
*1 >967 > 1998 1 989 1 990 199i 
Govoewsn3t Ebods nne anne noao noae 0.08
Coporate Bond. 0.27 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.09
Total 0.27 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.17
Gov.ruu"nt Boads 16.25 29.88 5t.34 37.78 32.71
lmicipall 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.30 4.38
Finanelal Debentures 1.65 2.60 2.86 5.95 10.09
Corporat Beads 4.03 6.20 10.24 15.49 16.79
Total 22.04 35.65 49.69 59.52 63.97
Goveenuat Securities 3.43 2.74 1.84 1.91 1.29
Corp-ate, Debt 0.07 0.47 0.60 0.64 0.77
Casm As Bods 0.56 0.44 0.46 0.15 -
Total 4.06 3.65 2.90 1.70 2.06
Govenuzmet Securities 15.16 1.87 2.30 1.06 n.e
Corporate Debt 1.36 0.95 1.19 0.94 n.-
Iotal 16.S4 2.82 3.49 2.00 n.e
GovrZaunt Bonds 1.936 2.643 2.067 0.454 0.081
Central 1.165 2.290 1.682 - 0.069
Provincial 0.175 0.248 - 0.442 0.010
alcipelpl 0.150 0.105 0.385 O.012 0.003
Corporate Bands 0.414 0.337 0.126 0.601 0.008
GcoonxDt Enterprise 0.333 0.213 0.076 0.483 0.006
Ptivat Enterprises 0.081 0.124 0.050 0.119 0.002
Fi4nanial Debontures D.e a.a a.a n.e 0.006
T0tal 2.350 2.980 2.193 1.055 0.089
Govrnmont Bonds 1.165 0.812 0.629 0.267 n.e,
State Enterprise Bands 0.068 0.087 0.243 0.264 n.a
Corprate Boand 0.100 0.020 0.033 0.216 U.a
Setal. 1.333 0.919 0.905 0.747 n.a
Source OI2M, Vixed-Income Secuites Matiets of Six Dynamic Asin Eonamies, by S. Gho Rho.
Mme Secuntis Jouwna (December 1991) Stock Exchange of Hong Koog LAd.
Mont statistical Bulletin (Apri 1992). Bank of Korea.
Sumary SMaiksa of Securties Mafkot (January 1991) Secusitic E&xcange COmmision (wnittn in Korea).
Annual Repos 1991, 1990, 1989, Bank Na Mlaysia
nvestom Dis (Jnuy 1992) Kual Lumpur Stock Excang
Annua Report 1990/1991, 1989/1990, 1988/189, onearuy Aufhriy of Singpore
Vaious ues of Fiunaid Statistd Monthy (Apfi 19fl Deoeber 1991, and Noember 1991 Centnd
Bank of Chins
Annual Repos 1990 and 1989, Bank of TUiland.
Thaibad Financial Sector Study 'M;&y 1990), The Wodd Bank.
DAEs Written Responses to OM) OOacstionnaire
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Tal C: Secondwy Markets In Selected Asa D)eveloping Economies
(As of December 1991)
_________ ____,
W~- -- - -n
A. ksket MSm (WS bbliM) 122.80 176.93 86.13 a 140.94 41.04
Debt eaurSties Cutstanding 1.07 80.82 26.90 u.s 17.29 5.76
Ouwerrinent bond 0.08 42.39 24.01 5.94 13.50 5.65
Corporate baud. 0.99 38.43 2.89 3.79 0.13
Equity gasket CapitaUsation 121.73 96.11 59.23 58.59 123.65 35.26
Pr Cmat of GNP (t) 150.60 65.34 189.34 n.a 75.24 51.13
B. eadlse V*olu t(SS biilmi) 
Debt SecurIties 0.34 2.76 3.79 | n. 145.44 0.0082
GOV_rgM11t bonds 0.31 1.83 2.83 1n.41 145.36 0.0030
Corporate bonds 0.03a 0.93 0. 35 1.59 0.08 0.0052
cOnuD Eqity 42.84 82.24 11.03 17.14 376.03 30.30
C. TUz klr RtS ) _ _ _
Debt Seouritteo 23.39 3.41 14.09 _ .e 841.18 0.14
GovrA nt bonds 406.702 4.32 11.78 n.& 1,077.00 0.05
Corporat bonds 3.06 2.41 12.20 n.- 2.11 3.88
COllD Equity 1 35.20 85.57 18.62 29.28 304.11 85.94
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